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POLITICAL LEADER PROFILES AND EFFECTIVE OPERATIONAL DECISION-MAKING

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by

Michael James Alvord

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my lovely wife, Vanessa. Without her patience, understanding, support, and dedication to raising our three handsome boys, the completion of this work would not have been possible.

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POLITICAL LEADER PROFILES AND EFFECTIVE OPERATIONAL DECISION-MAKING

by

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American Public University System, May 26, 2013

Charles Town, West Virginia

Professor Robin Thompson, Thesis Professor

A person's life is comprised of defining experiences. From these experiences the basis for bias, personality and traits are formed which guide the decision-making process. Political leaders routinely make decisions regarding national and international policy, drawing on their prior experiences. With the numerous impacts on decision-making, it is essential to identify reliable factors that influence decisions, which can be analyzed. This paper demonstrates how bias, personality and behavior traits influence effective decision-making. The study utilized psychobiography profiles, the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) and the review of operational case studies to determine if a political leader's profile can provide definable, reliable indicators as to the viability of the operation.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Political leaders throughout time have dictated the course of history. Regardless of governmental system, economic structure or religious beliefs, those in positions of power influence successes and failures of the institutions and operations they control. The conduct of intelligence operations, and military or paramilitary operations the intelligence community supports, has been driven by the political leaders of the time. To this end, a single political leader can have a profound effect (Hermann 1999, 86). Thus, it is critical to understand how political leaders, both in the United States and abroad, make decisions. In *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, Heuer highlights the effects of cognitive bias on the intelligence collection process. According to Heuer, cognitive biases within human decision-making are influenced by environmental and cultural pressures that can lead to flawed judgment (Heuer 1999, 111). The impact of cognitive biases extends beyond the realm of intelligence collection, into the world of politics. Coinciding with the effects of bias are personalities and traits, which also have an impact within the decision-making process.

Multiple literary sources provide information regarding methods for psychobiography and trait analysis that can enable an analyst to build a psychological profile or "psychobiography" of political leaders. Cottam, Dietz-Uhler, Mastors, and Thomas Preston describe in *Introduction to Political Psychology*, that a personality is the base for an individual's psychological profile, and therefore their "political being" (Cottam et al 2009, 13). Yet, according to Hermann, the personality and behaviors of leaders are shaped by experiences, goals and the environment when making political decisions (Hermann 2001, 86). Furthermore, in the 1992 article, *Can Personality and Politics be Studied Systematically* Greenstein asserts that personalities may be affected by the environment. While personalities are not completely altered

by the environment, the personality and tendency for decisions can be altered or influenced by differing environments (Greenstein 1992, 108).

Research Questions

How do political leader profiles that encompass their personal bias, personality and traits influence a political leader's decision-making effectiveness in regards to approving intelligence, military, or paramilitary operations? Can these profiles define a political leader's effectiveness in approving viable versus unviable operations?

Background of the Problem

According to Greenstein, personality is developed through a variety of experiences, social and otherwise (Greenstein 1992, 114). These experiences mold characteristics that become a part of the personality, and are therefore part of the individual's psychological make-up (Greenstein 1992, 116). Identification of personality traits, such as narcissism, can provide evidence of why the leader in question engaged in politics, fulfilling a search for power. Thus, it is important to identify all factors in the sequence of developmental experiences specific to the political leader in question in order to understand how their political psychology developed. Furthermore, it can explain why such individuals are successful, as narcissistic or self-confident leaders are seen as charismatic to followers (Cottam et al 2009, 18). In the article *Explanation and Evaluation in Cognitive Science*, Montgomery details various biases and how bias is a common plague to the cognitive process (Montgomery 1995, 277). Bar-Joseph and McDermott state the leading cause of failure is through biased analysis of the situation (Bar-Joseph and McDermott 2008, 127-128). The authors further assert that analysts possess personality traits that are prone to biased analysis.

Despite the sum of the foregoing literature, a predominance of the literature surrounding political leaders throughout history focuses on his or her actions, with few objectively analyzing their psychological profile. In order to address the issue of how political leaders influence operations, this paper has pooled information regarding the actions and backgrounds of multiple political leaders and compiled the information gathered to form a full-spectrum psychobiography. Of the literary sources currently available that do describe the life and profile of political leaders, many do not adequately tie how the leader's profile may have influenced operations or have gaps in information about background and events of the time.

Purpose Statement

Similar experiences compiled throughout a person's life increase the likelihood that the person will base decisions made during future situations on those prior experiences. Their personality, or psychological profile, is developed by the collection of all these experiences (Lindenfeld 1999, 295-296). With the numerous impacts on decision-making, it is essential to identify reliable factors that influence decisions, which can be analyzed. This paper attempts to demonstrate how bias, personality and behavior traits influence effective decision-making through the use of a psychobiography of historical political leaders and the review of operational case studies. Additionally, the environment surrounding each political leader and the sequence of events leading to selected intelligence, military and paramilitary operations have been analyzed. Finally, utilizing the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP), the data on the individual leader's personality, the environment and decisions made surrounding the operations reviewed have been compared to determine if the leader's profile provided definable, reliable indicators as to the viability of the operation.

CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The primary focus of the mixed method approach within this study draws on qualitative research to establish the definitions for bias, personality and traits as well as provide literature for the construction of a political leader psychobiography. Therefore, the purpose of this literature review was to provide a basis for analysis and justify the need for the study (Creswell 2009). The major literary works collected for this review have been gathered through the following databases, or sources referenced in the following databases: ProQuest, EBSCOhost, and JSTOR.

Personal motives create a person's psychological profile. The collective of similar experiences increase the likelihood that the person will reference those experiences in future situations as a part of their psychological profile, also known as their personality (Lindenfeld 1999, 295-296). By the nature of the dramatic effect a single leader can have on a political unit or environment, and as noted by Hermann in the article *Who leads matters: The effects of powerful individuals*, understanding how their personality effects decision making is extremely important (Hermann 2001, 119). Through a robust understanding of the decision-making process for political leaders, a better understanding of how the leader will react in a given scenario can be achieved. Such an understanding is reliant on dissecting the major components of and hindrance to decision-making; primarily bias, personality and behavior. In order to analyze the impact of bias, personality and behavior within the decision-making of political leaders it is first necessary to establish a definition for each.

Bias

Before acceptable definitions for bias, personality and behavior can be built, a review of multiple peer-reviewed sources established where these definitions originate. A leading study of how bias has disrupted intelligence analysis was conducted by Heuer in *Psychology of*

Intelligence Analysis. Heuer conducts an empirical analysis through a combined study of available literature and use of multiple experiments to describe bias as seen in the human mind's ability to interpret, store and recall information. Though the study does not directly discuss bias within political leaders, it details information regarding bias that can be cross-pollinated from intelligence analysis to politics. According to Heuer, cognitive biases are grounded in an analyst's organizational culture or his or her own personality. "Cognitive biases are mental errors caused by our simplified information processing strategies. It is important to distinguish cognitive biases from other forms of bias, such as cultural bias, organizational bias, or bias that results from one's own self-interest" (Heuer 1999, 111).

Heuer further asserts that the human mind is not equipped to cope effectively with both inherent and induced uncertainty. Heuer states, "The process of perception links people to their environment and is critical to accurate understanding of the world about us, [and] research into human perception demonstrates that the process is beset by many pitfalls," (Heuer 1999, 7). Personality forms our perception of the world in very distinct ways; we perceive what we expect to perceive, mind-sets form quickly but are resistant to change, new information is assimilated into pre-existing images, and ambiguous information inhibits accurate perception even after better information becomes available (Heuer 1999, 7-17). These mind-sets are the lenses through which people perceive information, caused by a variety of factors leading an individual to misinterpret information. Collection of information over an extended period of time allows for the analysts to assimilate the information into pre-existing mind-sets. Additionally, in positions of power, particularly political offices, the individual is frequently pressed to develop instantaneous assertions of developing or recent circumstances. Such drive for limited critical thought instigates poor judgment based on preconceived notions regarding the information at

hand relative to their current understanding of the situation and society (Heuer 1999, 15). These poorly formed perceptions greatly impact the individual's ability to accurately interpret future information and limits development of a grounded analysis of the entire situation. Heuer concludes that tools and techniques that apply higher levels of critical thinking can substantially improve analysis of complex problems (Heuer 1999, 173-184). By applying the academic description of bias to the analysis of the decision-making process of political leaders, an improved understanding can be achieved. Yet, further understanding of the impacts bias can have when incorporated within decision-making can greatly enhance analysis applied to determining potential outcomes from biased decisions.

To expand upon the concepts put forth in Heuer's work, examination of Montgomery's article *Explanation and Evaluation in Cognitive Science* is needed. The article authored by Montgomery applies a first person perspective study to catalog the effects of bias. Within the article, Montgomery details various biases and the effects of those biases, to the cognitive process. One of the biases Montgomery outlines is the false consensus effect, as defined by Ross, Green and House in 1977, is "the tendency to overestimate the frequency with which other people share one's own beliefs, values, and behavioral tendencies" (Montgomery 1995, 277). This form of bias can be attributed to the fact that people frequently interact with people like themselves and people are easily able to imagine behavior from their point of view rather than from a differing view. Although the approach of the article is presented with less academic rigor than others addressed in this study, the information presented is supported by several academic sources within the article and is congruent with other sources reviewed in this study.

To achieve a fuller understanding of bias, *Introduction to Political Psychology* by Cottam, Masters, Uhler and Preston cover multiple concepts of human perception, cognition and

bias. Cottam and colleagues detail how the human condition is plagued by cognition flaws and bias including Attribution. Attribution is the attempt to "predict" a future outcome or result utilizing readily recalled prior experiences and general perception of the current situation (Cottam et al 2009, 80-82). Attribution tends to flaw perception of a situation more when the situation involves close-knit relationships. People allow emotion to cloud our understanding of events, resulting in hasty decisions based on feelings and prior experience rather than the reality of the situation. Additionally, identification of personality traits can provide evidence of why the leader in question engaged in politics, such as narcissism leading to a search for power. Thus, it is important to identify all factors in the sequence of developmental experiences specific to the political leader in question in order to understand how their political psychology developed. Also, it can explain why such individuals are successful, as self-confident leaders are seen as charismatic to their followers (Cottam et al 2009, 18). Cottam et al further detail how social identity is a significant part of any society. People condition their perception to be based on identity and standing within society. Accordingly, people place themselves in a group they can associate with and view in a positive light, creating a sense of superiority (Cottam et al 2009, 96-99). Through this lens, a preconceived notion of right or wrong, good or bad is developed about others who are of a differing social group.

Personality and traits

Moving from bias into the aspect of personality, the 1992 article *Can Personality and Politics be Studied Systematically* by Greenstein asserts personality is not the only influence in politics and should not be studied solely, but concludes that other factors are also influential on political outcomes. Greenstein's study utilizes a methical approach to researching peer-reviewed literature of the human psyche and the impact of experiences on personality and

decision-making. Through the use of an in-depth and objective approach, Greenstein provides the definitions and concepts presented with much credibility. Of the factors discussed within this source, the environment, predispositions and characteristics of the political atmosphere also have an effect on the decisions made (Greenstein 1992, 108). According to Greenstein, personality is developed through a variety of experiences, social and otherwise. These experiences mold characteristics that become a part of the personality, and are therefore part of the individual's psychological make-up (Greenstein 1992, 114-116). Additionally, Greenstein states personalities may be molded by an environment, but are not completely altered; and therefore, can exist within a multitude of environments. However, the personality and tendency for decisions has differing possibilities in different environments. Thus, all elements must be considered.

Essential analysis of personality and traits is supplied by Hermann, Preston, Korany and Shaw in the 2001 book *Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals*. In the book, the authors catalogue a myriad of character traits possessed by political leaders. Hermann et al conduct an extensive comparative study of the available research and data regarding common traits exhibited by political leaders as well as problems, relationships, motivations, and overall impact of the traits displayed. Each trait is described in a thorough scientific narrative and examined within comparative tables listing potential causal factors and results. Through the extensive, systematic detailing of important traits of leaders, Hermann and colleagues establish a solid foundation of reliable information from which to assess traits exhibited by political leaders.

Hermann et al discuss a few of the traits displayed by individuals in positions of authority, like political leaders. These traits include self-confidence, distrust and suspicion of others, belief one can influence and control what happens, and need for power and influence. In relation to the first trait in a leader, Hermann states, "self-confidence helps us determine how

open they will be to information" (Hermann et al 2001, 10). Self-confidence is reflective of an internal assessment of self-worth. From that self-assessment, a leader develops environment responses. Individuals with high self-confidence do not allow themselves to be "victims of events" and handle the situation on their own terms (Hermann et al 2001, 20-21). The second trait discussed is an individual's general distrust or suspiciousness of others. Holding to a steadfast doubt, leaders with this trait continuously worry about the motives of others, notably those nearest them. Such a leader is, "driven by the threats or problems he or she perceives in the world" (Hermann et al 2001, 28). As a result, they are wary of people around them gaining power, and frequently shuffle around those close to them. In regards to outside their immediate surroundings, this type of leader is likely to see threats throughout the world, and easily initiates confrontations (Hermann et al 2001, 27).

Next, Hermann and colleagues describe the belief that one can influence or control what happens, and hence the need for power and influence. According to the authors, individuals who display these traits have an unwavering belief that a single person or a single person in charge of a government can influence everything that happens, regardless of other actors at play within the world (Hermann et al 2001, 13-14). Therefore, a political leader may feel an overwhelming need to control all aspects of their environment and society, driving them to be involved in everything within their purview. From that need develops the mentality that the implementation of policies is essential to achieving their goals. The authors elaborate that, "such leaders are likely to call subordinates to check on what they are doing, to make surprise visits to places where policy is being implemented, and to be interested in meeting with other leaders face-to-face to see how far they are willing to go," (Hermann et al 2001, 15). Overall, the use of an extensive, methodical

analysis of traits and dedication to removing bias from the research makes the credibility of this source high.

Psychobiography

Having established a collection of reputable resources defining bias, personality and traits, it is essential to construct an overview of the literature regarding development of a psychobiography. Cottam and colleagues *Introduction to Political Psychology* discusses how personality is the base or "root" of one's psychological profile, and therefore being their "political being" (Cottam et al 2009, 13). According to Cottam et al, a psychobiography examines the familial environment and defining events in the life of an individual, creating an outline of how the personality and traits of the individual developed (Cottam et al 2009, 17). Cottam et al credit Sigmund Freud with founding the first approach for studying and understanding personality. Freud's psychoanalytical approach is a method of understanding the unconscious mind and its role in developing one's personality. Freud theorized that the unconscious mind forms the largest part of where our personality lies. Our traits and operational decision making are rooted in the unconscious mind, thus we behave according to an unconscious set of rules rather than conscious thought. Those rules are defined by the id, ego and superego (Cottam et al 2009, 16). The id is the "lizard brain" in a sense, as it drives base instinct response to situations, predominantly focused on survival and pleasure. The ego filters the id through "reality" based on socially learned responses. Finally the superego applies morality.

