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# Why Does Egypt Resist the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Doctrine?

Dale E. Anderson

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**WHY DOES EGYPT RESIST THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P)  
DOCTRINE?**

A Master Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty

of

American Military University

by

Dale Eugene Anderson

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree

of

Master of Arts

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Charles Town, WV

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## DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my wife, Cheryl; and my children, Jordan and Bethany. Their consistent patience, encouragement, and sustained love made this project and the journey it represents possible and pleasurable.

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I wish to thank the following people for their helpful guidance throughout this project. Their clear direction has been greatly appreciated. Dr. Paula Wylie was very helpful in narrowing my focus on a very broad subject. Dr. Charles Metteer, a personal friend, who coached me in organizing my approach to research and writing. More than anyone else Dr. Metteer had the initial confidence in my ability to not only complete a degree, but to complete it with excellence. And finally, to Karen Metteer, M.Div., who edited the work, helping me polish this presentation.

My course work throughout the international relations program has awakened a new level of understanding in my world-view; I look forward to any new opportunities the degree path affords.

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

**WHY DOES EGYPT RESIST THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P)  
DOCTRINE?**

by

Dale Eugene Anderson

American Public University System, February 28, 2016

Charles Town, West Virginia

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ABSTRACT

Considerable research regarding the United Nations doctrine of Responsibility To Protect (R2P) has been focused on the debate between state sovereignty verses human rights protection. Since the Doctrine's inception, smaller non-Western states have argued that R2P presents a threat to state sovereignty arguing for the status quo in the global state system, namely, state sovereignty and noninterference. Egypt has been a dissenting state arguing for that status quo. The purpose of this research is to examine: Why does Egypt resist the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine? This research will analyze the political and cultural norms and values of Egypt using the theoretical framework of modernization theory as researched by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. Using primarily qualitative research strategies (case study and content analysis methods), the analysis will focus on a review of documents, data sets and surveys. The analysis will show that Egypt interprets R2P doctrines as a new norm heralding a shift in the international system from state sovereignty to human rights development and protection.

Next, documentation will show that Egypt's traditional cultural (Islamic) values and political culture (authoritarian regime) values are being threatened by the changing international social order.

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## **Introduction**

Since the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), and the development of the principles for the modern state system, states have had sovereign control over their territories and internal affairs. This sovereign power ensured noninterference from external meddling by other states, regardless of a state's size, making the concept of a state the highest actor in the international relations system. Westphalian principles, which emerged from the peace between Spain, France, Sweden, the Dutch Republic and The Holy Roman Empire, have evolved since the seventeenth century into the foundational norms of the present global system. In the Westphalian system, "...'sovereignty' signifies the legal identity of a state in international law, [and] is the sole repository of sovereign authority, understood as the capacity to make authoritative decisions with regard to the people and resources within the territory of the state" (Badescu 2011, 21). Westphalian principles promise state sovereignty, territorial integrity and nonintervention by neighboring states.

These aforementioned principles are violated at times in International Relations (IR). States use either soft or hard power to coerce other states into economic treaties, boundary shifts, resource acquisition, and more recently, international norms and values socialization (Ramsbotham 2011, 22-23). In many instances it is possible to point to examples of military conflict being used as a source of coercion. Imperialism and colonization of other peoples and lands by larger, stronger states has brokered such principles since the Westphalian agreements began, and more recently has initiated a review by the present international community of the definitions of state sovereignty as it moves deeper into the twenty-first century.

After World War II, during the construction of the United Nations and the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, most of the Westphalian principles have been upheld. State sovereignty, equality, and noninterference ratified at that time, continue their entrenchment-enabling international courts and tribunals the legal foundations to judge between quarreling states. The UN and its structures are seeking to stabilize a global system so that further world wars can be averted, and diminish or eradicate the horrible collateral damage that such conflicts inflict on innocent publics. Since the end of the second war in Europe, no global conflict has emerged, but the international system has seen a rise in intra-state conflicts and the growth of non-state actors with their insurgencies and the targeted blood-letting they bring in their wake. Cases such as the Bosnian War (1992-1995), Somalia (1990-present), Rwanda (1994), Kosovo (1998-1999), and Darfur (2003-present), represent just a handful of genocidal targeting attacks or purposeful instances of mass atrocities upon innocents during combat operations. In the case of Rwanda alone, well over 800,000 innocent human beings were systematically targeted and slaughtered in just over 100 days (CNN 2011). Clearly the global system needs some legitimate, legal means to respond to such crises.

The global community's response in 2001 has set a new trend in International Relations. This response by the United Nations (UN) in conjunction with ratifying states is popularly known as 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) (Bellamy 2011, 8; Evans 2008, 3, 6). This doctrine calls each state member of the international community to their Responsibility to Protect their publics from genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and to provide for the welfare of their people in humanitarian crisis (ICISS 2001, XI). According to this doctrine or developing norm, to which it is also referred, if a

state cannot or refuses to provide such protection, the UN Security Council (UNSC) may establish an international, multinational military force with authorization to cross that state's sovereign boundary and provide the protection necessary to secure the endangered population. Egypt dissents against R2P, arguing that, "...there is no shared [international societal] responsibility beyond a state's responsibility to its citizens and that the protection of civilians should [not] trump [state] sovereignty" (Bellamy 2009, 88, 134). Egypt is challenging R2P, citing the bedrock foundations of the state system built on noninterference according to UN Charter Articles 2(4) and 2(7).<sup>1</sup> And, as a dominant dissenting voice amongst its peers, the impact of Egypt's rejection heightens the state sovereignty debate between the Global North and South, reaching the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) directly as Egypt engages its two-year term in the UNSC.<sup>2</sup>

Breaking a state's sovereign boundary for the sake of sparing human life appears justified, but significant questions remain. The challenge of balancing state sovereignty and international human rights is precarious. The global system has historically been built on international understandings such as the UN Charter Articles 2(4) and 2(7). Yet, with the increase of genocide, targeted crimes against humanity, states and armies must be held accountable for such schemes.<sup>3</sup> And, to add, it is clear that not all states in the global

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<sup>1</sup> UN Charter Articles 2(4) protects member states from the use of force by other states, and 2(7) promises nonintervention in matters of state domestic concern (UN Charter 2016 - <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html>).

<sup>2</sup> As Egypt begins its two-year term in the UNSC, the state is challenged by a consistent view by Western media sources that it has digressed from 'democratic institutions' seeking to increase in authoritarian power via President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. There has been a clear increase in state surveillance against Islamic extremists operating in Egypt and tighter domestic restrictions on civilian movements (O'Grady 2015). Egypt will likely face increasing pressure from UNSC Permanent 5 members regarding their policies, and by R2P watchdogs like the Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect which has already published its 2016-2017 report on the historical record of the newly elected non-permanent UNSC members and their official positions on R2P (GCR2P 2016, 2-3).

<sup>3</sup> ***Crimes against humanity*** are attacks upon civilian populations, regardless of nationality whether during wartime or peace. It is also the umbrella category under which "war crimes" and "genocide" both fall in international law. ***War crimes*** are heinous criminal acts representing dreadful departures from the rules of

community hold the value of human life with the same primary sacredness. It is clear that some states put their cultural beliefs, norms, and laws before the value of human life.

Some place their regime leaders first, creating *de facto* totalitarian governments or *juntas*.

In addition, it seems that many states, which are still resistant to R2P, are randomly unpredictable in respect to their adoption of the UN Charter of Human Rights. Though resistant to R2P, some have adopted the UNCHR and others have not. Egypt has signed and ratified the UNCHR and, as a mediator in the conflict between Gaza's Palestinian Authority and Israel, has even called for a measure of R2P in that conflict—yet still rejects R2P in principle (Bellamy 2011, 26). What explains this dilemma? From a superficial point of view, there appears to be no explanation as to Egypt's dissent other than the claim that R2P threatens their state sovereignty. Irrespective the reassurances of the Global North, and the apparent safeguards written into the R2P rules of engagement, Egypt still opposes Responsibility to Protect, and Western powers scratch their heads in disbelief. Add to this the impact and strength of Egypt's political influence regionally in the Middle East, and one can certainly perceive the growing pressure of this issue and its value for deeper research.

The purpose of this capstone project, therefore, is to examine why Egypt has resisted R2P doctrines. The driving research question for this thesis is: *Why does Egypt resist the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine?* This research will analyze the political and cultural norms and values that are resistant to the foundational values and norms of R2P doctrines, and the political culture of Egypt will be tested via the

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engagement during warfare. Acts such as torture, destruction of property, and the killing of civilians or hostages can be defined as war crimes. **Genocide** is the systematic planned annihilation of a group of people and is an attempt to destroy a group. Some label genocide as the ultimate crime against humanity because the aim of genocide is to eradicate a part of humanity (Task Force on Holocaust Education 2010).

modernization theory of human development as presented by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). By using this theoretical framework, Egypt's political culture and decision-making processes are tested and evaluated. The hypothesis of this thesis is that Egypt considers Responsibility to Protect a threat to its sovereignty because of its traditional cultural norms and beliefs being impacted, swayed and biased by the modernization of stronger, liberal democratic states in the global community.

Egypt is threatened not only in its political sovereignty, but also in its cultural sovereignty as well. Responsibility to Protect reflects, at least in the opinion of Egyptian political and cultural values, a post-modern transformation of global values away from state sovereignty toward an overbalance with human rights. By utilizing modernization theory and the World Values Survey (WVS 2005-2014) developed by Inglehart and Welzel, this capstone project will analyze and evaluate the impact of the independent variable, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) on the dependent variable of Egypt's political and cultural response to the R2P doctrine. In addition, in order to further isolate the causal factors driving Egypt's rejection of R2P, a comparison with the state of Jordan will be conducted. By comparing Egyptian with Jordanian data sets, Egypt's causal factors come into greater focus and certain conclusions emerge.

Responsibility to Protect clearly places great importance and value on human rights and therefore has deep connections to postmodern thought.<sup>4</sup> These values represent a re-centering of Western and European modernism, values that are generally rejected by

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<sup>4</sup> *Postmodern thought* is global in scope, militates against past traditions, focuses more on social justice and ethics, and is consumptive and pluralistic in approach to lifestyle and world-view (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 291-292).

Islamic publics. As Anwar Alam argues, "...it cannot be a mere coincidence that Islamism has emerged at a time when Europe and the West have started questioning their own modernist paradigm" (Alam 2009, 356). This apparent transition by the Western powers from modernism to postmodernism in its norms and values not only challenges non-Western states and their values, but presents a very interesting puzzle for the future of global relations as the developmental gap between states appears to widen.

The research in this project will reveal compelling evidence regarding the causal factors explaining Egypt's dissent of the United Nations' doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Until this project, significant gaps occurred in research in two primary areas. First, until this research project, connections between Egypt's resistance to R2P as explained through modernization theory have not been considered. Second, until this research analysis, the connections between Egypt's governmental regime type (authoritarian/military), how it was used to modernize Egypt, and its subsequent entrenchment as a political and military enclave, has not been considered as a causal factor to Egypt's resistance to R2P and the norms shift taking place in the global community. This project, therefore, offers compelling explanatory evidence as to why Egypt would consider R2P norms a threat to its state sovereignty.

Using primarily qualitative research strategies (case study and content analysis methods), the analysis focuses on a review of documents and surveys. Statistical quantitative data is also considered, namely the World Values Survey and Polity IV Project; however, that statistical data is not produced by this author's research but is part of the qualitative material available in public domain for analysis. Further definition of modernization theory by Inglehart and Welzel (2005) is used to critique and explain the

political culture of Egypt and its response to R2P.

The remainder of this thesis is divided into four familiar sections. Following this introduction, a review of the primary literature and data used for this analysis is summarized, which also includes the basic definitions of terms covered in the research. Immediately after the literature review, the research methodology is defined and established, followed by the fourth section, the findings and analysis of the research data set. And finally, the fifth section of this project finishes with summary conclusions, and proposals for future research.

## **Literature Review**

In considering the driving question of this project, research has uncovered a variety of perspectives that discuss the main themes analyzing Responsibility to Protect and Egypt's response. R2P, as a doctrine in the global community and a developing international norm, focuses on human rights, thereby signaling a potential shift in the driving philosophy of the global state system as established by the UN in 1945. Since that time, the focus of the international community has been the sovereignty of the state and the individual state privacy that it affords. R2P, however, announces to the global community that the 'neighbors are watching,' and privacy to a certain extent has diminished. The causal factors motivating Egypt's resistance and lethargic pace with negotiating the articles that threaten their sovereignty appear unclear. This section begins with a synopsis of the literature discussing and defining the main debate between Responsibility to Protect and its challenge to state sovereignty. Egypt's most recent stance is also reviewed within this section. Following that summary, a review of the main theoretical literature, which defines modernization theory, is discussed.

### ***R2P vs. State Sovereignty: Announcing a Change in Global Values***

First, the content containing the debate imbedded in Responsibility to Protect doctrines is considered. The growing trend of intra-state conflicts has initiated R2P doctrines (Badescu 2011, 1; Bellamy 2009, 1-2, 8-9; 2011, 1-2; Evans 2008, 2-3; Glanville 2014, 8; Knight et.al. 2012, 1, 7). According to Badescu, the horrors of intra-state war in the twentieth century make it clear that, "...an agreed normative foundation for dealing with such crises seemed to be missing" (Badescu 2011, 1). As Bellamy cites, "...the world's most powerful states simply lack the political will to stop...the bloodshed... placing their own interests ahead of the victims...or blocked by political deadlock" (Bellamy 2009, 1-2). By late 2000, Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, had initiated the development of a protocol that would help the UN Security Council respond to the growing number of intra-state conflicts that were responsible for killing hundreds of thousands of innocent victims, like unto the WWII Jewish Holocaust and other events in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Darfur (Evans 2008, 6; Bellamy 2009, 2-3). These growing number of crimes against humanity needed to be stopped or at least significantly checked.

The primary challenge to R2P doctrine is balancing state sovereignty against human rights (Badescu 2011, 19-20; Knight et.al. 2012, 7, 14). There is consensus in principle amongst the global community that human life is sacred, yet the methods of protecting that sacredness within each state have been the sole responsibility and the right of each state. Egypt and other states in a dissenting position claim that the doctrine presents a serious risk to state sovereignty, citing that, "...the international community had [no] responsibility to protect civilians and that the protection of civilians should not

trump sovereignty” (Bellamy 2011, 23). R2P forces the state to be responsible to its people, "...making the people the true sovereign" (Knight et.al. 2012, 258-259). Bellamy, Evans and Glanville argue that the doctrine has built-in rules of engagement, which protect the sovereignty of the state system as R2P is deployed to save lives (Evans 2008; 140-141; Bellamy 2011, 35-40; Glanville 2014, 197). Badescu argues for R2P from the perspective of norm change, analyzing the challenge that values and norm transformation presents to an international system already entrenched on the hard-dried cement of a sovereign state foundation (Badescu 2011, 117). It is painfully clear that the international community needs not only a legal and legitimate mechanism to halt all forms of crimes against humanity and provide for humanitarian need in crisis, but as well, greater agreement regarding international human rights norms from the global community.

Bellamy also adds to the R2P debate with research on economic development and democratization (Bellamy 2011, 91-121). In his discussion of this controversial subject, Bellamy asserts that with any preemptive consideration of R2P doctrines, states have a responsibility to first prevent mass atrocity and genocide through healthy economic development and by cultivating democratic institutions that undergird a healthy economy. Certainly Bellamy’s research and presentation proves modernization theories’ basic core principles. However, for this project, it is Bellamy’s assertion that, “A world of wealthier, more equitable and more democratic states would be one with far fewer atrocities” (Bellamy 2011, 95), that challenges the Egyptian authoritarian regime. Research shows that to a greater extent, those states that are underdeveloped and revert to some government regime form other than democracy, have a higher tendency to violate international human rights charters and doctrines (Bellamy 2011, 102-103). It is this

contribution and data presented by the US government study, Polity IV Project, that clearly demonstrates how Western values and political culture defines non-Western, non-democratic regimes and, on many occasions formulates policy approaches toward non-Western, non-democratic states.