Together, the three create, in the unconscious mind, behavioral trait based decisions and actions defining one's personality and political being. The psychoanalytical approach has been criticized as difficult to test and lacking in empirical evidence, however it does form a framework from which the political being can be understood. Psychoanalysis is relatively easy to

understand and employ. It enables the observer to develop an actionable understanding of one's behavior traits and provide reasoning for internal influences in one's life, such as dreams and impulses. As previously noted Cottam and colleagues perform methodical research and present their approach on the psychobiography with little bias. The psychobiography method is ideal for the purposes of this study as it allows for analysis of full spectrum information regarding the political leaders addressed in this study, generating a more well-rounded profile. Furthermore, as this study does not extend beyond the sources currently available within academic databases and electronic libraries, conducting a psychobiography has removed the need to seek information on political leaders or those around them that has not already been recorded.

Political leaders

In order to understand the selected political leaders and their importance to the study, it is essential to provide an overview of the world in which they lived. Yet, identifying the history of one's social background is only part of what determines one's personality (Matthews et al 2004, 210). Following this concept, to build the psychobiography of each leader it is essential to catalogue through trusted sources the personal, social, and political events that molded their development and defined their leadership. The information contained within the prominent literature supplied data regarding each leader's background and enabled a comprehensive examination within the analysis section of the causal factors that molded their personality, and ultimately their behavior as a political leader.

Adolph Hitler

Much of the literature surrounding Hitler focuses on his actions as the Fuhrer, leading the Nazi party and Germany during the Second World War. Of the sources that describe his early life, many have gaps in information about his familial background and events during his time in

Vienna. Many sources do not provide detailed accounts or reference how his experiences impacted his later life. Few authors have analyzed the psychological impact of Hitler's early development on his actions in later life. A previous literary staple in the library of Hitler psychological comparisons was Weiß's *Der Augenzeuge*. However, Ächtler's *Hitler's Hysteria: War Neurosis and Mass Psychology* provided refining analysis and clarity about Hitler's life and psychology not captured by Weiß. Using a psychoanalytical approach, Ächtler, clarifies some of Hitler's war and postwar period experiences and behaviors, by comparing Weiß's literature with information from competing contemporary resources. Drawing on the information compiled from these resources, the systematic psychoanalysis presented by Ächtler provides greater explanation of how Hitler transformed from an abandoned youth to soldier to fanatic Nazi leader. Though playing off of Weiß's work, Ächtler presents a vital analytical perspective on Adolf's early development into later life.

Victor's book *Hitler: The Pathology of Evil* analyzes Hitler's obsessive hatred, through study of records and conversations of those closest to him. Victor uses these sources to chronicle the life events that turned Hitler from a child born to a little known Austrian family, into one of the most infamous leaders in history (Victor 1998, 1-15). Though much of the basic information presented by Victor is not new, it references many documents stemming from Hitler himself, and many of those around him. As the information gathered by Victor stems largely from first or near first person perspective, the credibility of the information is high. Though there is always the potential for misrepresentation or extreme bias, obtaining data directly from the source is less likely to be corrupted and altered through repeated regurgitation. Additionally, Victor systematically applies analytical analysis of Hitler's early life experiences, behaviors, and

thoughts via his writings in *Mein Kampf*. Overall, Victor's analysis of Hitler's psychology is an extremely reliable, well formatted literary source.

Providing critical insight from Adolf's life, *Hitler, the man—notes for a case history* by Vernon supplies substantial supporting data regarding Hitler's life, behaviors and actions. Written as a case study, Vernon chronicles his childhood, details overt traits displayed, and provides basic analysis of the origins for Hitler's behaviors. The work does not fully encompass a thorough methodical approach to analysis, therefore has potential for bias. Yet, it gains credibility by its proximity to Hitler's life and references multiple reputable sources of the time. Therefore, Vernon's work has been used to support data gathered from other sources, and fill chronological gaps in the information gleamed from other sources. Of note, Vernon documents Hitler as a school child, where he did not find satisfaction in many subjects, with the exception of art. However, his fascination with art did not gain favor with his father. He avoided the only Jewish boy in school, which was not uncommon in strong Catholic communities of the time. In fact, such behavior was generally accepted in neighborhoods like the one where he grew up. Mild anti-Semitism in the form of social interaction, or lack of, was part and parcel of the routine social environment (Vernon 1942, 307).

Joseph Stalin

Opposing Hitler in the battle for the Eastern front during the Second World War stood Joseph Stalin. Though not the founder of the communist movement within Russia, in many respects he is viewed as the father of all things Soviet. As with Hitler, to understand the leader that was Stalin, a review of his early life and major events in his life establish a base for building a psychobiography. Unlike Hitler, or many other political leaders, an article composed by Suny provides a basic psychoanalysis of Stalin. The impact of Suny's article *Beyond Psychohistory:*

The Young Stalin in Georgia is curtailed by its short length and limited review. Yet, thoroughly summarizing and analyzing other reputable sources covering Stalin's life, Suny's study of the young Stalin provides critical insight. As Stalin did not leave behind much in the form of introspective works, such as letters or journals, Suny's overview of his life is even more critical to understanding the man who was Stalin (Suny 1991, 48). Suny notes that the Bolshevik political culture in which Stalin was raised presented a hostile environment of enforced modesty. For this reason, he did not leave behind personal much correspondence (Suny 1991, 48). Referencing the work of Ioseb Iremashvili, a boyhood friend of Stalin, who composed the first memoir of Stalin's childhood, Suny summarizes some key events in the early life of Stalin. Highlighting Gustav Bychowski and Daniel Rancour-Laferriere's analysis of Iremashvili's memories, Suny points to childhood beatings dispensed by Stalin's father as a key formative event. According to Suny, the beatings sparked a suppressed hatred extending beyond his father to all persons in power (Suny 1991, 49). The abusive nature of his childhood further created a conflicted self-image within Stalin. He held both an elevated opinion of himself, rising above his father, leading to a narcissistic personality; and he retained a debased opinion of himself, full of loathing, leading to outward expressions of hatred (Suny 1991, 49).

Next Suny details the impact that attending seminary had on a young Stain, stating that his time there fostered a commitment to revolutionary ideals (Suny 1991, 52-55). In fact in an interview with Ludwig, Stalin says, "In protest against the humiliating regime and Jesuit methods which existed in the seminary, I was ready to become and actually became a revolutionary, an adherent of Marxism as a genuinely revolutionary teaching," (Suny 1991, 55). It was during this time that Stalin underwent his transformation from Soso to Koba and finally Stalin, shifting his Georgian background to a personal footnote. 'Russicifcation' complete, the young rebel would

translate his deep hatred into a determined war on perceived injustice which would transport him to assume the highest position of power within Russia, surrounded by a distinctly loyal following (Suny 1991, 57-58).

A more detailed work, cataloguing many of the major events in Stalin's life, Simon Montefiore's *Young Stalin* provides critical data from previously closed archives including a memoir written by Stalin's mother. Montefiore uses a biographical approach, starting with Stalin being born the son of a Georgian cobbler (Montefiore 2009, 1-23). Born Josef Djugashvili, Stalin was raised in a home stricken by poverty, wrought with beatings doled out by his alcoholic father. According to Montefiore, Stalin's mother also contributed to his troubled childhood with transitions from overwhelming affection to harsh punishment, stating that the treatment was of no harm to Stalin. A rough life also surrounded Stalin on the streets of his hometown, where brawls were commonplace (Montefiore 2009, 53-96). When he reached school age, Stalin was sent to study at the Orthodox seminary, becoming a romantic poet at an early stage in life (Montefiore 2009, 108-128). Through his education at the seminary, Stalin was exposed to contemporary literature and political ideology. Montefiore notes that it was during his time at the seminary that Stalin first took up radical politics.

Before Stalin had grown out of his teenage years, the criminal underworld became a main part of his life. According to Montefiore, Stalin came into his own in the criminal life, and it was in fact his preferred environment. Using his view of the seminary's "surveillance, spying, invasion of inner life, violation of feelings," Stalin would create the template for his future actions (Montefiore 2009, 136). Capturing the change from a student to a street gangster and finally a political force, he changed his name to Koba and finally Stalin, or "man of steel" (Montefiore 2009, 420). Rapidly rising in the ranks of bandit radicals, he masterminded a

legendary bank robbery, which aided in making a name for himself (Montefiore 2009, 290-304). Graduating from a revolutionary in Georgia, Stalin's role during the October Revolution is identified by Montefiore as a critical cementing moment in his march up the political ladder. The banditry and political strong-arming of his early life suited Stalin's personality and would define the remainder of his political career (Montefiore 2009, 313-472). The result was a political ideology based on his flawed self-image of perfection, characterized by stealth and ruthless tactics, which carried him to the top of Russian politics. However, as Montefiore recounts, the rise to the top left many friendships and enemies, love affairs and illegitimate children, all of which serve to paint the picture of the man Stalin became.

The next essential literary work that provides an abundance of information on the life, events and political career that define Stalin is *The Secret File of Joseph Stalin: A Hidden Life* by Brackman. In the book, Brackman compiles several sources, including archives of the Russian secret police and personal interviews, to form an understanding of Stalin's character and its connection to events in his life. Coming to power after Lenin, Stalin took control of a country recouping from the effects of the First World War (Brackman 2001, 155-160). Brackman catalogues throughout the narrative of the book the course Stalin followed, and the suspicion that surrounded his rise to power. Of note are accusations of Stalin being a spy for the police during his revolutionary days in Georgia in the late 1890s. According to Brackman, Stalin's long record of escaping police custody following arrest suggests protection was given by the police (Brackman 2001, 13-36). Brackman asserts that the exposure of information confirming his involvement would likely have resulted in Stalin committing suicide or an attempt on his life. Therefore, as a form of self-preservation, Stalin was driven by a deep need to prevent exposure of his true nature, resulting in an open campaign to rewrite history and violent displays of

reckless behavior, including a string of 'purges' in the 1930s (Brackman 2001, 197-203). The restoration of Stalin's support and control within the Soviet Union came at the expense of multitudes of his countrymen, when Nazi Germany invaded during the Second World War. The initial defeats were massive; however, Stalin was able to quickly improve his application of strategic warfare ultimately turning the tide of the war. In the end, most of Eastern Europe fell under his control and the people of the Soviet Union looked to Stalin as their savior, leading the country to be a world power (Brackman 2001, 300-333).

Jimmy Carter

Moving from leaders of the Second World War to figureheads during the Cold War era, the next political leader examined in this study is President Jimmy Carter. Evolving from humble beginnings as a simple Southern man into the well-known leader of the "free-world", Carter represents the American dream realized. Known by many as "The Great Peace Maker", Carter has been involved in various humanitarian movements and initiatives from Korea to Palestine. In his book *Jimmy Carter: A Comprehensive Biography from Plains to Post-presidency*, Bourne starts with Carter's lineage, detailing the hard times and environment in which he was raised, finally covering the life and trials of the peanut farmer turned President. Born James Earl Carter on October 1, 1924 in a small town in southwest Georgia, Carter was raised in a profoundly Christian home. According to Bourne, Carter's opinions of right versus wrong were strong and influenced many of his decisions. Bourne attributes the popularity of Carter with the American people to Carter's internal sense of integrity, honesty, and dedication (Bourne 1997 1-180). Carter's upbringing shaped his perception of the world and he viewed the presidential office as an opportunity for implementing positive change. Following his time with the Navy, Carter used his experiences and sense of morality to launch a political career. Translating his beliefs into

political positions, Carter became a public advocate for class over race and moved to eliminate prejudice as he viewed it (Bourne 1997, 199-242). Bourne suggests that Carter's stubbornness and self-righteous perspective of the world caused him alter perceptions of situations in order to appease all sides. In doing so, Carter earned ridicule and contempt from those who opposed him politically, and even from within his own party. Coming from a humble background, Carter was insecure, and his insecurity was amplified by the misgivings of those who did not agree with his political agenda. Nevertheless, Bourne concludes that Carter was successful through a combined internal compass based on his religious upbringing and the steady, cunning counseling of his wife, Rosalynn Carter (Bourne 1997, 445-550).

Another view into the life of Jimmy Carter is supplied within Morris' *American Moralist*. A full-scale biography of Carter, Morris collects interviews and data from a variety of literary sources to details Carter's rise from his southern beginnings, to his service in the Navy, and into his political career. In contrast to Bourne, Morris' work casts a more negative light on aspects of Carter as a person and some of the events that comprised his life (Morris 1996). Drawing upon data from literary works, polling data, popular culture, music and personal interviews, Morris builds a picture of Carter that not only captures the man, but how the world viewed him. The resulting profile is similar to other sources, as it details a man deeply impacted by a fragmented family and humble beginnings in a small, segregated town. The profile constructed by Morris presents information collected from potentially otherwise untapped sources, such as the interview of a resident of Carter's hometown, leading to a unique perspective of his personal and political self (Morris 1996, 331-340). Morris concludes that the moral outlook possessed by Carter was held so deep within his unconscious mind, that he could not control its effect on his life. Morris suggests that this deep sense of right and wrong drove Carter to be a leader not suited

for the 1970s, focusing on the plight of others in foreign affairs and failing to develop domestic

policy needed throughout his presidency (Morris 1996, 370-425).

Ayatollah Khomeini

The final leader analyzed in this study is Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, better known as

Ayatollah Khomeini. Born on the 22 or 24 September 1902 in Khomeyn, Persia, the life of

Khomeini has long been masked by the lack of vetted information and abundance of

misinformation or politically controlled information. Despite the difficulty associated with

authoring a biography on Khomeini, Moin conducted a detailed study of Khomeini. By gathering

all available information from various sources, Moin compiles an authoritative review of the

actions and views of Khomeini in the book *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah*. Moin documents

that early in life, Khomeini made a pilgrimage to escape British influence, studying at the

Islamic seminary in Arak after the First World War (Moin 1999, 5-20).

Growing into a young revolutionary, focused on making change, Khomeini began

espousing his political and religious beliefs. He composed an anonymous book stating, that the

clergy were not sufficiently engaged in political activities. Additionally, he openly opposed the

shah giving many speeches against the shah's leadership, sparking several riots and protests

(Moin 1999, 70-115). As a result of his outspoken opposition, Khomeini earned a place in exile

in 1964, but did not stop espousing his message ultimately instigating the revolution in 1979

(Moin 1999, 112-203). Moin continues to show that Khomeini shifted his primary focus from a

dedicated following of Islam to a politically motivated theocratic agenda. His commitment to the

principles of Islam was constant, however Khomeini was driven by a determination to achieve

the political cause as he saw it, and nothing could stand in the way. To Khomeini, the Iranian

government was a literal continuation of the Prophet Muhammad and could therefore take any

necessary action to advance the interests of the state, including altering religion (Moin 1999, 275-285). Based on his roots in religious and political teachings, Khomeini determined that true power and knowledge were reserved for only the chosen, and all others presented a danger. This mindset drove him to have little tolerance for dissidents or perceived affronts to the progress of his realization of the merger between politics and religion. Such determination resulted with Khomeini's leading Iran into war with Iraq and the execution of thousands within his country (Moin 1999, 203-252).