Non-Western states, which are smaller and weaker, recognize that the global system is not equal in many respects. Weaker states often seek protection either in trade agreements, which provide opportunity for growth, or close their doors to foreign trade or Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), thus increasing the potential of inequality that Bellamy says acts as a trigger to unrest and potential atrocities (Bellamy 2011, 98). Since research does reveal that the threat of atrocities or authoritarian strong-arm tactics decrease as states become more democratic, it then makes logical sense that the stronger democratic states in the global system should push that agenda in the global community. If reliable scientific research demonstrates this logic, then what is it that causes states to resist such change for the better? Regardless the answer to that question, one principle is certain: all states have a particular value and norm set, which may or may not align with Western values, and the pressure of a Western agenda, no matter how logical that agenda may be, can be perceived as an imperial advance to socialize the global system (Bellamy 2011, 2). Whether that perception is accurate or not, what a state ‘perceives’ as real can provide a significant trigger to divergent views and subsequent opposing policy.

Another strong data set that reveals the nature of Egypt’s regime type is the Polity IV Project and *Global Report 2014: Conflict, Governance and State Fragility* (Marshall and Cole 2014). Content from these sources analyze the global system, the main regions of conflict, causal factors for conflict, state regime types that are presently in conflict, and

a general state-by-state assessment of governance and the fragility of states (Marshall and Cole 2014, 1-2). These two sources provide extensive research for the case study of Egypt, its regime type, and present stability conditions. Marshall and Cole also provide analytical insight into the nature of conflict, governance and the causal factors of instability within states. Their review of societal upheaval and domestic discontent, triggered by inequality, holds an interesting counterargument to Inglehart and Welzel's studies in modernization theory.

Self-expression that can lead to democratic values is challenged by Marshall and Cole's study. "Mass protest should not be viewed as an exercise in democracy but, rather, as a signal that the political process, whether democratic or autocratic, is failing to adequately recognize the levels of discontent and dissent and properly address an important and valued issue in public policy" (Marshall and Cole 2014, 3). As their research reveals, in states like Egypt, with autocratic regimes or hybrids that amount to nothing more than authoritarianism with a democratic facade, discontent may not necessarily lead to the emergence of democratic values, but actually expose the authoritarianism as that very power which seeks to quell unrest and any attempts to displace its power. These principles, though not the main focus of this thesis project, do help identify the common response of an authoritarian regime as it seeks to hold power, which is certainly what seem to be the governing structure in Egypt, and a likely causal factor for resisting R2P.

Egypt, a leader in the Middle East region, argues that R2P is nothing more than the realist power posturing of Western states. The West forces smaller, weaker states to conform to the human rights protocols (values and norms) established by the global

community (Bellamy 2009, 80). Talal and Schwarz argue convincingly that before R2P is considered, healthy state building and state legitimacy are far greater concerns for the Arab publics. "It might be easier and cheaper to focus on conflict prevention and capacity-building in the field of state-building rather than on intervention once states have already failed" (Talal and Schwarz 2013, 11). In essence, as norm change goes, R2P is considered too big a step for the Arab World to consider (Ibid. 2013, 12-13). Western powers seem to assume that since Arab states agree in principle to the UN Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, that R2P would not represent a significant challenge. In the political culture of Egypt, a dominant leading nation in the Arab World, R2P is not necessarily more important than state sovereignty.

One final piece of literature under review that contributes to the discussion regarding R2P is, *Responsibility to Protect: Cultural Perspectives in the Global South* (Mani and Weiss 2011). Mani and Weiss, editors of a collection of authors from the Global South, contribute to the R2P discussion in two particular ways. First, Mani and Weiss bring research of R2P as influenced by religious beliefs and values from Global South (GS) perspectives and authors. This is a significant contribution of not only valid insight from religious and spiritual beliefs and their definitions, but also identifies how the Western Global North biases impact the Global South. Citing case studies from Africa, East Asia and former Eastern Europe, definitions of religion, beliefs, values, and traditional culture are developed within the over all research of R2P as a developing international norm (Mani and Weiss 2011, 12, 28-30). Using a scholarly scientific approach, this volume introduces 'religious/spiritual' content and cultural motivations of the Global South, while clearly defining key terms.

Second, Mani and Weiss address the bias of the Global North as it often engages conflict zones. In their case study on Nepal, a simple yet powerful conclusion that, “more knowledge of a local culture is a prerequisite to better design international efforts, ...[and that] norms more than laws are what makes villages function; what effectively stand between stability and mass atrocities” (Mani and Weiss 2011, 240-241). It seems from their study, clear non-biased definitions of key terms could help for greater understanding in the global debate with R2P, and could also help educate the Global North to areas where policy and procedure seem to lead with significant bias, assumptions projecting what the West understands of other cultures upon those non-Western cultures.

In summary then, what are the causal factors driving the R2P agenda by the Global North and reciprocal dissent by the Global South? Is R2P a tool in the hands of powerful liberal democratic states bent on global political transformation as well as a potential weapon to punish non-democratic regimes (Knight et.al. 2012, 80-81)? Egypt and other Middle East North Africa (MENA) states see the potential shift from the realist, state-centered framework of the international community to a new theoretical order driven by human rights and security. And in addition, there seems to be a growing trend in the Global South to resist the advancement of particular developing international norms and Western socialization. The rising clarion call for a more equal and fair global system, one with a greater pluralist cultural balance has engaged in a significant manner.

### ***Modernization Theory, Values Transformation and Consequent Conflicts***

In review of the theoretical framework used to analyze Egypt’s response to the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, modernization theory, human development and the World Values Survey is considered (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Fourie 2012, Tessler

2002, Moaddel, and Azad 2002). Modernization Theory, since the time of Karl Marx and Max Weber, has experienced considerable evolution. Marx surmises that, “...socioeconomic development has a powerful impact on what people want and do” (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 1), while Weber suggests, “...a society's cultural heritage continues to shape its prevailing beliefs and motivations” (Ibid. 2005, 1). Extensive research by Inglehart and Welzel establishes a revised definition of modernization theory in which, "socioeconomic development brings cultural changes that make individual autonomy, gender equality, and democracy increasingly likely, ...[promoting] human emancipation on many fronts" (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 2). Clearly, the modernization of the global community is a growing trend especially since the end of WWII. This "human advancement" as explained by modernization theorists is clear, albeit challenged at present by the underdeveloped world as a successful ideology.

Fourie (2012) comparing modernization theory with multiple modernity theory cites Inglehart and Welzel, analyzing gaps and weaknesses in their work. Yet, her main contribution to this thesis and the theory of modernization adds to Inglehart and Welzel. Fourie notes, “...that autonomy and rational mastery are central to modernity, but that different societies can interpret both of those concepts in radically different ways...[therefore, in the case of Islam] Islamism rejects the dominant features of modernity, ...yearning for a mythical past set at odds with certain aspects of [modernity]" (Fourie 2012, 61). Where Inglehart and Welzel have an explanation for Egypt’s rejection of Western values within their definition of modernization, Fourie believes fundamental religion mitigates against Western values of modernity. Inglehart and Welzel’s definition of modernization theory would predict, therefore, Egypt to accept R2P with only minor

challenge regarding state sovereignty. Fourie, on the other hand, would expect greater mitigation by Egypt with the doctrines of R2P since its principles challenge Islamic beliefs and values, and political regime choice.