Summary

Bias, personality and traits establish the foundation upon which the psychobiography is formed. The works of Heuer, Montgomery and Hermann et al supplied the definitions for each of these foundational building blocks, which are used to develop a complete psychobiography. Cottam and colleagues present a thorough description of how to conduct a psychobiography, including identification of bias and traits in order to gain an advanced understanding of political leaders. To enable in-depth psychobiography analysis of various political leaders, the collection of multiple sources presenting detailed accounts of the leader are needed. Victor and others painted a picture of the first leader analyzed in this study, Adolf Hitler. A man defined by his childhood, Hitler became a dynamic leader of his time and politically opposed to Stalin during the Second World War. As the second leader analyzed, Stalin though opposed to Hitler politically, faced similar defining moments in early life. Moving forward in time to the Cold War, the next two leaders analyzed are opposed in more than just politics, Carter and Khomeini differed in the realm of religion and ideals. Both men were defined by early experiences within devoutly religious communities beset by hard-times. In sum, the literature reviewed in this study contains ample information to enable the identification of the biases, personality and traits

displayed by the four political leaders discussed, but all fall short of definitively identifying how the decision-making of each leader was impacted over the course of their life and in relation to singular events. From the identification of biases, personality and traits displayed by each leader, the full psychobiography analysis in this study bridges this gap.

CHAPTER 3: METHOD

Theoretical Design

Several theories regarding behavior traits and cognitive bias establish a framework upon which this study is built. The concepts of personality and traits extend back in history to the teachings of Aristotle regarding moral and immoral behaviors (Matthews et al 2003, 3). Students of Aristotle continued to describe human behavior, assigning similar characterizations well into the modern era. Sigmund Freud conducted the first notable in-depth scientific review of behavior, cognition and personality, resulting in psychoanalysis. Freud theorized the unconscious mind encompasses the largest portion of where an individual's personality originates. According to Freud, the id, ego and superego are the key building blocks of personality and behavior as these three define how the mind learns, interprets, and reacts to the world (Cottam et al 2009, 16).

Going beyond the broader concept of personality, into aspects of how personality and behavior are developed, a systematic study of cognitive bias was conducted by Heuer in *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*. Heuer focused on how bias disrupted intelligence analysis, theorizing cognitive biases are grounded in an analyst's organizational culture or his or her own personality. According to Heuer, "Cognitive biases are mental errors caused by our simplified information processing strategies. It is important to distinguish cognitive biases from other forms of bias, such as cultural bias, organizational bias, or bias that results from one's own self-interest" (Heuer 1999, 111). Heuer further asserts inherent and induced uncertainty extends beyond the effective coping mechanisms within the human mind, forcing the mind to adapt and inhibiting accurate perception even after better information becomes available (Heuer 1999, 7-17).

Building upon Heuer, Cottam et al covers multiple concepts of human perception, cognition and bias in *Introduction to Political Psychology*. Cottam, Masters and Uhler detail how the human condition is plagued by cognition flaws and bias. Cottam and colleagues assert that individuals allow emotion to cloud our understanding of events, resulting in hasty decisions based on feelings and prior experience rather than the reality of the situation. They further theorize perception is based on identity and standing within society, and preconceived notions of right or wrong, good or bad are developed based on social grouping (Cottam et al 2009). Connecting the theories on personality and traits with Freud's psychoanalysis, Cottam and colleagues propose use of the psychobiography. A psychobiography examines the familial environment and defining events in an individual's life, creating an outline of how the personality traits of the individual develop and impact their decision-making (Cottam et al 2009, 17).

Research Design

This study has employed a mixed method research approach to establish a framework through which to analyze political leaders and review several intelligence, military, and paramilitary operations (Creswell 2009). The scope of the study is limited by time, monetary resources and availability of information for review. Thus, the primary sources of the information used are academic databases and electronic libraries. Sources capturing the life events of the political leaders to be analyzed have been gathered from these academic databases and electronic libraries include books, journals, articles, and documented interviews. Further examination on this topic requires additional resources not currently available in order to mitigate the limitations of this study in order to acquire personal interviews if required, and access rare or restricted documents (Creswell 2009).

In order to establish a foundation for the study, a qualitative method review of the influence of a leader's profile on operational decision-making has been conducted beginning by defining behavioral traits and cognitive bias (Creswell 2009). Moore's *Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis*, Cottam and colleagues *Introduction to Political Psychology* and Heuer's in *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* has provided the basis for defining traits, bias and their impact on decision-making.

Following examination of traits and bias, literature containing details pertaining to the personal history of several political leaders is dissected. An in-depth review of the information provided by these sources has supplied the data necessary to build a psychobiography for each leader, as defined by Cottam and colleagues. Conducting a psychobiography has enabled objective collection of information regarding the political leader from vetted peer-reviewed sources (Cottam et al 2009). Details regarding a leader's personality and behavior are necessary to produce a well-rounded psychobiography, as behavioral trait based decisions and actions enable the observer to develop an actionable understanding of how a political leader will reason their way through a situation, driven by internal influences.

As a means for determining the impact on effective decision-making, this study has utilized the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) to generate and evaluate future scenarios based on operational case studies for each political leader. LAMP, as defined by its creators, is a twelve-step process that involves an in-depth study of the issue at hand, the actors and their perceptions (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993). The process then compares that information to create a prediction of the most likely future for a given set of scenarios. A critical component of the LAMP model is that it accounts for "actor perceptions", which encompasses the human factors, such as bias and traits being considered in this study (Lockwood and

Lockwood 1993). Therefore, the LAMP model has been chosen over other common methods, such as the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), due to the ability of LAMP to accurately predict the most likely future. The twelve steps of the LAMP method are:

1. Determine the issue for which you are trying to predict the most likely future.

The issues discussed within the study are identified in the Introduction and Research Question sections. The specific issues addressed are: How do political leader profiles that encompass their personal bias, personality and traits influence a political leader's decision-making effectiveness in regards to approving intelligence, military, or paramilitary operations? Can these profiles define a political leader's effectiveness in approving viable versus unviable operations?

2. Specify the "actors" involved.

The actors reviewed by the study are listed in the Literature Review section, under Political Leaders. There are four actors reviewed in the study: Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Jimmy Carter and Ayatollah Khomeini.

3. Perform an in-depth study of how each actor perceives the issue in question.

Under the Analysis section, historical and biographical data pertaining to each of the four actors has been identified. Additionally, the psychobiography analysis of each actor is formulated by capturing bias, personality and traits displayed by the actor. The psychobiography of each actor has provided detailed information pertaining to the perceptions of each actor.

4. Specify all possible courses of action for each actor.

The number of potential actions taken by each could theoretically be infinite. Therefore, the most likely courses of action have been defined into general categories for courses of action based on analysis of the actor perceptions (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993). Within the limited

scoped of the study, six general courses of action are available to each political leader for the scenarios reviewed: Viable Direct confrontation in the form of military, paramilitary, or dynamic intelligence operations; Non-viable Direct confrontation in the form of military, paramilitary, or dynamic intelligence operations; Viable Neutral action through political negotiations; Non-viable Neutral action through political negotiations; Viable Avoidance of confrontation by ignoring the issue or acquiescing to demands; and Non-viable Avoidance of confrontation by ignoring the issue or acquiescing to demands.

5. Determine the major scenarios within which you will compare the alternate futures.

Two scenarios have combined the assessment of two leaders per scenario. The scenarios first combine the assessment of Hitler and Stalin, then Carter and Khomeini. The scenarios reviewed are: Russia expands westward into Germany's supply lines; The US ignores or rebukes Iranian revolutionary political objectives as Iran seeks to establish a new government.

6. Calculate the number of permutations of possible "alternate futures" per scenario.

To determine the basic number of possible futures for each scenario, the LAMP equation $X^Y = Z$ has been employed (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993). In the equation "X" represents the number of available actions of each actor, the two political leaders examined in each scenario represent "Y" and the result is the total number of futures represented by "Z" (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993). Alternate Futures for the first scenario are captured in Table 1 and numbered one through thirty-six. Each future, consisting of a combination of actions taken by Carter and Khomeini in the second scenario have been placed in Table 2, also numbered one through thirty-six.

7. Perform a "pairwise comparison" of all alternate futures, and relative probability.

To determine the total number of pairwise comparisons required the equation $X = (n-1) + (n-2) \ldots + (n-n)$ (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993). In this equation *n* represents the number of alternate futures and *X* represents the number of pairwise comparisons needed. The courses of action that comprise each alternate future are placed on the vertical and horizontal axis. Drawing on each leader's psychobiography, a comparison of each future determines the more likely of the two futures (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993). After comparing the futures the favored future is placed in the table. Upon completion of the pairwise comparison process, the number of times each future appears in the table provides a number of "votes" each future received for that scenario. The results for the pairwise comparison of each scenario are shown in Tables 3 and 4 respectively.

8. Rank the alternate futures from highest to lowest based on the "votes" received.

Following the completion of the pairwise comparison tables, a rank order of the data within the tables identifies the most and least likely futures based on the number of votes received (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993). Tables 5 and 6 depict the most to least likely futures for each of the two scenarios respectively

9. Analyze each alternate future in terms of its consequences for the issue in question.

To limit the scope of the study, the top three likely alternate futures has been analyzed in regards to impact on the respective scenario.

10. Determine "focal events" that must occur to bring about a given alternate future.

A focal event is an intersecting occurrence between the current situation and the alternate future that changes the likelihood a future will take place. Data contained in the Psychobiography and LAMP sections of the study provide context for determining focal events

for each scenarios. The analysis of historical data regarding each scenario has determined what most occur for each specified alternate future to transpire.

11. Develop indicators for the focal events.

Indicators identify if a focal event either has or will occur. Following determination of focal events, utilization of contextual data in the Psychobiography and LAMP sections generated individual aspects, or indicators, for predicting the occurrence of alternate futures.

12. State the potential of an alternate future to "transpose" into another alternate future.

The final step within LAMP is to analyze possible transpositions from one future into another. Analysis in this section of LAMP focuses on potential for Alternate Futures to interchange, or morph from one Alternate Future to another (Lockwood & Lockwood 1993, 27-28).

Upon determining the most likely future based on the information gathered in the initial portion of the study, the result has been compared side-by-side to the result of the operation as defined within the case studies. The comparison confirms whether the use of psychobiography analysis and examination of traits accurately determined how each of the leaders made decisions. This result can then be applied in future studies to a larger population of leaders, for additional comparison and confirmation. From the accurate determination of how a leader will make decisions, it is possible to determine which operations will be approved or not. By categorizing which operations will be approved or not, it is then possible to define if the leader will in fact effectively approve viable operations.

CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

A combination of the theoretical literature and background literature reviewed in the previous sections forms the basis for the analysis section. The background data gathered for each political leader has been reviewed for its impact on the individual, and for reoccurring themes. Drawing upon the definitions of bias, personality and traits, an in-depth analysis generates a detailed psychobiography. Within each psychobiography, key biases and traits are identified and used to formulate the "actor perception" required for development of future scenarios under the LAMP method. The traits specifically reviewed and analyzed within the psychobiography are: sense of self-confidence, distrust of others, and a need for power and influence over what happens. Through use of the definitions provided by the literature, analysis of the bias, traits and personality displayed by each leader was possible.

Psychobiography

Adolf Hitler

Having reviewed the cornerstone literature for bias, personality, traits and psychobiography, literature detailing the political leaders to be analyzed must be reviewed. The first of the leaders analyzed is Adolf Hitler, Commander of the Third Reich and dictator over Nazi Germany. A dynamic and influential political leader, Hitler displayed traits, behaviors, and social indicators common to similar personalities throughout history. Leaders like Hitler do not always display psychological disorders, but dynamic people like Hitler may have psychological traits and social factors that are identifiable. Personalities possessed by such political leaders generally stem from a childhood of pain, disappointment and shame. Receiving emotional injury at the hands of parental rejection hinders success in adulthood and may lead to a constant quest for a sense belonging and significance. In Hitler's case, he developed a personality defined by

belief he could influence what happened. Hitler regarded himself, "a guru destined to fulfill a unique place in history in which strategic triumph equates to personal ascendancy" (Victoroff 2005, 6). His self-image spurred increasingly dynamic actions, and aided in his rise to becoming one of the most powerful dictators to change the world.

Adolf Hitler's life story begins long before his birth. Hitler's family originated from a lower class family, his grandmother was employed by a local Jewish family as a maid. While employed by the family, his grandmother is rumored to have had sexual relations with the man of the house (Victor 1998, 1-15). Adolf's father, Alois, was the result of that relationship and was subsequently raised solely by his mother. Later in life, Alois married his cousin, Klara. The couple initially had difficulty conceiving; eventually in 1889, Adolf Hitler was born (Victor 1998, 10-25). Having grown up without a father, Alois was prone to abusive tendencies (Victor 1998, 30-35). His rough treatment of Adolf created a rift in their relationship from the beginning. As the illegitimate offspring of a Jew, Alois' treatment of Hitler would serve as the basis for a growing hatred, associating Jews with the abusive world he lived in (Victor 1998, 1-15). The violence increased when Hitler was around the age of six. Alois traveled less than he had over the previous years, spending much of time at home. During this period, his beatings of the family, and particularly Adolf, grew most violent. A notably terrible beating stemmed from a day that Adolf considered running away. Alois, according to Victor, "beat him so badly [Adolf] went into a coma. For days the family did not know whether he would live," (Victor 1998, 29). In contrast, Klara's behavior toward Adolf was defined by her difficulty in bearing children. She spared no effort in providing Adolf with affecting and ensuring he was cared for. Victor notes, her efforts even led to, "breast-fed him longer than other children," (Victor 1998, 24). Sparked by the unabashed love received from Klara, Adolf was drawn extremely close to his mother,

sleeping in her bed when Alois' was not home. Following Alois' death while Hitler was a teenager, the threat of abuse lifted and he was shown only love from his mother for the remainder of his adolescence. Eventually, Klara admitted to Hitler that she believed he was destined for greatness, to be a savior as a result of her suffering (Victor 1998, 26).

The detrimental psychological effect of his childhood left Hitler with persistent issues concerning self-worth and purpose in life. Adolf was also troubled in his academic and social pursuits. As a school child, Hitler did not find satisfaction in many subjects, only finding solace in art, which did not gain him favor with his father. An up-bringing where the child is shunned by a parent often results in an individual who is submissive to authority yet prone to rebellion (Vernon 1942, 307). He therefore sought an outlet for his frustration, finding some solace in socially accepted forms of mild anti-Semitism aimed at other children in his school (Vernon 1942, 307). Concluding a troubled adolescence, Hitler was struck by a defining loss when his mother quickly faded from breast cancer, dying when he was 19 years old. After her death, Adolf traveled to Vienna where despite his father's previous misgivings; he pursued painting (Kasher 1992, 51). Painting generated little income, so he essentially lived in poverty and was considered to be lonely (Vernon 1942, 297). During this time, Ächtler suggests that Hitler suffered, "a disappointing experience with a Jewish girl," (Ächtler 2007, 328). As a result of that experience, and the accepted mistreatment of Jews as a child, Hitler developed many of his preliminary ideologies on anti-Semitism. Hitler transferred the blame for trouble in his life to the Jewish population, identifying them as the root of everything wrong with the world (Victor 1998, 30-35).