Inglehart and Welzel have developed the *World Values Survey*, providing over twenty years of data collection testing the evolution of modernization theory in human development. The WVS analyzes the development of democracy stemming from socioeconomic values and norms changes, which in turn transform a culture and promote human self-expression (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 19). Since 1981, Egypt has been a test case participating in the WVS. Over the course of the survey, Inglehart and Welzel notice that religious (what they call traditional) values and norms do have an impact on political culture (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 46). The authors of the survey notice that the traditional values of societies and cultures in transition do not have converging values. In other words, though socioeconomic changes in values and norms do have a societal impact, studies show that modernization does not always lead to democratic ways, but can also follow other trajectories in political regime types—namely authoritarianism, fascism, and communism (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 21). Therefore, datasets produced by the WVS demonstrate that it is possible for modernization in human development to lead to a pluralism in values instead of convergence in certain cases where traditional values have had a major formative impact in the culture.

Tessler's study argues along these lines that traditional values, especially Islamic values, have an impact on political culture in Egypt, while still valuing and able to measure the effects of human development exerted through modernization (Tessler 2002, 1). "From the crash and burn of Algeria's liberalization to Tunisia's more

subtle...transformation into a police state, and Egypt's backsliding into electoral manipulation" (Tessler 2002, 2), not all Arab states are clear democracies. Tessler also demonstrates that often, "...many Arab leaders are motivated to stay in power and protect their personal interests, [even] defending themselves against their own people" (Ibid. 2002, 3). Tessler believes that there is a greater convergence of values between political cultures in the West and Islamic publics, specifically because Islamic belief systems do carry values similar to other cultures (the golden rule, rule of law, etc.) (Ibid. 2002, 13). And lastly, Tessler demonstrates according to evidence from the WVS in Egypt that, "...support for political Islam does not lead to unfavorable attitudes toward democracy among ordinary citizens" (Ibid. 2002, 15). Therefore, Egypt can demonstrate an 'open mind' toward democracy, even when vying for political Islamic institutions.

Moaddel and Azad's research also interprets data from the WVS, offering an explanation of world-view from Islamic publics and the impact of this world-view on political culture (Moaddel and Azad 2002, 1). Though their study showed varying interpretive aspects of Islamic belief in the countries in focus (Egypt, Jordan and Iran), several factors were clear regarding Islamic world-view in Egypt. First, well over 95% of survey respondents classified their identity as "Muslim" (a religious designation) over "Egyptian" (national/political designation); and over 43.7% of respondents said that "...an essential characteristic of democracy ultimately is religious authorities interpreting the law" (WVS 2010, Moaddel and Azad 2002, 3). What is clear from Egyptian respondents on the WVS in 2010, demonstrates that the, "important basis of identity in religious beliefs [in this case Islam] over national identity is a very powerful factor" (Moaddel and Azad 2002, 4). Moaddel and Azad found that Egypt was religious but far

more secular than other ME Islamic publics (Iran or Jordan), often having ruling regimes with differing degrees of authoritarianism (Moaddel and Azad 2002, 6). Moaddel and Azad demonstrate that there is incongruence with one's religious identification in Egypt as compared to an individual's spiritual practice.

Studies by Moaddel and Azad further showed that religious leaders have an impact on the political regime, influencing the political culture and point of view (Moaddel and Azad 2002, 6). Their study also analyzed WVS responses regarding education, women's rights and traditional gender values, finding Egypt to be very traditional while it still validates democratic institutions. Egyptians by and large believe men make better political leaders than women; that women should have diminished authority in the home compared to the man, and hold a noticeable gender bias favoring men in the job market (Ibid. 2002, 22-24). Through the WVS responses in Egypt, it appears that though modernization theory can interpret the desirability of democratic values which impact economic potential, it is clear that traditional (Islamic) values are still deeply entrenched in the political culture of Egypt and do impact political decisions.

Anwar Alam makes a significant contribution to the theoretical framework discussion with his case study, *Islam and Post-Modernism: Locating The Rise of Islamism in Turkey*. Alam's overview of the progression of Islamism in Turkey, though different in kind to the position of Egypt, does provide some valid theoretical perspective. Alam's contribution is primarily two-fold. First, he brings significant perspective when considering the definition of terms between Western and Eastern world-views. As Turkey has sought to ascend to NATO status, the Turkish government has needed to define terms clarifying Islamic values, beliefs, religious concepts, and cultural traditions in order to

contextualize their development as a Islamic state in the post-modern era (Alam 2009, 352). Alam makes it clear that definitions made by Western states of Islamic 'ways' do not always constitute an accurate view of Islamism according to Islamic publics and states. This Western bias has placed pressure on international norm development, especially with human rights, with regards to 'Islamic fundamentalism' and how that is different from any other form of 'religious fundamental' behavior (Ibid. 2009, 353-354). Alam makes it clear that misunderstandings and miscommunications between the Global North and South, especially between Western powers and Islamic publics is painfully evident.

Secondly, Alam offers interesting perspective regarding convergence of post-modern thought and the recent rise in Islamism. "The rise of Islamism reflects part of the growing philosophical critique that points to the limitations of European modernity as a framework to explain the social changes taking place across many societies—developed and underdeveloped, modern and traditional" (Alam 2009, 356). He further asserts that post-modern Islamism is embedded in seeking to de-center Western modernity, cultivate pluralism globally, affirm the values of healthy detente, and reject apologeticism (Alam 2009, 356, 369-370). Alam's case study in Turkey, which also observes the rise of Islamism globally, notices a purposeful de-centering of Western modernity, rejecting outright any bias by Western states projected upon Islamic states or publics. In essence, Alam observes that, "Muslim intellectuals do not try to reconcile Islam and modernity, but rather they are critical of the premises of modernity itself " (Ibid. 2009, 370). Therefore, in applying this principle to Egypt, we find the traditional values of Islam not only resisting Western modernity as it defines what should be ethical in the global state

system, but a purposeful de-centering of Western values for an established pluralism in the international system.

To summarize, several factors are clear from the present research. First, it is clear that R2P represents a transition in values and norms for the global state system. This shift signals a greater focus on human rights and providing for humanitarian need (Evans 2008, Bellamy 2011, Knight et.al. 2011, Badescu 2011, Talal and Schwarz 2013). Second, research is clear that this norm shift presents a considerable challenge to the balance between state sovereignty and human rights for non-western states and much of the Global South (Glanville 2014, Badescu 2011, Bellamy 2011). Third, research is clear that Egypt is one such non-Western state, which is challenging R2P regarding the imbalance this norm creates with state sovereignty (Bellamy 2009, 2011, Glanville 2014). Fourth, by applying modernization theory and data from the WVS, we observe that a large percentage of Egyptians value democratic norms, specifically liberal economic norms, which would tend to predict a major values transition, even possible regime adjustment due to the impact of these new norms (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, WVS 2001-2002). It would seem that the events of the Arab Spring and subsequent regime change would lend validity to modernization theory in Egypt. Finally, modernization theory does allow for traditional values (in this case traditional Islamic values) to impact political culture in a state. At this point in a general sense is where the literature ends. Therefore, in considering why Egypt's political culture considers R2P a threat to its state sovereignty, the present literature under evaluation is inconclusive, leaving a gap in the research.

This research will connect findings from various authors, and data sets including

the World Values Survey and refined modernization theory, with Egypt's refusal of R2P, explaining the causal factors of such rejection. No other research project has connected Egypt's resistance of R2P norms because of its Islamic traditional values, and its authoritarian political regime type within the proposed theoretical framework of modern and postmodern theory. A comparison with another state [Jordan] from the ME region provides an opportunity to further elucidate the causal factors driving Egypt's rejection and hesitation with R2P norms development. These connections offer a unique analysis of Egypt's causal motivations for refusing R2P doctrines. The connections found in the research addressing this gap are presented in the findings and analysis section of this thesis, preceded by the research methodology found in the next section.

### **Methodology and Research Strategy**

In developing a method of research and subsequent tools for the analysis of this capstone, several questions need consideration. First, why conduct this research? The causal factors engaging Egypt's rejection of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine are paramount to further investigations regarding the political culture of states. This research is necessary because most states rejecting R2P cite state sovereignty as the main causal factor for a dissenting opinion. Yet the 'state sovereignty' defense is often used as the formal line of protest with various underlying factors hidden behind the primary argument. The purpose of this research analysis and case study, therefore, seeks to uncover any hidden causal factors for Egypt's objections. The relationships between Egypt, modernization theory and R2P have no previous connection point, which makes this research unique and necessary. Next, this research seeks to expand existing theoretical frameworks. Using modernization theory as the main tool to test Egypt's

rejection of R2P gives deeper insight into the state's political culture, and any biases or weaknesses in the theoretical framework. Finally, Egypt provides a unique research opportunity because of its potential as a template design in the Middle East for Islamic publics.

Using qualitative research strategies, this thesis triangulates data from several sources, utilizing case study and content analysis formats for articles, books, surveys, and significant video documentation.<sup>5</sup> Statistical quantitative data is considered, aided by the World Values Survey and Polity IV Project; however, that statistical data is not produced by this author's research but is part and parcel of the scope of material available in public domain. The focus of this data and goal of this methodology is to analyze the impact of the independent variable, the UN doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), upon the dependent variable, Egypt's response to the threat against its sovereignty by R2P.

Modernization theory is used as the theoretical framework to critique and examine the political culture of Egypt, explaining why R2P is considered a threat to its state sovereignty. The hypothesis of this capstone project proposes that Egypt considers Responsibility to Protect a threat to its state sovereignty in two primary ways. First, Egypt's cultural sovereignty as an Islamic public continues to be threatened by R2P. Egypt's traditional (predominantly Islamic) cultural norms and beliefs are influenced, swayed and biased by the modernization of the stronger, liberal democratic states of the global community. R2P, at least in the opinion of Egyptian cultural values, represents a

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<sup>5</sup> Two videos from the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs at Georgetown University were included in the documentation. [1] Rethinking Religion and World Affairs - [https://youtu.be/\\_X51qfHMbRQ](https://youtu.be/_X51qfHMbRQ); [2] God's Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics - <https://youtu.be/GsoWD5Mifz8>

post-modern transformation of global values away from state sovereignty toward an overbalance with human rights. Second, Egypt is threatened in its political sovereignty by R2P. Historically, dating as far back as the ancient pharaonic dynasties, Egypt is structured politically by a bold authoritarian leader supported by a strong military.<sup>6</sup> Egypt envisions building an Islamic Constitutional government with certain liberal democratic institutions (Rutherford 2008, 102-105). This hybrid form of government is threatened by further international influences from modern/post-modern norms transition, primarily by states in the Global North and the socializing effect that powerful states have on smaller ones.

This thesis employs two qualitative research methods to analyze the hypothesis-- case study and content analysis (Klotz and Prakash 2008). First of all, a comparison case study approach evaluates Egypt's political culture with the Kingdom of Jordan. A comparison between Egypt and Jordan provides greater clarity for Egypt's rejection of Responsibility to Protect. Egypt is a valuable case study since its position in the Middle East as a negotiator is valued by neighboring states and the UN. As well, from the beginning wave of the World Values Survey, Egypt is a consistent participant, providing valuable data and insight into its cultural values and norm transitions. In addition, as an Islamic public, Egypt provides insight into the challenges Islamic publics have in producing liberal democratic values and the domestic institutions that support them. And

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<sup>6</sup> In his chapter entitled, *Authoritarian Regimes*, (Caramani 2011, 102-117), Paul Brooker states, "*disguised military rule* is when the military's rule has been disguised either by civilianizing the regime or by ruling indirectly through behind-the-scenes influence over a civilian government" (Caramani 2011, 109). He adds, "The civilianization of a military dictatorship involves...a military officer holding the post of president (though often...the presidency involves no more than the military incumbent resigning or retiring from the military)" (Ibid. 2011, 109). What is interesting to note is that this appears to be a *modus operandi* for Egypt, as recent as the present regime structure under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, former Egyptian General.

finally, Egypt's political culture and government are recovering from the recent upheaval of the Arab Spring and subsequent regime changes. Especially for that reason, modernization theory is evaluated within a context that provides fresh data for analysis.

Alongside Egypt, Jordan is juxtaposed for this research, providing a comparison data set within the region. Jordan provides an interesting comparison partner for a few reasons. First, Jordan as a near neighbor in the Middle East faces similar pressures as an Arab state. Both Egypt and Jordan share a border with Israel, and both have rich histories of conflict and resolution with Israel. Second, Jordan has certain similarities in political culture to Egypt.<sup>7</sup> Though the primary structures are dissimilar, both states host authoritarian regime types with various constitutional frameworks in operation at some level. Third, the official religion of Jordan, Islam, matches Egypt's. With these and other similarities, one expects that both states would partner together in rejecting R2P. Yet, from the formative moments of Responsibility to Protect doctrines, Jordan has never waived in its support of the doctrine, which makes for an excellent comparison case in contrast to Egypt.

The content analysis of the datasets for Egypt and Jordan clearly reveal Egypt's position with Responsibility to Protect doctrines. Questions from the World Values Survey selected and analyzed are characteristic of Egyptian and Jordanian cultural and political norms and values. Several value questions from Wave 5 (2005-2007) and Wave 6 (2010-2014) of the survey are examined for the analysis. The questions used to create

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<sup>7</sup> Jordan is considered a *constitutional monarchy*. Thus King Abdullah II is the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief. The king *appoints* the executive branch of the government, the Prime Minister, Cabinet, and the regional governors (Freedom House 2013). <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/jordan>. Like Egypt, Jordan is not considered a "free" state, as compared to other democratic states. It is in this way Egypt and Jordan have similar political cultures.

the dataset are applied to both states of the case study for consistency. Since the WVS has over two hundred questions, a representative group of thirteen questions are selected for the dataset of this analysis. These thirteen questions use the revised definition of modernization theory as a guide.<sup>8</sup> The questions are selected and organized into four main categories: *freedom of choice values*, *equality values*, *traditional values*, and *political leadership values*. This thesis believes that the case studies and content analysis of Egypt and Jordan offers interpretive understanding as to why the political climate of Egypt considers R2P a threat.

It is critical to define key terms for this project since not all terms carry identical definitions from one researcher or culture to another. To start, key terms that need defining are, "traditional values," "norms," and "beliefs and values." First, traditional values are commonly understood by scholarship to institute any area where culture (mainly religion) influences beliefs, values, and norms (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 18-19). Next, norms represent the accepted, "shared understandings and values that shape preferences and identities of states...and legitimize behavior" (Badescu 2011, 101). For Egypt, an accepted understanding or value that shapes their preferences, legitimizing their behavior, is state sovereignty in the global system. Egypt believes Responsibility to Protect represents a new norm. And finally, beliefs and values are those components of society that often shape norms development. Beliefs are those convictions and truths that society hold to be true about human beings within their space, and values are the behaviors or 'rightful conduct' that manifest what a society believes (Mani and

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<sup>8</sup> "Socioeconomic development brings cultural changes that make individual autonomy, gender equality, and democracy increasingly likely, ...[promoting] human emancipation on many fronts" (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 2). See also Christian Welzel, *Freedom Rising* (2013), Cambridge Press, page 67.

Weiss 2011, 12; Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 6, 19). These definitions are often a point of miscommunication between the Global North and South and so need common ground for this discussion.

Other key terms of a sectarian nature need clarification and are critical for this capstone project. First, distinctions between ‘religion’, and ‘spirituality’ are necessary since it is routinely accepted in the Global South that religion and spirituality are not interchangeable terms. The main difference accepted by scholarship between religion and spirituality is important to discuss because it impacts one of the causal factors for Egypt rejecting R2P. For the Western world and much of the Global North, ‘religion’ represents, “...the man-made rules and regulations, rigid structures, the external, social, public and even political dimension of religion, while ‘spirituality’ implies the interior mode of relating to the divine, the private and personal relationship with God” (Mani and Weiss 2011, 28). Simply put, “... ‘religion’ equates to external laws, rituals, social institutions and cultural customs, whereas spirituality with love and with the soul or heart” (Ibid. 2011, 28). These Western definitions and distinctions often create pressure for states in the non-Western world because most of the Global South adheres to more of a spiritual approach to their traditional values.