After a time in Vienna, Hitler enlisted in the army and served multiple tours during the First World War. Soon after his enlistment, Hitler was given orders to the Western front where

he earned several awards but never advanced past corporal. Duty was more important than camaraderie to Hitler, which produced few friends in the army (Vernon 1942, 297). His devotion to duty led Hitler to routinely accept dangerous assignments, receiving wounds on numerous occasions. One of the more notable events during his service came during a hospitalization in the Pasewalk following a gas attack. Hitler's physical ailments were questioned by the physicians as not possible, leading several physicians to diagnose him with "hysterical blindness," a neurotic symptom stemming from the news of Germany's defeat (Ächtler 2007, 328-339). A secondary consequence of spending time in the hospital and around Vienna, Hitler was again exposed to a great deal of anti-Semitism, developing a deep-rooted dislike of the Jews, lashing out on many occasions (Ächtler 2007, 328).

Hitler was briefly employed in espionage following the war, which led to his meeting Anton Drexler, the individual that would assist in the rise of the Nazi Party (Vernon 1942, 297). Increasingly engaged in political activities, Hitler discovered he possessed natural public speaking abilities and capacity to influence others. Proceeding to give hundreds of emotionally charged speeches, defined by dynamic gestures, Hitler captured the attention of his audiences (Davis et al. 1992, 157). During his political rise, these speeches allowed for overt displays of the underpinnings of his personality. Though he frequently addressed the audience with passion, he would occasionally fail to say a word (Vernon 1942, 304). Outside of his public addresses, some lasting hours, Hitler seldom carried prolonged conversations. Many of the conversations he did hold were used only to criticize and subjugate those around him (Vernon 1942, 302).

Still reeling from the First World War, the German public needed a savior. Despite some of his awkward behaviors, Hitler's public appearances portrayed charisma. Thus, he captured the country's attention with ease. Hitler was able to tap into the anger, frustration and basic desires

within German society and forged those emotions into aggression toward the Jews (Ächtler 2007, 343). Waite notes that Hitler frequently spoke publicly about the unworthiness of the Jews in comparison to the German people, stating, "The Great Judge of all time...will always give victory to those who are the most worthy," (Waite 1971, 229). Igniting emotions all over the country, he rapidly ascended to the top of the Nazi party, and named himself Fuhrer. Hitler immediately set to obtaining retribution for his childhood at the expense of the Jewish population. He established the Nuremberg laws, making any relationship between Jews and Aryans unlawful, a direct correlation to his father's birth (Ächtler 2007, 231). Next, Hitler moved swiftly to dominate Europe and impose punishment on the Jews to the fullest extent. To this end, Hitler instigated the Second World War, and as Victor states, "Hitler was determined to complete it during his lifetime" (Victor 1998, 187). He did not believe extermination of the Jews would occur under anyone else, and his hatred could not allow the Jews to remain. Therefore, Hitler made calculated decisions during the war to enable massive genocide operations, including the gassing of Jews in concentration camps and delaying railway shipments to the army in order to move Jews to camps (Victor 1998, 185-212).

As leader of the Nazi party, Hitler's suspicion of others played out in his conflicting directions and creation of competing positional duties (Kershaw 2008). The ensuing confusion limited the powers of others in the party, increasing his control. Entering the Second World War, Hitler applied the same tactic within the German military. Hitler removed experienced officers from command and insisted on making major military decisions (Josephson 1952, 115). Moving from decisive and cunning, to rigid and unforgiving, Hitler's military guidance inhibited his top military leaders; victory became unsustainable (Satterfield 1998, 677-679). Angering those around him, several assassination attempts were carried out against Hitler (Hoffman 1973, 43).

As the Second World War progressed to total defeat, Hitler realized he would not be able to complete his eradication of the Jews. He could no longer wield power and control over all of humanity, save his own life, and hence committed suicide in a bunker.

Joseph Stalin

Born Ioseb Besarionis Jughashvili, Joseph Stalin was raised in the Georgian town of Gori by his mother, Ketevan Geladze, and father, Besarion Jughashvili. The town of Gori was representative of Georgian society for the period. In the nineteenth century Georgian society began a cultural change under Russian influence. A large gap between the peasant base and affluent upper class left few living in the middle class (Suny 1991, 50). The economic and social shift created an environment of instability within the towns and villages (Suny 1991, 51). Stalin's parents led commoner lives, earning a living through menial labor. Ketevan struggled to balance employment and housekeeping until finally securing a position in a couture shop, where she worked for about 17 years (Montefiore 2009, 1-17). Besarion also earned a meager salary, yet maintained steady employment as a cobbler. The couple endured personal trials, losing two infant children. In addition to the weight of coping with the loss of their children, Stalin's parents were troubled with his continuous health issues (Montefiore 2009, 1-17). At birth, Joseph had adjoined toes on his left foot, which impaired his mobility from a young age. Though not uncommon for the era, Stalin's face was marred by smallpox at the age of 7. Additionally, as a young boy of 12 years old, he suffered a debilitating injury during a carriage accident. As his left arm healed from the accident, it shortened and stiffened, greatly reducing its use (Montefiore 2009, 17-23).

Antagonized by the circumstances of his life, Stalin's father resorted to abusing alcohol. As a result, Besarion took to beating his family relentlessly. Over the course of his formative

years, Stalin was subjected to personal abuse and proxy abuse through witnessing the abuse of

his mother at the hands of his father (Brackman 2001, 13-18). Abusive treatment in the home

was not the only time young Stalin was exposed to violence. In his hometown of Gori, street

brawls were almost an everyday occurrence (Montefiore 2009, 83-96). Taking to heart the

lessons of his early childhood, Stalin learned to keep his thoughts and feelings to himself lest he

be singled out for abuse or initiate an unwanted fight. His turning inward began the process of

desensitizing Stalin to much of the world around him. However, he retained a portion of himself

attune to certain people and events. Stalin's daughter later recalled when he would become

attached to a person, they were "only to those he associated with his mother," (Brackman 2001,

8). One occasion where he was particularly affected took place around the time when Stalin was

twelve years old. He and his classmates witnessed a public execution of two men. One of the

men to be hanged reminded Stalin of his father, so while others felt pity on the men, Stalin did

not (Brackman 2001, 7-8).

The abuse imposed by his father instigated a repressed anger, and low self-esteem in

Stalin. To cope, he sought for himself an inflated image. The contradictory treatment issued by

his parents created a need in Stalin to be a conqueror (Suny 1991, 49). During Stalin's early

education, he was able to find refuge from his upbringing in the literature of Caucasian

mountaineers. The heroic stories provided an escape from his past, and supplied a source from

which he could create a new image (Suny 1991, 48). Identifying with literary characters such as

Koba, a bandit-hero whose name Stalin would adopt, he was able to assume a self-imagined

status of conqueror, aiding his self-esteem (Montefiore 2009, 121-123).

An added effect of the abusive childhood was the generation of a rebellious nature within

Stalin (Suny 1991, 49). At the age of 16, Stalin received a scholarship to attend the Georgian

Orthodox Tiflis Theological Seminary in Tbilisi. As Stalin aged and withdrew more into literature and poetry, he increasingly rebelled against authority figures within the school. Despite performing to the seminary's standards during the first few years, Stalin failed to complete the final exams (Brackman 2001, 8-10). As a result, he was expelled from the school in 1899 (Montefiore 2009, 124-133). Though he did not officially finish school, it had not been without lasting effect. During his time at the seminary, Stalin had been an avid reader (Montefiore 2009, 114-142). His journey through the various literary works held in the library, combined with his growing affinity for rebellion, eventually led Stalin to delve into books considered to be forbidden. The forbidden literature favored most by Stalin was that of Social Democracy and Marxist teachings (Montefiore 2009, 118-127).

By this point in his life, he had been exposed to various unappealing aspects of the Georgian culture through his childhood experiences, and had been educated in the ways of Russian society, reinforced by his time in the seminary (Suny 1991, 50). Inspired by Marxist ideology, Stalin left the seminary and set out to join the Bolshevik movement in 1903. This path was the true beginning of his amalgamation of his Georgian roots into the Russian Marxist leader he aspired to be. The culture of Russian Social Democracy provided Stalin with morals, personal behaviors, and self-image he had sought through much of his adolescence (Suny 1991, 50). As he initiated the new revolutionary endeavor, Joseph would again seek to renew himself within this culture. He would eventually adopt the name "Stalin" from the Russian word for "steel;" he used it as an alias and pen name in his published works (Montefiore 2009, 420). He rapidly rose into a chief operational position within the group, taking control of paramilitary and propaganda actions. Some of the operations even included bank robberies, such as the 1907 Tiflis bank robbery. During that particular event, bombs were used to incite chaos and gain control,

ultimately causing an estimated 40 deaths but netting Stalin's "Outfit" somewhere between 250,000 and 341,000 rubles, a handsome some for the day (Montefoire 2009, 35-50). Far from a picture perfect operation, the Tiflis bank robbery would serve to create the political man Stalin would become. He became a *persona non grata* in Georgia, setting him on the path toward Russian statesmanship. Additionally, the reputation he gained from the violent nature of the robbery would assist his quest for control, rising through the ranks with little regard for the cost (Montefoire 2009, 51-55). In the short-term, Stalin's criminal activity won ill-favor with the Russian secret police, the Okhranka. He would spend many long months, during a total of seven separate occasions, in Siberia paying for his transgressions. Still an avid reader, the periods of exile did not prevent Stalin from feeding his academic appetite. He routinely seized opportunities to obtain new books, making several visits to the library in Vologda (Montefiore 2009, 371).

At the age of 26, Stalin was conscripted by the Russian army during the Russo-Japanese War (Brackman 2001, 24). However, the damage to his left arm sustained during his childhood carriage accident prevented him from service. Immediately after being released from potential military service, Stalin returned to an active role in the Bolshevik movement. He moved to assume control of the Communist newspaper, the *Pravda*. Following Lenin's success in the 1917 Communist Party conference, Stalin used the *Pravda* to directly oppose the provisional government (Brackman 2001, 85-140). During the same conference, Stalin was elected to the Bolshevik Central Committee. Shortly thereafter, the Committee committed to launching an insurrection, known as the October Revolution. Stalin quickly set to conducting the insurrection in a manner that resembled Lenin's Marxist views. He created a temporary alliance with the peasantry in order to attack the Russian representation of capitalism under the tsarist regime. Lenin was predominantly responsible for envisioning what would become the revolution,

however Stalin inherited much credit (Carr 1953, 2-3). In short order the Bolsheviks took the Winter Palace, arrested the cabinet and seized control of Russia (Brackman 2001, 115-120).

With the Communist Party taking control of the Russian government, Stalin seized the opportunity to seek retribution for the hardships he faced in early life. In 1921 the Russian "Red Army" crossed into Georgia, and took over the local government. Only a few months after this action, Stalin having strategically positioned himself within the party, was promoted by Lenin to the newly created post of general secretary (Brackman 2001, 136). Empowered more than ever before, Stalin rapidly surrounded himself with allies in the party. Then he moved to impose a harsh political stance toward the Georgian populace, allegedly sanctioning the murder of persons from his past (Brackman 2001, 137). Stalin's actions portrayed an indifference to Lenin's political objectives, and created a growing distance between the two. Continued transgressions shifted Lenin's view of Stalin quickly to suspicion and fear. Unable to simply remove Stalin from the general secretary post, due to the support of Stalin's allies, Lenin moved to tie Stalin to the violence in Georgia (Brackman 2001, 137). In 1922, Lenin called on a commission to investigate what was dubbed the "Georgian Affair", aimed at providing the leverage needed to remove Stalin from his position. Only days later, Lenin suffered the first in a series of debilitating heart attacks, and later a stroke in early 1923 (Brackman 2001, 138-142). Over the course of the following months, Stalin took advantage of Lenin's failing health to isolate Lenin and his supporters. Though Lenin's health showed signs of returning, he suddenly fell ill and died in January 1924. Just before his death, Lenin stated that he had been poisoned (Brackman 2001, 158).

Lenin's death sparked a shift in Stalin's actions. The abuse from his father had created isolationist anger in Stalin; however he still formed a few strong attachments. Though Lenin had

been a perceived enemy in life, Stalin identified with Lenin in death (Brackman 2001, 159).

Beginning with his speech at the funeral, Stalin initiated a new cult of personality around Lenin.

He placed Lenin's legacy on a spiritualistic platform, building a hero for the Soviet people. He

then reinvigorated his own self-image in a personality cult for himself, as Lenin's heir apparent

(Brackman 2001, 159). Giving Lenin and himself iconic titles and renaming cities, such as the

change of Petrograd to Leningrad, generated a movement led by Stalin to rewrite the political

and historical landscape in Russia ensuring his place of power (Brackman 2001, 170).

As time progressed, Stalin separated himself further from the tribulations of his past,

insistent that others had wronged him and the people of Russia; accusing many of the acts he had

in fact committed (Brackman 2001, 177). Implementing a series of show trials, Stalin

continuously pursued placing blame with others, cleansing him from any wrong doing

(Brackman 2001, 178-279). Content to consolidate his power at the expense of those around him

and the people of Russia, Stalin continued his internal and external purge until the summer of

1941. Nazi Germany, under Hitler broke through the Soviet Union's western borders, in

violation of the Russo-German pact (Brackman 2001, 294). Initially suffering wide-spread

defeat, allowing German forces to reach Moscow, Stalin turned the tide in the winter. Pushing

the German army out of Moscow, Stalin gained great standing within the Soviet Union,

capitalizing on the situation to solidify his position as the savior of the Russian people

(Brackman 2001, 295-301). From the ashes of the war, Stalin arose as a prominent leader on the

world stage, and an icon within the Soviet Union. He had achieved his crafted self-image

(Brackman 2001, x-xi).

Jimmy Carter

James Earl Carter, Jr. was born October 1, 1924 to James Earl and Bessie Lillian Carter in the small town of Plains, Georgia. The Carter family hailed from a mixed Anglo-European ancestry that had deep ties to the Southern US, dating back to the Revolutionary War (Morris 1993, 23). His parents fared well within the community, Earl a local business owner and Bessie a nurse. The couple would later have three other children, two girls and a boy (Bourne 1997, 10-20). During his childhood, the South was still in the throes of racial segregation. The town of Plains was representative of the region at the time, with the black population restricted from owning a business and relegated to labor under white management (Morris 1993, 27). A businessman, Jimmy's father was no different than many others in the town at the time. He treated blacks in the community as second class citizens, even directing black children to lose to Jimmy when they played games (Morris 1993, 65).