These key concepts are a challenge for Western thinkers when considering worldview. In the Western paradigm, scholars primarily see Islam as a religion (set of rules and laws, rituals, etc.) while Islamic thinkers and scholars view themselves as spiritual believers on a path (Alam 2009, 369-370). In essence, Western worldview interprets Islam as one of the monotheistic ‘religions’ of the earth, which means the Western approach to policy, procedure and relational engagement is often considered

biased. Mani and Weiss further defend the addition of religion and spirituality in R2P debate. They determine that the discussion of religion and spirituality in the context of R2P is necessary as, "it enables peoples to assess human behavior and political regimes and decide what kind of behavior is abhorrent and should not be tolerated" (Mani and Weiss 2011, 30). This, of course, engages our discussion of Egypt as a case study since the state challenges R2P doctrines along state sovereignty lines. Egypt rejects any notion that the Global North is the benefactor who determines what is considered 'abhorrent behavior,' and also rejects international assessments of political regimes, if R2P legitimizes or legalizes regime disruption. Two other biases that impact this research are considered in summary in the findings and analysis section.

### **Findings and Analysis**

In this research, an unexplained gap emerges when considering Egypt's rejection of UN Responsibility to Protect doctrines. This thesis links findings from the World Values Survey and refined modernization theory, Egypt's refusal of R2P, and the causal factors of such rejection. No other research project has connected Egypt's resistance to R2P norms because of its traditional Islamic values, its anocratic political regime within the theoretical framework of modernization theory. Based on the documentation under examination for this research, what clear findings and analyses present themselves when considering the impact of the independent variable, the UN doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), upon the dependent variable, Egypt's response to the threat against its sovereignty by R2P? This section begins with research findings analyzing the political culture of Egypt in comparison to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Egyptian political culture emerges with greater clarity when compared to a similar neighbor from the

Middle East. And, this section concludes with findings and analysis of biases in modernization theory that sifted to the surface during the research phase of this project.

### ***Egyptian and Jordanian Political Culture - World Values Survey Dataset***

To begin, several questions from the World Values Survey provide analytical insight regarding the cultural values of Egypt and the impact of those values on the state's political culture. These particular values stem from over 160 questions from Wave 5 and 6 of the survey conducted in Egypt from 2005-2014 (WVS 2014). Thirteen questions are used, as they provide interesting data regarding the political, economic, and religious culture of Egypt, from which the hypothesis of this project is tested. Further comparison with datasets from another Middle Eastern state (Jordan) provides a contrasting view for this particular study. These thirteen value questions are listed below and the final five questions are preceded by their survey prompts (WVS 2010-2014):<sup>9</sup>

v. 7 - How important is *politics* in your life?

v. 9 - How important is *religion* in your life?

v. 19 - Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? - *Religious faith*.

v. 45 - When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women do

v. 51 - On the whole, men make better political leaders than women

v. 52 - A university education is more important for a boy than a girl

v. 53 - On the whole, men make better business executives than women do

I will describe various types of *political systems* and ask what you think about each one as a way of governing this country. For each one, would

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<sup>9</sup> All questions in this data set are taken from the World Values Survey website, Wave 5 and 6 for Egypt and Jordan. <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSONline.jsp>

you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?

v. 127 - Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.

v. 128 - Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country.

v. 129(150)<sup>10</sup> - Having the army rule.

v. 130 - Having a democratic political system.

Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of **democracy**. Please tell me, for each of the following things, how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy” and 10 means it definitely is “an essential characteristic of democracy”:

v. 132 - Religious authorities ultimately interpret the laws.

v. 140 - How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?

These questions are selected on the basis of two criteria. First of all, which value questions demonstrate increased self-expression moving toward democratic values? And second, which value questions provide insight into the traditional and political culture of Egypt as compared to Jordan? Table 1 organizes the thirteen value questions into four categories, which contribute to the overall analysis of the hypothesis. The four categories are defined as: **freedom of choice**, means the political and traditional self-determination of lifestyle choices; **gender equality**, means how the culture views gender opportunities in all spheres of society; **traditional**, means traditional religious beliefs and values; and finally, **political leadership**, means the type of preferred leadership (executive and

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<sup>10</sup> Values question 129 from Wave 6 and question 150 from Wave 5 serve as a critical comparison for Jordan and Egypt. The question content remains the same for the two survey waves as only the value

legislative) for each state.

<b>Category</b>	<b>WVS Question #</b>
<i>Freedom of Choice</i>	v. 7, 140
<i>Gender Equality</i>	v. 45, 51, 52, 53
<i>Traditional</i>	v. 9, 19, 132
<i>Political Leadership</i>	v. 127, 128, 129(150), 130

Table 1 - Categories for Analysis

*Freedom of Choice Values*

To begin, freedom of choice values (v. 7, 140) in the most recent wave of the World Values Survey are considered. First, for Egypt, value question (v.7) reveals that 75% of Egyptians state that *politics* are either ‘very important—31%, or rather important—44%’ (WVS 2014). Clearly, 75% of the survey group considers politics an important subject in life. Jordan on the other hand, seems less engaged as a political public since 59.6% of respondents on the same question state that politics is 'not at all important' or 'not very important' (WVS 2014). Based on this statistic, one would expect significant attention to the political culture of Egypt by its population, and an active political public, whereas Jordan would not. In value question (v. 140) survey respondents are asked how important is democracy. Over 90% absolutely or strongly agree democracy is important for Egypt, and 81% in Jordan (WVS 2014). Clearly both states have a high value for democracy as a regime type and wish to live in a political public directed by democratic institutions.

*Traditional (Religious) Values*

Traditional (religious) value questions (v. 9, 19, 132) provide interesting responses from the WVS for both Egypt and Jordan. With value question (v. 9) survey

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question number changes. Both Jordan and Egypt were surveyed in Wave 5 (v. 150), but in Wave 6 (v.

results reveal that 99.8% of those polled in Egypt, consider *religion* important in life. Interestingly, 94.1% deem religion as very important, while 5.7% state that religion is rather important (WVS 2014). Moaddel and Azadarmaki report that in Egypt, "...people were more likely to describe themselves as Muslims, above Egyptian (Moaddel and Azadarmaki 2002, 4)." The trend that in most cases, Egyptians are more likely to identify themselves with a religious designation (Muslim) over state citizenship (Egyptian) means that religious values will have some impact on political decisions in Egypt. There were similar findings in Jordan as 93.3% of respondents consider religion to be very important, 6.2% rather important with a combined total of 99.5% (WVS 2014). Jordanians also would consider their religious designation of greater importance than their national one-- 70% to 14% respectively (Moaddel and Azad 2002, 4). Clearly religion is an important value for both Egyptians and Jordanians, with the expectation that these values would impact the political culture of both states.

Next, both Egypt and Jordan believe religious faith is an important value for children to have. In value (v. 19), 83% of respondents in Egypt 'mentioned' that religious faith was an important quality for a child to have (WVS 2014). In light of the previous question, it does not seem odd that a high percentage of Egyptians want to see their children, the employable public of the next generation, honoring religious traditions into adulthood. As well, 79.8% of respondents in Jordan state that religious faith was important for their children (WVS 2014). Clearly Egypt and Jordan see religious faith and training of the next generation in Islamic beliefs a critical component of state values.

In (v. 132), the essential characteristics of democracy are evaluated. In Egypt, 55% of respondents say that, "...an essential characteristic of democracy would be for

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129) only Jordan's survey included the same values question content.

religious authorities [to] interpret the laws" (WVS 2014). This percentage represents the strength of the top four responding groups combined, leaving analysts to surmise that imams, pastors, priests, or other clergy should be the main foundation to the judiciary in a democratic Egypt. In Jordan, 43.4% of the same top four respondent groups agree to the same value question (WVS 2014). This difference suggests that Egyptians value the input of religious authorities when interpreting law, more so than Jordanians. In addition, this disparity could also suggest that Jordan is more secular in its approach to interpreting laws than Egypt.