The family dynamic was defined by a lack of bonding familial interaction. Earl's instruction and rebukes of Jimmy were done in much the same manner. He would be spanked or punished in a school like manner for all offenses, and Earl would push Jimmy to be responsible in all areas of conduct. Many triumphs in Jimmy's early life were not without a lesson or correction from his father. Even when Jimmy killed his first quail, he was corrected for leaving his rifle on the ground in excitement (Morris 1993, 67-72). Though his dad was tough, Jimmy was driven to please his father, and earn affection through increased responsibility. Jimmy sought attention from his father, as his mother was distant with the family, and rarely gave affection to Jimmy (Morris 1993, 65). She was a book of the month club member and would routinely disappear into reading, leaving the family to themselves (Morris 1993, 46-59). Nonetheless, she would have a liberal impact on Carter's life through her direction of his social

engagements. Contrasting with Earl, Lillian was not opposed to Jimmy openly interacting with the community's black population. She was also the source of Jimmy's religious background. From a young age, he attended a Southern Baptist church in Plains with her. Through routine exposure to the influences of Christianity, Carter's modes of thinking about morals and equality were forever changed (Morris 1993, 4-41). These views supported by his mother, combined with the deep sense of responsibility instilled by his father, would serve to guide Carter's actions for the rest of his life.

Carter was a good student in school, completing assignments with relative ease. He would even seek opportunities for additional reading, drawn to books as was his mother (Morris 1993, 95-96). Though a good student, Carter had been inspired by post cards from his uncle's time in the Navy. Attracted to the responsibility, and unencumbered by ties to his family, Jimmy set himself to finding his place in the Navy (Bourne 1997, 44). Upon graduating from high school, Jimmy quickly moved on to college, attending Georgia Southwestern College. After a short time there, he applied to the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis. However, prior to being admitted he needed to complete additional mathematical courses, which he did through Georgia Tech (Bourne 1997, 40-55). Entering the Naval Academy in 1943, Carter immediately set to work making a name for himself. By the time he entered the Academy, he had a few years more of college and life experience than this fellow classmates (Morris 1993, 70-90). The added experience, and motivation to make the most of an education previously unattained by his family, gave Jimmy a leg up on the others. Dedicating himself entirely, he finished schooling at the Academy ranked top eight percent in a class of eight hundred twenty two midshipmen (Morris 1993, 95). Immediately following graduation, he married his long-time sweetheart, Rosalynn in 1946 (Morris 1991, 101).

Following his commission into the Navy, Carter volunteered for the nuclear submarine program. The submarine program was particularly demanding, driving Carter to develop leadership skills and a keen sense of trust (Bourne 1997, 65-72). Carter's nuclear engineering training and leadership was tested in 1952. A reactor in the Chalk River facility suffered a partial meltdown, requiring the reactor to be shut down (Bourne 1997, 74-75). Carter served as the officer in charge of a team assigned to disassemble and contain the reactor. His experience at Chalk River would greatly impact his future views, ultimately guiding his policy to abandon development of a neutron bomb (Morris 1993, 207). Though still new to the Navy's nuclear program, Carter rapidly altered his path in life following the death of his father in 1953. Carter resigned his commission, to the displeasure of his supervising officer, and returned to Plains, Georgia. In the wake of his passing, much of the monetary assets Carter's father possessed served to settled debts or was divided among the remainder of the family. As a result, Carter was forced to live in subsidized public housing for a year (Morris 1993, 114-116).

Drawing from his education, experience in the Navy and internal drive, Carter set to taking the yolk his father had left behind and running the family peanut farm (Bourne 1997, 82-85). His habitual reading at the county library aided Carter in establishing a base of understanding in agriculture. Rosalynn, eager to help, sought out financial management advice in order to improve the family's position (Morris 1993, 115). The first year they managed to even the debts and earnings on the farm, advancing toward success in the following years. However, motivated by a sense of responsibility to others, Carter did not sit idle on the farm for long. Branching out from his life as a farmer, Carter involved himself in local politics. He engaged with school boards, hospitals, and libraries, building his appetite for public service (Bourne 1997, 101-118).

When state senate districts were realigned, Carter saw an opportunity to serve at the next level by advancing his political career. In 1962, Carter ascended to the Georgia state senate, serving two terms (Morris 1993, 133-140). While in the state senate, Carter developed his abilities as a politician, gaining exposure to many state and national issues, and earning a reputation as a progressive. He focused much of his time on employment, education and equality (Morris 1993, 140-144).

After his second term within the state senate, Carter shifted his focus to the governor's seat in 1966 (Bourne, 1997, 150-160). Though not garnering enough votes to be elected, he did achieve a small victory by forcing a runoff between the two remaining candidates. For the next four years, Carter remained on the farm and planned for a return in the 1970 election, again seeking the governorship (Morris 1993, 165-170). Despite considering the 1970 campaign four years preceding its arrival, Carted did not begin his campaign in earnest until late 1969. During the campaign, he was determined to beat the former Democratic governor, Carl Sanders (Morris 1993, 184-195). While his philosophy was anti-segregationist, because of his commitment to winning the election he developed a scheme of pandering to segregationists without committing to their beliefs (Morris 1993, 187). Carter's campaign was centered on delivering his platform through wide spread in-person speeches. In doing so, he was able to communicate with the voters at a level not achieved by his opponents (Morris 1993, 151-183). As a result of his aggressive campaign strategy, Carter secured the governorship in 1971, immediately announcing his intent to end segregation and improve the status of the lower class, poor population (Morris 1993, 151).

Within a year of his election, Carter was unimpressed with the state of national affairs. Convinced that candidates preparing for the next presidential election were lackluster at best, he

made the decision to enter the race (Morris 1993, 193). Carter's entry into the 1976 presidential primaries was initially hampered by political commitments as the incumbent governor of Georgia, and the upcoming local elections, as well as his lack of national publicity (Bourne 1997, 248). Carter employed a strategy formed from his successful gubernatorial run, dedicating himself to visiting and speaking in a majority of the contentious voter base areas ahead of his opponents (Morris 1993, 227). With the Watergate scandal souring the perspective of many voters, Carter's personality driven by responsibility and Christian morality created a strong candidacy. He quickly moved to the front of the polls (Bourne 1997, 249-250). Furthering his popularity, Carter made use of his amenable personality to win favor in the national media, garnering positive coverage (Bourne 1997, 285-310). Holding onto favorable public opinion, Carter maintained an advantage over Ford throughout the presidential elections. Ultimately, he obtained victory in November 1976, officially sworn in as president in 1977 (Morris 1993, 235-246). Carter assumed office immediately faced with several national and international issues, including inflation and an energy crisis (Bourne 1997, 424-460).

As Carter's presidency matured, he consistently implemented foreign policy and conducted his actions according to what he thought would be the morally just position. These decisions were not based on public opinion, and were subsequently frequently unpopular. Engaging the energy issue, recalling the Chalk river incident, Carter applied a strong policy toward the use of nuclear energy (Bourne 1997, 439). However, his decision did not win as much popularity as hoped with the tough economy, as it stifled potential job creation in the energy industry. Some of the other less popular decisions of his tenure included supporting energy reducing initiatives, advancing a treaty on the Panama Canal, and boycotting the Olympics (Aronoff 2006, 427). Carter's focus on a foreign policy platform geared toward aiding others,

while many viewed his domestic policy to fall short of aiding the population at home, caused a dip in approval of his performance (Morris 1993, 260-262). Heading into his final year as president, Carter's biggest challenge would appear in the form of the Iran hostage crisis. In 1979, a group of Iranian students seized control of the US Embassy in Tehran, taking many hostages. Determined to resolve the situation politically, Carter refrained from initially using the military to resolve the situation (Jordan 1982). His choice, called the "Rose Garden strategy", was viewed by many in the American public as indecision, or as a political move to avoid debates in the upcoming election (Jordan 1982). After several months with little movement to free the hostages, Carter directed a complex, high risk rescue attempt be launched. Carter remained focused on negotiations throughout planning of the military mission (Bowden 2006b, 1-2). When the operation commenced, it was immediately beset with problems. Before reaching the embassy, two aircraft and eight servicemen were killed in the Iranian desert during an accident at a refueling point (Bowden 2006a, 221-350). The tragedy loomed over Carter's head through the rest of the year. Ultimately, public opinion solidified against Carter, and he lost the 1980 election to Ronald Reagan.

Ayatollah Khomeini

Born in 1902, Ruhollah Khomeini's family, including five siblings, lived in a small, but prosperous town in central Iran (Moin 1999, 2). Khomeini's father was a religious man, and had followed the tradition of his family becoming a cleric. Shortly after Khomeini's birth, his father was murdered by two local khans. The murder was met with public outcry and Khomeini's family pushed for justice (Moin 1999, 3-8). After the family gained support from an Imam and other members of the government, the two men were captured. They were taken to Tehran where, after pleading to Mozzafar al-Din Shah, the men were executed (Moin 1999, 8-11).

Despite a childhood without a father, as a child Ruhollah was active and possessed a forthright personality. He often dominated play with the other children (Moin 1999, 13).

Customary for the time, Ruhollah attended a religious form of schooling, the *maktab*, until about the age of seven (Moin 1999, 14). There, he was instructed on the Qur'an, and memorized basic lessons in Arabic and Persian. After turning seven, Khomeini moved to the local school, where he was taught traditional subjects such as math and history (Moin 1999, 18). He continued receiving tutoring in Shi'a religious studies from Ja'far, his mother's cousin, and his brother, Morteza (Moin 1999, 18). In 1920 Ruhollah sought further education in Arak under the tutelage of a well-known and pious mullah, Sheikh Abdolkarim Ha'eri (Moin 1999, 22). Shortly thereafter, following his teacher, he moved to an Islamic seminary southwest of Tehran, residing at the Dar al-Shafa school in Qom (Moin 1999, 25). Khomeini's schooling covered Islamic religious law, but his interests also included poetry, philosophy and mysticism (Moin 1999, 28-35). Over the following years, Ruhollah was mentored by several teachers, acquiring a background in the philosophies of Aristotle, and Plato (Moin 1999, 40-49). Throughout his adolescence and into adulthood, Khomeini's interest in poetry remained, writing several pieces of his own (Moin 1999, 18-49). As his education progressed, Ruhollah transitioned himself into more of a teaching roll, taking on students and composing several literary works. Combining his passion for philosophy and mysticism with religious instruction, Khomeini stepped outside the norm. Using his educational background and broad range of instructional topics, Khomeini focused his teachings on applying religion to daily life (Moin 1999, 50-53). In doing so, he quickly connected with his students and a larger audience, igniting his push on teaching ethics to combat the secular nature of Iranian culture (Moin 1999, 54).

Khomeini continued his instruction of religion and philosophy for many years in Qom, garnering status as a prominent leader within the religious opposition to secularism (Moin 1999, 82). Following the deaths of other clerics and Ayatollahs of the time, Khomeini easily moved into a leading position within the Shi'a religion (Moin 1999, 69-73). Spurned by previous secular movements under the previous Shah, Khomeini and many of the clerics were immediately inflamed by Muhammad Reza Shah's "White Revolution" in 1963 (Moin 1999, 88). Viewed as "Westernization" by Shi'a religious teachers, these programs posed a direct threat to their leadership and their culture. Ayatollah Khomeini openly condemned the Shah's actions, and organized a boycott with other marjas in Qom. Khomeini's actions were quickly met by a show of force from the Shah (Moin 1999, 90-114). In response, Khomeini released a manifesto, signed by multiple religious leaders, detailing alleged unconstitutional and corruptive acts taken by the Shah. Further he directly accused the Shah of pandering to America and Israel; comparing the Shah to a tyrant (Moin 1999, 104-119). For his transgressions, the Shah had Khomeini arrested, igniting major nation-wide riots. The riots lasted three days, and resulted in the deaths of many people (Moin 1999, 111-114).

Released, Khomeini was sent into exile in Turkey, but eventually moved to Iraq where he stayed for several years until forced out by Saddam Hussein. After his departure from Iraq, he spent a short period in France (Moin 1999, 128-191). During Khomeini's exile, the opposition movement within Iran continued. Over several years, many groups carried out a variety of subversive actions against the government. Many within the movement openly professed support for Khomeini (Moin 1999, 160-185). In 1979, the Shah departed Iran for the United States. Seizing the opportunity, opposition groups in Iran held demonstrations, calling for President Carter to take action against the Shah (Moin 1999, 185). Khomeini took advantage of the

situation, leveraging the Shah's extended absence and growing rebellion in Iran to make his return. Having spent 13 years in exile, Khomeini was met by a welcoming crowd and received world media coverage (Moin 199, 186-201).

Immediately moving to assume power, Khomeini set to resolving the prominent issue behind the revolution in restructuring the government. Khomeini appointed his own prime minister, and then organized the ratification of a referendum to replace the monarchy with an Islamic Republic (Moin 1999, 209-213). Khomeini quickly turned his attention to any opposed to his control, such as the National Democratic Front, directing efforts to eliminate those groups (Moin 1999, 218-226). By December 1979, the new constitution of the Islamic Republic was formally adopted and Khomeini became the Supreme Leader of Iran (Moin 1999, 232). As a dramatic statement to solidify his newfound power, Khomeini called for the Shah's return to Iran to stand trial (Bowden 2006a, 7-20). With little acknowledgement from the US on the request to return the Shah, Khomeini's supporters looked for a show of force to grab world attention. The show of force took shape when students overran the US Embassy in Tehran (Bowden 2006a, 77-140).

Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction

The first two steps of LAMP have been captured within the initial chapters of this study. The issue to be examined has been defined within the introduction, research question and background sections, completing the first step. The second step, involving the identification of actors, has been accomplished in the method section. Defining actor perceptions, the third step, was contained in the Literature Review and Analysis sections. Perceptions, and thereby the decision making of each political leader, have been influenced by the experiences in their lives.

Each psychobiography detailed these experiences, forming the basis for understanding the biases, traits and personality profiles that define the decision-making process for each leader.

Potential Courses of Action

As the actors and their perceptions of events have been identified, the next step in LAMP is to determine all possible courses of action for each of the actors identified (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993). Although four political leaders (actors) are involved, two scenarios combine the assessment for two leaders per scenario. The scenarios first combine the assessment of Hitler and Stalin, then Carter and Khomeini. Though each scenario is limited to two actors, theoretically the number of potential actions taken by each could be infinite. Therefore, highly probable courses of action are defined into general categories for courses of action based on analysis of the actor perceptions (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993). Within the limited scope of this study, six general courses of action are available to each political leader for the scenarios reviewed. Presented with confrontational scenarios, each leader may select: Viable Direct confrontation in the form of military, paramilitary, or dynamic intelligence operations; Non-viable Direct confrontation in the form of military, paramilitary, or dynamic intelligence operations; Viable Neutral action through political negotiations; Non-viable Neutral action through political negotiations; Viable Avoidance of confrontation by ignoring the issue or acquiescing to demands; and Non-viable Avoidance of confrontation by ignoring the issue or acquiescing to demands.

In addition to reducing the number of categories to six general actions, two essential assumptions have been made. The first of these is that each political leader's decision-making process as defined by their psychobiography can be accurately assessed within the six general

actions. The second assumption is that decision-making of each leader is not influenced by actors outside the scope of this study.

Major Scenarios

Within the methodology of LAMP, courses of action taken by a focal actor develop what are considered major scenarios used to analyze and determine the most likely future (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993). The scenarios examined in this study combine focus on two of the political leaders discussed. Thus scenarios analyzed in this study revolved around interactions between the national level actors controlled by Hitler and Stalin, then by Carter and Khomeini respectively. In order to effectively examine two leaders per scenario, general scenarios have been generated based on the historical data provided within the Psychobiography analysis for each leader regarding the political situation immediately preceding the case studies examined. The general scenarios generated can be easily replicated for analysis of each political leader's decision-making. Scenarios examined within this section are representative of the scenarios examined during the case study review. Use of these scenarios has provided the data necessary to determine the ability of psychobiography driven LAMP analysis to predict effective decision-making. The scenarios analyzed are:

1. Russia expands westward into Germany's supply lines.

2. The US ignores or rebukes Iranian revolutionary political objectives as Iran seeks to establish a new government.

Permutations of Behavior

To determine the basic number of possible futures for each scenario, the LAMP equation $X^Y = Z$ has been employed (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993). In this equation "X" represents the number of available actions of each actor, the two political leaders examined in each scenario

represent "Y" and the result is the total number of futures represented by "Z" (Lockwood and

Lockwood 1993). Thus, with six possible courses of action for each actor, and two major actors

per scenario, the equation is $6^2 = 36$. Therefore, a total of thirty-six futures exist for each of the

scenarios to be analyzed. Each future, consisting of a combination of actions taken by Hitler and

Stalin has been placed in Table 1 and numbered one through thirty-six. Each future, consisting of

a combination of actions taken by Carter and Khomeini has been placed in Table 2 and

numbered one through thirty-six. The courses of action within each possible future are: Viable

Direct confrontation = VD; Non-Viable Direct confrontation = ND; Viable Neutral action

through political negotiations = VN; Non-Viable Neutral action through political negotiations =

NN; Viable Avoidance of confrontation by ignoring the issue or acquiescing to demands = VA;

and Non-Viable Avoidance of confrontation by ignoring the issue or acquiescing to demands =

NA. For the purpose of this study, viable means a successful military, paramilitary, or

intelligence operation and non-viable represents an unsuccessful military, paramilitary, or

intelligence operation leading to a weakened position or defeat.

Table 1. Alternate Futures for Scenario 1

Possible Futures	Hitler	Stalin	Remarks
1	VD	VD	Mutual conflict
2	VD	ND	Mutual conflict
3	VD	VN	
4	VD	NN	
5	VD	VA	
6	VD	NA	
7	ND	VD	Mutual conflict
8	ND	ND	Mutual conflict
9	ND	VN	
10	ND	NN	
11	ND	VA	
12	ND	NA	
13	VN	VD	
14	VN	ND	
15	VN	VN	Mutual negotiations
16	VN	NN	Mutual negotiations
17	VN	VA	
18	VN	NA	
19	NN	VD	
20	NN	ND	
21	NN	VN	Mutual negotiations
22	NN	NN	Mutual negotiations
23	NN	VA	
24	NN	NA	
25	VA	VD	
26	VA	ND	
27	VA	VN	
28	VA	NN	
29	VA	VA	Mutual avoidance
30	VA	NA	Mutual avoidance
31	NA	VD	
32	NA	ND	
33	NA	VN	
34	NA	NN	
35	NA	VA	Mutual avoidance
36	NA	NA	Mutual avoidance

VD - Viable Direct confrontation
ND - Non-Viable Direct confrontation
VN - Viable Neutral action through political negotiations
NN - Non-Viable Neutral action through political negotiations
VA - Viable Avoidance of confrontation by ignoring the issue or acquiescing to demands
NA - Non-Viable Avoidance of confrontation by ignoring the issue or acquiescing to demands

Table 2. Alternate Futures for Scenario 2

Possible Futures	Carter	Khomeini	Remarks
1	VD	VD	Mutual conflict
2	VD	ND	Mutual conflict
3	VD	VN	
4	VD	NN	
5	VD	VA	
6	VD	NA	
7	ND	VD	Mutual conflict
8	ND	ND	Mutual conflict
9	ND	VN	
10	ND	NN	
11	ND	VA	
12	ND	NA	
13	VN	VD	
14	VN	ND	
15	VN	VN	Mutual negotiations
16	VN	NN	Mutual negotiations
17	VN	VA	
18	VN	NA	
19	NN	VD	
20	NN	ND	
21	NN	VN	Mutual negotiations
22	NN	NN	Mutual negotiations
23	NN	VA	
24	NN	NA	
25	VA	VD	
26	VA	ND	
27	VA	VN	
28	VA	NN	
29	VA	VA	Mutual avoidance
30	VA	NA	Mutual avoidance
31	NA	VD	
32	NA	ND	
33	NA	VN	
34	NA	NN	
35	NA	VA	Mutual avoidance
36	NA	NA	Mutual avoidance

VD - Viable Direct confrontation
ND - Non-Viable Direct confrontation
VN - Viable Neutral action through political negotiations
NN - Non-Viable Neutral action through political negotiations
VA - Viable Avoidance of confrontation by ignoring the issue or acquiescing to demands
NA - Non-Viable Avoidance of confrontation by ignoring the issue or acquiescing to demands

Table 3. Pairwise Comparison for Scenario 1

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36
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3	1	2	3																																	
4	1	2	3	4																																
5	1	2	5	5	5																															
6	1	2	6	6	5	6																														
7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7																													
8	8	8	8	8	8	8	7	8																												
9	9	2	9	9	9	9	7	9	9																											
10	10	2	10	10	10	10	7	8	9	10																										
11	11	2	11	11	11	11	7	11	11	11	11																									
12	12	2	12	12	5	12	7	8	9	12	11	12																								
13	13	13	13	13	13	13	7	13	13	13	13	13	13																							
14	14	14	14	14	14	14	7	14	14	14	14	14	13	14																						
15	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	15	15	15	11	15	13	14	15																					
16	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16																				
17	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	17	9	10	11	17	13	14	15	17	17																			
18	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18																		
19	19	19	19	19	19	19	7	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19																	
20	20	20	20	20	20	20	7	20	20	20	20	20	13	20	20	20	20	20	19	20																
21	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	21	9	21	11	21	13	14	21	21	21	21	19	20	21															
22	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	22	17	22	19	20	21	22														
23	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	23	9	23	11	23	13	14	23	23	23	23	19	20	21	23	23													
24	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	24	19	20	21	22	23	24												
25	25	25	25	25	25	25	7	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	19	25	25	25	25	25	25											
26	26	26	26	26	26	26	7	26	26	26	26	26	13	26	26	26	26	26	19	20	26	26	26	26	25	26										
27	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	27	9	27	11	27	13	14	27	27	27	27	19	20	21	27	27	27	25	27	27									
28	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	28	17	28	19	20	21	22	23	28	25	26	27	28								
29	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	29	9	29	11	29	13	14	15	29	29	29	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	29	29							
30	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	30	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30						
31	31	31	31	31	31	31	7	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	19	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31					
32	32	32	32	32	32	32	7	32	32	32	32	32	13	32	32	32	32	32	19	20	32	32	32	32	25	32	32	32	32	32	31	32				
33	1	2	3	4	33	33	7	33	9	33	11	33	13	14	33	33	33	33	19	20	33	33	33	33	25	26	33	33	33	33	31	32	33			
34	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	34	34	34	19	20	21	34	23	34	25	26	27	34	29	34	31	32	33	34		
35	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	35	9	35	11	35	13	14	35	35	35	35	19	20	21	35	23	35	25	26	27	35	35	35	31	32	33	35	35	
36	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	36	36	19	20	21	22	23	36	25	26	27	36	29	36	31	32	33	34	35	36

Table 4. Pairwise Comparison for Scenario 2

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36
1	1																																			
2	1	2																																		
3	1	2	3																																	
4	1	2	3	4																																
5	1	2	3	5	5																															
6	1	2	3	4	5	6																														
7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7																													
8	1	8	8	8	8	8	7	8																												
9	9	9	9	9	9	9	7	8	9																											
10	1	2	10	10	10	10	7	8	9	10																										
11	11	2	11	11	11	11	7	8	9	11	11																									
12	1	2	12	12	12	12	7	8	9	10	11	12																								
13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13																							
14	14	14	14	14	14	14	7	14	14	14	14	14	13	14																						
15	1	2	15	15	15	15	7	15	15	15	15	15	13	14	15																					
16	1	2	16	16	16	16	7	16	16	16	16	16	13	14	15	16																				
17	17	17	17	17	17	17	7	17	17	17	17	17	13	14	15	17	17																			
18	18	18	18	18	18	18	7	18	18	18	18	18	13	14	15	16	17	18																		
19	19	19	19	19	19	19	7	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19																	
20	20	20	20	20	20	20	7	20	20	20	20	20	13	14	20	20	20	20	19	20																
21	21	21	21	21	21	21	7	21	9	21	11	21	13	14	21	21	21	21	19	20	21															
22	1	2	22	22	22	22	7	8	9	22	11	22	13	14	15	16	17	22	19	20	21	22														
23	1	2	3	23	23	23	7	8	9	23	11	23	13	14	23	23	23	23	19	20	21	23	23													
24	1	2	3	24	24	24	7	8	9	10	11	24	13	14	15	16	17	24	19	20	21	22	23	24												
25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	13	25	25	25	25	25	19	25	25	25	25	25	25											
26	26	26	26	26	26	26	7	26	26	26	26	26	13	14	26	26	26	26	19	20	26	26	26	26	25	26										
27	27	27	27	27	27	27	7	27	27	27	27	27	13	14	27	27	27	27	19	20	27	27	27	27	25	26	27									
28	1	2	28	28	28	28	7	28	28	28	28	28	13	14	28	28	17	28	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28								
29	1	2	29	29	29	29	7	29	29	29	29	29	13	14	15	16	29	29	19	20	29	29	23	29	25	26	27	29	29							
30	1	2	3	30	30	30	7	30	30	30	30	30	13	14	15	16	30	30	19	20	21	22	23	30	25	26	27	28	29	30						
31	31	31	31	31	31	31	7	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	19	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31					
32	32	32	32	32	32	32	7	32	32	32	32	32	13	14	32	32	32	32	19	20	32	32	32	32	25	32	32	32	32	32	31	32				
33	1	2	33	33	33	33	7	8	9	33	33	33	13	33	33	33	33	33	19	20	21	33	23	33	25	26	33	33	33	33	31	32	33			
34	1	2	3	34	34	34	7	8	9	34	34	34	13	14	34	34	34	34	19	20	21	34	23	34	25	26	27	34	29	34	31	32	33	34		
35	1	2	35	35	35	35	7	8	9	35	35	35	13	14	35	35	35	53	19	20	21	35	23	35	25	26	35	35	35	35	31	31	33	35	35	
36	1	2	3	36	36	36	7	8	9	36	36	36	13	14	15	36	36	36	19	20	21	22	23	36	25	26	27	36	29	36	31	32	33	34	35	36

Following the completion of the pairwise comparison tables, a rank order of the data within the tables identifies the most and least likely futures based on the number of votes received (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993). Tables 5 and 6 depict the most to least likely futures for each of the two scenarios respectively. A review of tables 5 and 6 reveals that the pairwise comparisons generated closely ranked likely futures. In particular, Table 6 shows an equal number of votes for three of the top five most likely futures. From this data, the following analysis of the most likely futures addresses the effect and issues associated with the most likely alternate futures for each scenario.

Table 5. Rank Order for Scenario 1

Possible Futures	Hitler	Stalin	Votes
7	ND	VD	35
19	NN	VD	34
31	NA	VD	33
25	VA	VD	32
13	VN	VD	31
20	NN	ND	30
32	NA	ND	29
14	VN	ND	27
26	VA	ND	27
11	ND	VA	25
2	VD	ND	24
9	ND	VN	23
1	VD	VD	21
33	NA	VN	20
5	VD	VA	19
3	VD	VN	17
6	VD	NA	17
21	NN	VN	17
27	VA	VN	17
4	VD	NN	16
8	ND	ND	16
23	NN	VA	15
10	ND	NN	14
15	VN	VN	14
35	NA	VA	14
12	ND	NA	13
29	VA	VA	12
17	VN	VA	8
34	NA	NN	8
22	NN	NN	6
36	NA	NA	5
16	VN	NN	4
28	VA	NN	4
24	NN	NA	2
30	VA	NA	1
18	VN	NA	0
Total			630

VD - Viable Direct confrontation
ND - Non-Viable Direct confrontation
VN - Viable Neutral action through political negotiations
NN - Non-Viable Neutral action through political negotiations
VA - Viable Avoidance of confrontation by ignoring the issue or acquiescing to demands
NA - Non-Viable Avoidance of confrontation by ignoring the issue or acquiescing to demands

Results for Scenario 1 indicate Alternate Futures #7, 19, and 31 are most likely to occur. Within the context of these alternate futures, the likely actions taken by both Hitler and Stalin are to engage in direct confrontation. Stalin engaged in direct confrontation in all of the three scenarios while Hitler sought negotiations or avoidance in two of the three futures. Stalin was likely to choose viable direct confrontation with Hitler choosing non-viable courses of action.

Alternate Future #7 – ND/VD: Hitler and Stalin mutually pursue direct confrontation, with Stalin deciding upon a viable course of action and Hitler deciding upon a non-viable course of action.

Alternate Future #7 earned the most number of votes by a single vote. In future #7, under Stalin's leadership, Russia's expansion into the supply lines of Germany is perceived by Hitler as an impedance to his continued expansion in Europe. Additionally, suspicious of Stalin's actions, Hitler views Russian expansion as a direct threat to his ability to seek vengeance against the Jews. Motivated by his mother's belief in destiny, Hitler would emotionally decide to break the pact with the Soviet Union by invading. Hitler's invasion would represent an affront to Stalin's perception of his position, thus drawing an immediate and mutual response. However, originating from a more emotionally suppressed background, Stalin's response would be measured in comparison to Hitler's. Initiation of confrontation based in emotion would prove to degrade the viability of Hitler's decision-making in comparison to Stalin's less-emotional measured decision-making, resulting in Hitler's failure and Stalin's success. The failed actions of Hitler would devastatingly weaken his efforts to expand in Europe, and divide his resources detracting from his ability to persecute the Jewish population.