### *Gender Equality Values*

When comparing gender equality, four value questions (v. 45, 51, 52, 53) are used to review the roles between men and women. These questions reveal whether Egypt holds to more traditional values or are moving toward greater equality between the genders. To start, we begin with (v. 45). In Egypt, when the job market is under pressure, 83.4% of respondents agree that men have more right to a job than women do (WVS 2014). Congruently, Jordanian respondents agreed (80.6%) that men should be put to work first (WVS 2014). Certainly this statistic would be based on the jobs available, since not all jobs carry gender specificity. Bellamy's point that often the unemployment created by authoritarian regimes can cause unrest is significant (Bellamy 2011, 98). It is unclear whether this particular question identifies traditional values inherent in Egypt and Jordan or simply practical economic sense, since large numbers of unemployed men are more likely to express dissatisfaction when employment is uncertain.

Related to this, (v. 53) paints a similar picture from a different perspective. On the whole, a cumulative 79.7% of respondents in Egypt believe that men are better business

executives than women (WVS 2014). In Jordan, a combined total of 71% also agree with this value (WVS 2014). Whether (v. 53) is a reflection of data from the executive business world or the fact that few women are business executives in these two states is a cause for further study. When considering these two values, (v. 45, 53), one might conclude that any study of the job market would uncover fewer opportunities for women for advancement into executive positions and significant inequality between the genders in the Egyptian and Jordanian employment sector. Whether this is indicative of traditional (Islamic) values or the result of an authoritarian regime remains to be seen. Moaddel and Azad partially attribute these gender value differences to age and education, 'a higher percentage of older people with a lower level of education tend to agree with giving priority to men over women' (Moaddel and Azad 2002, 23). One thing is for certain, based on these responses, one would anticipate Egypt resisting any emerging international human rights norm pressing for greater equality amongst the genders in society.

Continuing with gender equality values, responses to values (v. 51, 52) suggest further proclivity with males over females in two other ways. First, with (v. 51) both Egypt and Jordan agree that men make better political leaders than women do. In Egypt, 86.4% of respondents believe that men make better political leaders than women, with Jordan at 80.5% (WVS 2014). This confidence is exhibited in both states considering the male dominated monarchy in Jordan and the authoritarian/military male dominated sector of Egypt. This dataset suggests that Egypt and Jordan are very patriarchal societies with men dominating the political leadership arena. Second, (v. 52) finds Egypt and Jordan in common agreement again regarding the importance of a university education for boys or

girls. In Egypt, 64.1% and in Jordan, 71.2% of respondents disagree that boys should be favored over girls in post-secondary education (WVS 2014). Suggesting that a post-secondary education is of greater importance for a boy than a girl suggests more traditional gender roles. It is interesting to note that while traditional values would seem to favor males over females in the job market, certainly this inequality is not suggested with higher education.

### *Political Leadership Values*

The remaining questions (v. 127, 128, 129[150], 130) survey political systems and the nature of leadership. From Egypt's political system, two interesting outcomes are evident. First, in (v. 127), 71% of those surveyed state that it is, "...very good that Egypt have a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections" (WVS 2014). In converse, 53.7% of Jordanian respondents say that such unaccountable structures in the political system is bad (WVS 2014). This fact seems somewhat contradictory when considering Jordan's political framework: a ruling monarchy with a functioning parliament. Barari and Satkowski suggest such discontent with Jordanians is that their troubles, '...are increasingly economic, not political, and they see that corruption has reached a point where it is impeding the functioning of the state' (Barari and Satkowski 2012, 53). For this reason, Jordanians seek a more accountable system. Second, in (v. 128), 58% of the total number of cases completing the survey in Egypt state that, "...having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country is very good" (WVS 2014). Jordanians are more evenly divided with (v. 128) with 43.4% affirming such experts, and 46.5% against any system lacking common checks and balances (WVS 2014). It would appear that a significant

number of respondents in Egypt favor a strong leader, even possibly authoritarian leadership, to an elected parliament representing the citizens. Another conclusion could be that Egyptians have not been duly informed of the nature of democratic processes and institutions, but this seems unlikely.

Third, with (v. 130) there appears to be considerable agreement between Egyptian and Jordanian interests in a democratic political system. In response to (v. 130), 70% of Egyptians state that having a democratic political system would be 'very good' while 28% say that such a system would be 'fairly good' (WVS 2014). Clearly, Egyptians desire a democratic political system by nearly three-quarters of those polled. For Jordan, however, the response is significantly less with 48.8% agreeing having a democratic system is 'very good' and 37.2% believe such a system is 'fairly good' (WVS 2014). What can account for such a discrepancy? Jordan appears more secular yet less willing to have a democratic political system, whereas Egypt greatly desires democracy while sitting under military authoritarian rule. Clearly the inconsistencies emerging do not add up.

The fourth and final value question under consideration (v. 129[150]) surveys the willingness of both states (Egypt and Jordan) to have military rule. In analyzing the data for two survey waves (Wave 5 and 6), significant contrasts emerge. In Wave 5 of the survey Egypt and Jordan both positively support military rule at 55% and 67% respectively (WVS 2005).<sup>11</sup> Yet, the Hashemite state reverses course with 66% of respondents rejecting military rule at the conclusion of the Jordanian version of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2012 (WVS 2014).<sup>12</sup> Strangely enough there is no reported data for

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<sup>11</sup> Wave 5 of the World Values Survey was submitted and completed by both Egypt and Jordan in 2007, just prior to the Arab Spring. 'Having the army rule' was value question (v. 150) on the Wave 5 survey.

<sup>12</sup> Jamal Khashoggi in his article, "Morocco and Jordan are successful Arab Spring Models" for *Al Arabiya*, explains that the Jordanian Spring was more peaceful (no deaths) because King Abdullah II, 'opened his

(v. 129) under Egypt's Wave 6 survey. One plausible explanation for the absence of (v. 129) on the Egyptian survey is the evident involvement of the Egyptian Army's coup in the summer of 2013.<sup>13</sup> "...The military-led government has shown its unwillingness to abide by international human rights law" (R2P Monitor 2013, 13). Egypt's willingness to have military rule is evident, while Jordan's reversal still holds at present.

In summary, several distinctive traits emerge to describe Egypt's political culture from the WVS dataset. First, it is clear from responses regarding political systems that some hybrid form of democracy would be the regime of choice in Egypt. This hybrid form of democracy in Egypt would include a strong leader with independent autonomy, expert knowledge brokers making the most important decisions, and a religious judiciary interpreting laws. In addition, data suggests that Egyptians by and large choose a traditional (religious) identity rooted primarily in Islam, not nationality (Egyptian). And, traditional Egyptian political culture is generally male dominant and paternally focused. The similarities between Egypt and Jordan cause one to question why there is such a distinction in their reactions to UN Responsibility to Protect doctrines. Yet, certain causal factors for Egypt's rejection of R2P begin to emerge when juxtaposed beside Jordan, a neighboring authoritarian monarchy in the ME helping Syrian refugees and not resistant to R2P.<sup>14</sup>

### ***Confronting Global Norm Transformation***

Considering Egypt's rejection of Responsibility to Protect, research is clear that

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arms to Islamic proponents [namely the Muslim Brotherhood], but they refused to participate [in open discussions] so a large number of Islamic supporters abandoned them [MB] because they saw that they ran away from their responsibilities' (Khashoggi 2014).

<sup>13</sup> President Mohammed Morsi was deposed by the Egyptian military on 3 July, 2013 (R2P Monitor 2013, 13).