Alternate Future #19 – NN/VD: Hitler pursues a non-viable negotiation course of action and Stalin decides upon a viable direct confrontation course of action.

In Alternate Future #19, the next most likely future, Soviet expansion into the supply lines of Germany is perceived by Hitler as a nuisance to his continued expansion in Europe, and campaign against the Jews. Intent on completing his destiny, Hitler decides Russia's incursion on his supplies must end. Viewing direct confrontation with the Soviet Union as detrimental to the remainder of his European campaign, Hitler chooses to attempt negotiations with Stalin. However, Hitler does not perceive partnership with Stalin as critical to his plan, and would negotiate only to immediately achieve his goal. Stalin, operating under an inflated opinion of himself and educated in brutal tactics, rebukes Hitler's attempts at negotiations in favor of confrontation. Measured brutal decision-making by Stalin prevails over Hitler's distracted attempt at negotiation. As in Alternate Future #7, Hitler's failed action would undermine his goal, and would advance Stalin's self-generated image of power.

Alternate Future #31 – NA/VD: Hitler pursues a non-viable avoidance course of action and Stalin decides upon a viable direct confrontation course of action.

Third most likely future, Alternate Future #31, presents the least dynamic decision-making on behalf of Hitler. Following Soviet expansion westward, Hitler remains focused to completing his European expansion. Unwilling to compromise his plan to eradicate the Jews by instigating Russia, Hitler attempts to avoid confrontation. His avoidance presents Stalin with an opportunity to solidify his position. Stalin decides to progress Soviet expansion to the point of direct confrontation with Germany, negating Hitler's attempts at avoidance. Unable to detach his decision-making from the emotional tie his perceived destiny, Hitler does not effectively counter

Stalin's aggression. Ultimately, Stalin increases his position through aggressive exploitation of his opponent.

Table 6. Rank Order for Scenario 2

Possible Futures	Carter	Khomeini	Votes
19	NN	VD	34
7	ND	VD	33
13	VN	VD	33
31	NA	VD	33
25	VA	VD	32
14	VN	ND	30
20	NN	ND	29
32	NA	ND	28
26	VA	ND	27
27	VA	VN	24
21	NN	VN	22
1	VD	VD	20
33	NA	VN	20
2	VD	ND	19
35	NA	VA	19
23	NN	VA	18
29	VA	VA	18
9	ND	VN	17
15	VN	VN	17
8	ND	ND	16
17	VN	VA	16
34	NA	NN	15
16	VN	NN	14
28	VA	NN	13
36	NA	NA	12
11	ND	VA	11
18	VN	NA	11
22	NN	NN	11
30	VA	NA	11
3	VD	VN	8
10	ND	NN	6
24	NN	NA	6
12	ND	NA	4
5	VD	VA	2
4	VD	NN	1
6	VD	NA	0
Total			630

VD - Viable Direct confrontation
ND - Non-Viable Direct confrontation
VN - Viable Neutral action through political negotiations
NN - Non-Viable Neutral action through political negotiations
VA - Viable Avoidance of confrontation by ignoring the issue or acquiescing to demands
NA - Non-Viable Avoidance of confrontation by ignoring the issue or acquiescing to demands

Results for Scenario 2 were closely grouped with four futures separated by a single vote. Alternate Future #19 was the most likely, followed by 7, 13 and 31 tied for second most likely garnering 33 votes each. The results indicate most likely actions taken by Carter favoring action other than direct confrontation, with the exception of one future, #7. In a majority of the likely futures, the action chosen by Carter was non-viable. In comparison, Khomeini's likely courses of action unanimously favored viable direct confrontation.

Alternate Future #19 – NN/VD: Carter decides upon a non-viable negotiation course of action, with Khomeini pursuing a viable direct confrontation course of action.

The most likely future, Alternate Future #19 captures the general nature of the other likely futures. To Khomeini, the West presents a threat to his religious power and the US is the face of what he considers wrong with the world. Motivated to secure his position in Iran by aggressive demonstration of his commitment, Khomeini seeks direct confrontation with the US. Carter, defined by commitment to serving others and tolerance, is motivated to seek alternatives to challenges. Despite being non-confrontational, Carter is driven to control the situation and as a result, he favors negotiation. However, Carter's sense of responsibility to seek peaceful solutions for all situations inhibits his ability to effectively negotiate. Undeterred by any negotiation attempts, Khomeini's motivation to obtain power drives him to successfully confront Carter. As a result, Carter loses position while Khomeini catapults himself and Iran into a new position.

Alternate Future #7 – ND/VD: Carter and Khomeini mutually pursue direct confrontation, with Khomeini deciding upon a viable course of action and Carter deciding upon a non-viable course of action.

Tied for the second most likely future with Alternate Futures #13 and 31, Alternate Future #7 is a unique result within the top futures. Khomeini again seeks direct confrontation

with the US as a means to combat a perceived threat to his religious power and immoral influence on Islam. However, Carter believes in standing up to those who would subjugate others, viewing Khomeini as a threat to the Iranian people and freedom elsewhere. Thus, Carter responds to Khomeini's aggression with aggression, engaging in mutual direct confrontation. Despite Carter's sense of responsibility to confront Khomeini, Khomeini's commitment to achieve Islamic rule in Iran and support from the Iranian population results in his success. The failure of Carter's direct confrontation serves only to debase his position while improving Khomeini's.

Alternate Future #13 – VN/VD: Carter decides upon a viable negotiation course of action, with Khomeini pursuing a viable direct confrontation course of action.

Alternate Future #13 continues to show Khomeini's aggression toward the US. Carter remains defined by a need to control and commitment to others, as in Alternate Future #19, thus he favors negotiation. Unlike Alternate Future #19, Carter's dedication to find a resolution to Khomeini's aggression enables viable negotiations. Ultimately, Khomeini is able to effectively confront the US, which forces Carter to negotiate. Carter gains position by being able to resolve the situation; however, Khomeini also advances his position by forcing the US to respond.

Alternate Future #31 – NA/VD: Carter pursues a non-viable avoidance course of action, and Khomeini decides upon a viable direct confrontation course of action.

The last of the top rated likely futures, Alternate Future #31 is still had Khomeini in the position of aggression. Because of his unwavering motivation to remove Western influence on his religious power he confronts the US lead by Carter. As in the two of the other three likely futures, Carter holds to a non-confrontational stance. Carter's adversity to direct confrontation in favor of peacefully resolving a situation and commitment to his policies influences his decision-

making leaning toward avoidance. However, Carter's avoidance of confrontation does not deter Khomeini's commitment to solidifying his power through perceived retribution against the US. Thus, the resulting future is defined by ineffective do-nothing policy by Carter that Khomeini capitalizes on to effectively confront the US and secure his position as religious leader of Iran.

Focal Events and Indicators

The ability to properly predict, assess, and then alter the course of events in a desired direction is essential to ensuring the viability of intelligence, military, or paramilitary operations. Determining focal events and indicators for scenarios reviewed has provided signs necessary to assess the actions taken by the political leaders. A focal event is an intersecting occurrence between the current situation and the alternate future that changes the likelihood a future will take place. Also associated with an alternate future are indicators that identify if a focal event either has or will occur (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993). The data contained in the Literature Review, psychobiography and LAMP sections of this study provide context for this analysis. For each of the most likely futures for each scenario, the Focal Events and Indicators have been listed below.

In Scenario 1, Russia expands westward into Germany's supply lines. The most likely futures were Alternate Future #7: Hitler and Stalin mutually pursue direct confrontation, with Stalin deciding upon a viable course of action and Hitler deciding upon a non-viable course of action; Alternate Future #19: Hitler pursues a non-viable negotiation course of action and Stalin decides upon a viable direct confrontation course of action; and Alternate Future #31: Hitler pursues a non-viable avoidance course of action and Stalin decides upon a viable direct confrontation course of action.

Focal events: Alternate Future #7

Russia's incursion into German supply lines decreases

Indicators: Alternate Future #7

Germany's westward expansion continues uninhibited

Hitler's concern with Russia's movements decreases

Focal events: Alternate Future #19

Russia's incursion into German supply lines halts Hitler's persecution of the Jews

Indicators: Alternate Future #19

Germany's westward expansion stalls

Hitler grows increasingly frustrated with Russia's movements

Germany decreases political liaison with Russia

Focal events: Alternate Future #31

Russia's incursion into German supply lines inhibits Hitler's persecution of the Jews

Indicators: Alternate Future #31

Germany's westward expansion slows

Hitler becomes concerned with Russia's movements

Germany seeks increased political liaison with Russia

The circumstances of the focal events leading toward Alternate Futures #7, 19 and 31 are defined by the impact of Russia's incursion into Germany's supply lines. As Germany's expansion slows, and subsequently Hitler's war on the Jews, Hitler's response to Russian incursion increases. Decreased political interaction between Germany and Russia is most evident

in Alternate Future #19 as an indicator of possible change in future; whereas in Alternate Future #31, indication of a possible change is present in increased political interaction.

Scenario 2 poses that the US ignores or rebukes Iranian revolutionary political objectives as Iran seeks to establish a new government. The most likely futures were Alternate Future #19: Carter decides upon a non-viable negotiation course of action, with Khomeini pursuing a viable direct confrontation course of action; Alternate Future #7: Carter and Khomeini mutually pursue direct confrontation, with Khomeini deciding upon a viable course of action and Carter deciding upon a non-viable course of action; Alternate Future #13: Carter decides upon a viable negotiation course of action, with Khomeini pursuing a viable direct confrontation course of action; and Alternate Future #31: Carter pursues a non-viable avoidance course of action, and Khomeini decides upon a viable direct confrontation course of action.

Focal events: Alternate Future #19

Carter abandons interaction with Iranian

Indicators: Alternate Future #19

Carter disassociates US policy from Iranian revolutionary actions

Focal events: Alternate Future #7

Carter halts political or military action direct against Iran

Indicators: Alternate Future #7

Khomeini responds to US political engagement

Carter increases political interaction with Iran

Focal events: Alternate Future #13

Carter abandons interaction with Iranian

Indicators: Alternate Future #13

      Carter disassociates US policy from Iranian revolutionary actions

      Carter decreases focus on peaceful resolutions

Focal events: Alternate Future #31

      Carter pursues military involvement in interaction with Iran

Indicators: Alternate Future #31

      Carter increases coordination with military planners

      Carter decreases political interaction with Iran

      Carter associates Khomeini's actions with repressing freedoms of the Iranian people

      The circumstances of the focal events for Scenario 2 are almost singularly defined by Carter's perception of interactions with Iran and influence on his policy in the US. An outlier indicator within the focal events is seen in Alternate Future #7, with Khomeini responding to political engagement. Response from Khomeini would likely occur after he determined successful confrontation of the US had been achieved.

Transposition of Alternate Futures

      The final step within LAMP is to analyze possible transpositions from one future into another (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993). Analysis in this section of LAMP focuses on potential for Alternate Futures to interchange, or morph from one Alternate Future to another. Actions taken by either Hitler or Stalin could initiate a transposition in likely futures for Scenario 1. Should Stalin progressively advance Soviet control westward into Germany's supply lines, the increased impact on Hitler's ability to pursue his perceived destiny would be increasingly impacted. As the impact on Hitler's plans increased, so would his response to Stalin's actions.

Thus, transposition from Alternate Future #31 to Alternate Future #19 or Alternate Future #7 could occur. Similarly, a transposition from Alternate Future #19 to Alternate Future #7 could occur. Transposition of Alternate Future #7 into another future is less likely, as it would require Stalin to retract his expansion efforts.

In Scenario 2, as with Scenario 1, the actions taken by Carter and Khomeini could initiate transposition from one alternate future to another. Alternate Future #19 and Alternate Future #13 are nearly identical in nature, with only the viability of Carter's negotiation being the difference. Successful negotiation by Carter could be influenced by his perception of the situation in Iran, but would definitively be impacted by Khomeini's reception of political engagement by the US. However, the ability for viable negotiations to transpose into non-viable negotiations or vice versa would negate the viability or non-viability determination of the first circumstance. Thus the two futures would directly transpose. Separately, Alternate Future #19 and Alternate Future #13 can transpose into either Alternate Future #7 or Alternate Future #31. Commitment by Carter to prevent perceived subjugation by Khomeini combined with Khomeini's unwillingness to relent to US negotiations could cause a transposition into Alternate Future #7. Should Khomeini's confrontation not escalate to instigate Carter to act on behalf of peace and equality, Carter may decide to avoid confrontation in favor of commitment to his other policies, transposing into Alternate Future #31.

Case Studies

Germany invades Russia

In the prelude to the Second World War, relations between Germany and Russia were tenuous. Much of Eastern Europe fell within spheres of influence controlled by Germany, Russia and Italy. Hitler, believing he could easily control Italy's Mussolini, was concerned with Stalin

(Koch 1983, 904). Focused on expansion, Hitler determined that a compromise with the Russians would create an eastern bloc allowing him to concentrate on Western Europe (Satterfield 1998, 678). Placing his dislike of Communists aside, he initially avoided open confrontation with Stalin by signing the Russo-German pact in August 1939 (Koch 1983, 893). Following the signing of the pact, Germany and Russia entered a brief period of pseudo-alliance. The formal agreement of non-hostility did not alleviate tensions between the two governments. Nevertheless, Hitler remained focused on achieving his expansion goals, launching invasions of Poland, Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France between 1939 and 1940 (Satterfield 1998, 678). After securing most of Western Europe, Hitler's optimistically continued the campaign. Ignoring conservative counsel from his top military advisors, Hitler committed to immediately defeating Great Britain. To Hitler, once England fell, he could consider action against Russia (Koch 1983, 895-896).

The situation changed in May 1940. Motivated by similar desires as Hitler, Stalin moved to expand the Soviet Union. Initiating rapid expansion in its western territories, Russia seized Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia (Koch 1983, 895). During this time, Stalin also improved his political bonds with Italy and Great Britain, generating apparent support for Russia's encroachment on Germany's limited influence in the region. Stalin's moves were felt as an inconvenience by Hitler, since they threatened Germany's supplies of raw materials (Silverman 1975, 1511). Unable to defeat Great Britain, Hitler perceived the lack of success to be a result of support from the US and Russia. He abandoned his view to delay confrontation with Russia and in July 1940, Hitler initiated plans to invade Russia, under the codename Operation Barbarossa (Koch 1983, 914-920).

Committing to the invasion of Russia, Hitler instigated a ground war unprecedented in history of warfare. Driven by his desire to conquer, and obtain power in the face of adversity, he set in motion the events that would lead to his downfall. Motivated by the same desire to overcome his enemies, Stalin met Hitler's advance with the full brunt of Russian military power (Satterfield 1998, 678). As the two political leaders met on the field of battle, both entered with the desire to achieve victory, and validate their drive for conquest. However, Hitler's optimistic visions of victory were dashed when the invasion stalled in face of the Russian military might and winter weather. Unwilling to admit defeat, Hitler pressed the operation until long after Germany was able to continue the war. Rather than face defeat, he sought final resolution in the form of a cyanide capsule (Satterfield 1998, 677-679).

Iranian Hostage Crisis

In order to adequately analyze the Iranian Hostage Crisis, a basic understanding of the background and recounting of the US led rescue mission dubbed Operation EAGLE CLAW is essential. As a result of Ayatollah Khomeini's rise to power in Iran the previous ruler, the Shah, entered exile (Bowden 2006a, 7-20). The Shah eventually traveled to the US to seek medical care for cancer. The US had supported the Shah during his rule, having even directly aided the Shah in defeating his opponents two decades earlier. Therefore, admittance into the country for treatment was viewed by the people of Iran as an offense (Bowden 2006a, 7-20). As a result, several prominent groups within Iran, particularly those influenced by Khomeini, called for the US to return the Shah to Iran in order to stand trial. On 4 November 1979, inspired by a desire to retaliate against the US, a group of Islamist students in Tehran assaulted the US Embassy, ultimately seizing control of the compound and 52 of the embassy staff personnel (Bowden 2006a, 77-140). Reaction in the US to the hostage situation was intense anger and anti-Iranian

sentiments, initially sparking a unified condemnation of the students and Khomeini, a sentiment that would shift as the situation progressed. In Iran, the event was met with widespread support, and fueled Khomeini's grasp for power (Bowden 2006a, 221-400).

In his article *The Desert One Debacle*, reviewing the Iranian Hostage Rescue, Bowden provides detailed insight into the political actions of Carter, and the personal experiences of the men involved in the mission. Bowden asserts, "Carter had met the takeover in Iran with tremendous restraint, equating the national interest with the well-being of the fifty-three hostages, and his measured response had elicited a great deal of admiration, both at home and abroad. His approval ratings had doubled in the first month of the crisis. But in the following months, restraint had begun to smell like weakness and indecision" (Bowden 2006b, 1-2). As the hostage situation turned from days to months, Carter insisted on maintaining the course of meetings and sanctions.

The predominantly political nature of a rescue mission, as detailed by Gazit, has tremendous impact on the planning and outcome. Therefore, rescues necessitate the use of techniques and methods, which the military does not routinely utilize, demanding that special units assume the responsibility of preparing for such actions (Gazit 1981, 111-114). Aside from the rescuing the hostages unharmed while sustaining little to no casualties in the process, the rescue operation itself must not create new political or military dilemmas not present prior to the operation (Gazit 1981, 111-114). With little specific guidance and under tremendous pressure to develop a response plan, Carter's staff initiated development of what would become Operation EAGLE CLAW, a rescue mission with no room for error. In the book, *Operation Eagle Claw: The Iran Hostage Rescue Mission*, author Kamps annotates mistakes made during the planning and execution of the operation that ultimately led to the mission's failure. The initial mistake

made was at the onset of the planning phase. Concerned with not derailing negotiations, planners were insistent on maintaining utmost security. Thus, the process was unusually segregated to ensure secrecy. However, the segregation prevented adequate review of the plans details (Kamps 2006, 1). Furthermore, the notion of segregation led to each of the military branches of service assuming a "piece of the action", which dramatically hampered the cooperation of the components during the operation.

From a disjointed planning phase, the operation took shape. Navy Helicopters were to be flown from an aircraft carrier by Marine pilots, and ferry special operations personnel to a refueling point, codenamed Desert One. Applying security over capability, the plan eliminated the in-flight refueling capacity possessed by Air Force helicopters, and added the inexperience of the Marine pilots who were unfamiliar with long distance night flying over deserts (Kamps 2006, 2-3). Further complicating the situation, an effective communication plan was replaced by radio silence (Kamps 2006, 4). Finally, during the planning and preparation phases, segregated training led to multiple miscues between the branches in the timing of various portions of the mission, creating multiple points for potential failure (Kamps 2006, 3-6).

On 24 April 1980, under the direction of Carter, the mission to rescue the US hostages in Iran was launched. Over the Iranian desert, the aircraft encountered thick sets of dust clouds, delaying their arrival at the refueling point and forcing one helicopter to turn around. (Bowden 2006b, 10-16). Exacerbating the situation, the radio silence practiced by the pilots impaired their forewarning of the flying conditions and coordination once in the clouds. Struggling to stay on schedule and short an aircraft, the command to abort was given and preparations to depart Desert One began (Bowden 2006b, 22). In the confusion, one of the helicopters hovering just off the ground collided with a parked C-130, igniting an explosion that killed the crew members.

Following the failed mission, a body of Generals known as "The Holloway Group", conducted an investigation into the operation. The group found that the pilots and crews, ill accustomed for assault flying in the harsh environment, were unprepared to encounter the circumstances posed during the mission (Holloway 1980, 38-42). The pinnacle reason cited by the group leading to the failure was a lack of precise operating procedures and practice. Concern on the part of the mission planners about secrecy and security again led to this shortcoming (Holloway 1980, 57-60). Building on the findings of the Holloway Group, Kamps writes, "In military history one can stand out as a splendid example or a disastrous reminder. The brave men who attempted to rescue American hostages in Iran in April of 1980 unfortunately became a disastrous reminder of the need for unity of command, joint training, and good communications, and the dangers of overly complex and needlessly compartmented planning" (2006, 1).

The Holloway Group's findings fell short of identifying the true source of the confusion that led the operation's failure; President Carter's decision-making. Carter was focused on negotiations, and other purely political means for resolving the hostage crisis. Therefore, his staff was left to plan a highly complex and unique mission with little direction other than to maintain secrecy. They were unable to gain objective foresight of potential pitfalls due to the segregation of players involved in the mission. Each piece of the mission had little oversight and during execution the lack of communication prevented identification of unforeseen problems. Thus, poor decisions were made throughout, ending with catastrophic results. It was not until 444 days after being captured were the hostages released, only a few days after Carter left office and was replaced by Ronald Reagan as President.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS

Profound in their effect on the intelligence community, and its operations, political leaders are worthy of study and understanding (Hermann 1999, 86-199). The ability to interpret and predict the decision-making process of a political leader can have tremendous influence on the course of operational planning, and ultimately operational success or failure. This study sought to investigate how to predict decision-making of political leaders and their influence on the effectiveness of operations by answering the questions: How do political leader profiles that encompass their personal bias, personality and traits influence a political leader's decision-making effectiveness in regards to approving intelligence, military, or paramilitary operations? Can these profiles define a political leader's effectiveness in approving viable versus unviable operations?

To build an understanding of political leaders, this study sought to investigate the predictability of decision-making based on a psychological profile. Expanding on the concepts of personality and traits established by Aristotle and Freud, the framework of a psychological profile was defined (Matthews et al 2003, 3; Cottam et al 2009, 16). Created by the collective of similar experiences, personal motives increase references that generate a person's personality (Lindenfeld 1999, 295-296). Factoring into personality and the decision-making process is bias. Bias is formed as an individual's response to previous experiences as a coping mechanism for future situations (Heuer 1999, 111). Traits, as portions of an individual's personality, are indicators of the internal motivators and influences on the decision-making process. Narcissism, a need to control and suspicion of others are some of the common traits displayed by political leaders like those examined in this study, and have provided indications for prediction of future decisions (Hermann et al 2001, 20-27).

Following examination of bias, personality and traits, a detailed review of four political leaders via a psychobiography was conducted. Utilizing the psychobiography method described by Cottam and colleagues, an in depth analysis of Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Jimmy Carter and Ayatollah Khomeini provided the framework from which to interpret their decision-making. The findings of psychobiography analysis of leadership personality traits were limited by the resource and information available. However, it demonstrates the importance of researching and understanding the background of key political leaders. Adolf Hitler was born into a life dominated by his abusive father and over-protective mother. The dualistic treatment created an emotionally charged personality, prone to fits of anger and attachment to a perceived destiny espoused by his mother. Hitler found prey in the Jewish population, who were a socially acceptable outlet for his anger, forming a staunch bias against them. Believing he was destined to achieve great things, he displayed narcissistic traits, exalting his perceived position in the world around him. However, the emotional wounds inflected by his father damaged his self-confidence, instilling a trait of suspicion of the motives in others. Nonetheless, driven to avenge his mother, Hitler crafted opportunities to control everything around him and execute his plan to punish the Jews for his lot in life. Yet, his decision-making aimed at achieving this goal was mired in the emotional net that formed his psychological make-up.

Joseph Stalin, like Hitler, was raised by an abusive father. However, less consistent affection from his mother drove Stalin to revert inward emotionally. Compounded by a rough childhood environment, he developed an emotionally detached, yet rebellious personality. As a method of coping and motivation to improve his position, Stalin sought to recreate himself on multiple occasions. The narcissistic trait manifested itself in the "cult of personality" he crafted during his rise through the Communist party ranks. While attending seminary, he was inspired by

revolutionary writings, which were rebuked by the priests. Stalin rebelled against the authority that the seminary represented, solidifying a bias against any authority figure that did not coincide with his perception of the world. Taking fully to the revolutionary life style, Stalin reformed himself into a Communist party leader. Promoting his inflated self-image, and moving to eradicate authority other than his own through controlling all around him, Stalin increasingly sought to gain advantage at the expense of others. Ultimately, Stalin's decision-making was embedded in an emotionally withdrawn, yet exaggerated sense of self and need to control in order to minimize the authority of others.

Raised amongst a racially segregated community, Jimmy Carter was immediately exposed to various forms of discrimination, creating a bias in Carter against perceived discrimination or favoritism. Carter was pushed to live responsibly by his demanding father, then taught to live to serve others and fight for equality by his mother. In sum, he developed a personality defined by outward displays of staunch dedication to public service. Carter further displayed the trait of control, stemming from his strictly responsible nature that was refined during his time in the Navy. However, unlike Hitler and Stalin, Carter's control was directed less toward confrontation, and more toward resolving issues through diplomatic means. Inspired by his childhood, career in the Navy and management of the family farm, Carter set to obtain public office. His campaigns were characterized by his devotion to serve those who he perceived needed his help. By securing increasingly prominent positions within government, Carter increased his span of control, effectively increasing his ability to engage in areas where he viewed diplomatic solutions necessary to obtain equality. His drive to eradicate inequality through political means defined his decision-making, and drove him to seek alternate means to confrontational situations.

The final leader, Khomeini was defined by his early exposure to application of religion and power as well as the influence of Western ideology. Following the death of his father, and the pursuit of his killers, Khomeini spent many of his formative years absorbing the religious and philosophical teachings of his mentors. Inspired by the application of philosophy into daily ethical living, Khomeini's early decision-making was motivated toward educating the youth of Iran. In order to accomplish his true goal of instilling theocratic governance in Iran, he set out to obtain total control. He openly rebelled against the Shah and the provincial government, earning an extended tour in exile. His time in exile only served to galvanize Khomeini's decision-making focus on securing his place of power to apply his philosophically based religious leadership. Ultimately, he returned to Iran and in rapid fashion established a revolutionary government in Iran, with himself positioned as the religious leader over the government.

Within the LAMP section of this study, a limited review of two scenarios was conducted. The scenarios were: Russia expands westward into Germany's supply lines; and the US ignores or rebukes Iranian revolutionary political objectives as Iran seeks to establish a new government. Each scenario presented thirty-six alternate futures for consideration. Comparison of the alternate futures, drawing on analysis from the psychobiography of each leader, resulted in the delineation of three and four most likely futures for each scenario respectively. In Scenario 1, the most likely futures indicate Hitler's decision-making was prone to a range of non-viable courses of action, as a result of emotional attachment in fulfilling his destiny and hatred of the Jews. Conversely, Stalin's emotional detachment and need to control presented courses of action predominantly centered on viable direct confrontation. Compared to the case study that discussed the German invasion of Russia, many parallels exist. Both Hitler and Stalin pursued expansion in order to increase their control, particularly for Hitler so he could advance his eradication of the Jews.

When Stalin's expansion encroached on Hitler's expansion and control of his destiny, the two careened toward direct confrontation. Emotionally motivated to salvage his goal, Hitler disregarded the council of many in his military, opting to invade Russia. Though initially sent reeling from Germany's assault, Stalin's more measured approach enabled him to correct the initial losses and repel the German invasion. Ultimately, Hitler's emotional decision-making resulted in demise, whereas Stalin's emotionally withdrawn decision-making yielded victory.

Assessment of Scenario 2 showed the most likely futures indicate Carter's decision-making produced both viable and non-viable courses of action, with the majority non-viable non-confrontational options representative of his desire to serve others and seek equality. In contrast, Khomeini held a high probability of viable direct confrontation based on decision-making colored by aggressive commitment to assuming power and instilling religious rule to erase Western influences in Iran. The Iranian Hostage Crisis bears proof that the transposition of alternate futures is possible and probable. Capitalizing on the situation to solidify his agenda for religious rule, Khomeini's decision-making promoted direct confrontation with the US. He achieved this through support of the assault on the embassy carried out by students. Carter's initial response was representative of his affinity for negotiation. However, after several months of failed attempts to resolve the situation peacefully, Carter moved toward direct confrontation. His concern to control the situation overcame his moral sense of peaceful equality, yet he could not fully commit to the decision-making process required for direct-confrontation. The hostage rescue mission suffered from a lack of definitive guidance, ultimately failing. Carter lost favor and position during the next presidential election, losing his place as president, while Khomeini retained his position of power.

Future Research

Future examination into the areas of psychological profiles and decision prediction would benefit from extensive review of multiple aspects of bias, personality and traits applied to several leaders well beyond the limited scope of this study. Additionally, further research into comparative analysis from psychobiography to case studies beyond the two scenario limited review of this study would enable more accurate correlation between the influences on the decision-making process and effective operations. Due to the importance of precise understanding regarding the decision-making process of political leaders and the influence their decision-making has on effective operations, continuous reexamination of psychological profiles, and decision prediction is essential.

Summary

Showcased within the psychobiography, LAMP comparison of futures and case study analysis, a political leader's psychological profile based on bias, personality and traits do influence decision-making. Bias, personality and traits collectively form the lens through which we view, interpret and act within a given scenario. Emotional or unemotional attachments, commitment to goals, a need to control and the suspicion of others are representative of a small portion of the potential impacts on the decision-making process. Comparison of the LAMP futures and case studies provided indications that a political leader's ability to decide upon viable operations is predictable, as shown by examination of Hitler and Stalin. Yet, the examination of Carter and Khomeini represented by the comparison of LAMP futures and the case study, provided indications that the possibility for permutation of futures poses an issue of contention for accurate prediction of effective decision-making.

Overall, the influence on each political leader's decision-making effectiveness was portrayed in the LAMP examination and confirmed in the case study reviews. Clearly shown in the failures of Hitler and Carter to select viable course of action, contrasting with Stalin and Khomeini's success, political leader profiles do provide defining data on a political leader's effectiveness in approving viable versus unviable operations. Yet, also demonstrated within the case study review was the ease in which alternate futures may transpose. Thus, in order to achieve greater accuracy in defining likely courses of action selected by political leaders, additional research is necessary.

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