R2P presents a major transition in values and norms for the global community. This signaling of a substantial shift with a greater focus on human rights providing for humanitarian need demonstrates that the international relations system is certainly experiencing a significant social evolution and transformation (Bellamy 2011, 8-9; Knight et.al. 2011, 260-261; Badescu 2011, 101; Talal and Schwarz 2013, 2-3). “The R2P doctrine challenge[s] certain key assumptions/norms in international ethics and redefine[s] the relationship between state-sovereignty and humanitarian intervention, [and R2P] implies a people-centered approach [replacing] a realist, state-centered, and militant concept of security with a new concept of ‘human security’” (Knight et.al. 2011, 258). This change makes R2P norms different than past forms of humanitarian intervention used by the international system. Now, under R2P doctrine, it is not just the responsibility of the state to protect its publics, but the responsibility of the international community to intervene and protect people at risk. Brooks argues, “...leading powers have declared...through the [UN] Security Council, that sovereignty implies a legal duty to protect civilian populations, and that states that fail in this duty can no longer assume a sovereign right to be free from outside interference, including the use of force” (Brooks 2013, 722-723). Therefore, with this change in humanitarian intervention practice, smaller states may become insecure before the might of Western democratic “humanitarian virtue,” abandoning over time the foundations of state sovereignty.

The pragmatic impact of this virtue as witnessed by UNSC Resolution 1973, R2P’s first mandated test in the Libyan Civil War of 2011. It could be interpreted that, ‘...*justification* of reaction and *execution* of reaction...’ (Knight et.al. 2011, 266) need

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<sup>14</sup> According to UNHCR websites, Jordan is hosting over 1,000,000 refugees from the Syrian-ISIS conflict as of December 2015, whereas Egypt is hosting slightly over 250,000. And, Jordan has been a consistent

further review and definition. Once Resolution 1973 was adopted by the UNSC, and NATO executed its mandate, Egypt could see its fears realized. Mandated to protect and create a no-fly zone, with no foreign military occupation; NATO went beyond what some have analyzed as its authorized mission (Knight et.al. 2011, 266-267).<sup>15</sup> "R2P in Libya morphed from civilian protection to regime change" (Brooks 2013, 716). The concern with R2P was not just the fact that it could become a mechanism for Western norm imposition, but that the imbalanced nature of the state system could lead to an, '...unfair application' of the new norm (Knight et.al 2011, 81). After all, if Russia, China, North Korea or other larger more powerful states, even the US for that matter, find themselves in a similar humanitarian crisis necessary for invoking R2P would the international community and the UNSC intervene? Or, would R2P be used only against weaker states in need of such stabilization as they are facing the threat of international intervention and potential regime change?

Intervention has always been an issue in International Relations (IR). From the beginning of the Westphalian state system, '...sovereignty is frequently connected with the norm of nonintervention...' (Badescu 2011, 21). Nonintervention is a foregone conclusion within the norm structure of the global state system, yet historically it is clear that states have, '...intervened in the affairs of other states,...for various reasons' (Ibid. 2011, 22). In 'Westphalian sovereignty...questions arise for...developing countries about how the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect could in some ways condition their sovereignty, depending on how it is carried out' (Luck 2009, 16-17). This fact is a

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supporter of R2P (GCR2P 2009, 11).

<sup>15</sup> Richard Falk, in his article, 'Libya After Qaddafi' in *The Nation*, argues that, 'NATO may have destroyed the prospects for future legitimate uses of the principle of responsibility to protect' (Falk 2011). Now that

springboard for the evolution of R2P as a norm in world affairs. In retrospect, the threat R2P poses to state sovereignty appears to be in how it forces change in the basic definition of traditional ‘...imperial concepts of sovereignty to that of popular sovereignty, according to which sovereignty now resides in the political will of the population, rather than in the will of its ruler or government (Badescu 2011, 41).’ Here again triggers the main issue for Egypt in that historically, Egyptian politics and governments are a consistent study in strong authoritarian leaders backed by a supportive, vigilant and powerful military (Cook 2005, iv, 1). If R2P is changing the very definition of state sovereignty, away from the will of leaders and governments, favoring the people of a state, then Egypt’s commonly accepted plan for government is being threatened.

Next, any state resisting R2P may be interpreted as exaggerating the threat of the new norm against state sovereignty, or at the very least heartless to the plight of humanitarian need in the midst of crisis. As Inglehart and Welzel assert, “...a society’s historical cultural heritage [religion, history, beliefs, etc.] continues to shape the values and behavior of its people, [in essence]...cultural convergence is not taking place, ...though states are becoming wealthier and more educated (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 46).” Thus, modernization theory can explain why the emerging norm of R2P is such a strong agent of change within the global system. In fact, Martin Gilbert describes R2P as, ‘the most significant adjustment to [global] sovereignty [norms] in 360 years’ (Talal and Schwarz 2013, 2). For Egypt, a state clearly holding to Islamic beliefs and values, R2P is a new norm that both affirms the necessity of human rights protection while realizing that the global community is responsible for human rights violations, not just states. Human

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Egypt has joined the UNSC for its two-year term, Russia and China may have an extra dissenting vote when it comes to R2P decisions.

development and modernization theory explains R2Ps rise, affirms Egypt's right of dissent based on its cultural values, but leaves a gap when explaining that dissent in political terms. Human emancipation and self-expression are recent values emerging within and between states in the global system. R2P may not be a powerful enough trigger initiating this value trend, but certainly is a sign of norm change, and a serious shift in the management of global affairs.

To continue, Egypt's traditional Islamic values are challenged by Western political authorities. "R2P, and especially the component of outside military intervention to halt mass atrocities, ...from a religious standpoint, states are human invention[s], and God remains the real sovereign above all earthly rulers" (Mani and Weiss 2011, 45). One common difference between the Global North and South is reflected in the connections between religious and secular world-views in global affairs. In the Global North, political authorities seem glad to maintain a healthy, albeit somewhat fearful distance from religious authorities and motivations. In fact, 'it is hard to find a social science that has given less attention to religion than political science' (Baumgartner et.al. 2008, 171). Yet, in the Global South, religion and spirituality are accepted motivations in politics, economics, and many other basic cultural beliefs, values and norms since, 'religion and spirituality [promote] a comprehensive and holistic way of life' (Mani and Weiss 2011, 29). Separating sectarian from secular culture for much of the Global South is simply just not possible. And, according to scholars like Timothy Samuel Shah, the Global North needs to, 'rethink religion and world affairs, ...[since] secularism is not a precondition to democracy' (Shah 2012). The international political roadmap that Egypt and other Islamic Global South states are confronted with is a daunting one.

Egypt is caught in this transitional space between the Global North and South. As recent as the Morsi Administration in Egypt, schisms between Islamic political factions, the inability of Islamic theorists to define political institutional praxis, and Islamic constitutional overreach triggered yet another transition in state power (Trager 2012, 1-2; Brown and Hamzaway 2008, 2). If a belief influencing Egypt's political culture is found in that the God of Islam, Allah, ultimately holds all authority and vests that authority in the leaders of a state; then it stands to reason that for such leaders to subjugate state sovereignty to some other authority would be considered religious blasphemy by radical Islamists and trigger significant internal cultural pressure at a domestic level.<sup>16</sup> 'Western-inspired ideals of nationalism, economic growth, the modernization of traditional forms of family life and gender relations,' (Toft et.al. 2011, 117), represent a new pattern for most Islamic publics and political authorities. Charting a healthy path for Islamic states to democracy requires the Global North to include religious motivations in IR research, and calls the Global South to adequately define their participation in democratic institutions.

Perhaps the most significant find in the research, is Egypt's authoritarian regime. Egypt's powerful controlling military enclave, supports a strong authoritarian leader (Cook 2007, 1). Rutherford also defends the notion of 'hybrid regimes' in the Middle East, including Egypt in his discussion of states developing hybrid forms of 'autocratic and democratic institutions' (Rutherford 2008, 17). Pointing to the development of Egyptian regime types over the last five decades, both Cook and Rutherford consider authoritarianism as the predominant form of government (Cook 2007, 15; Rutherford

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<sup>16</sup> The Minister of Justice in Egypt, Ahmed al-Zind was recently released from his position for derogatory remarks made about the Prophet Mohammed during a televised interview (Elwazer 2016). It is clear that though President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has returned a measure of authoritarianism to Egypt, and besieged radical Islam, that there is still demand for the respect of Islamic values amongst Egypt's citizenry.

2008, 16). Rutherford states that, "...hybrid regimes...may contain legislatures, independent judiciaries, and civil society organizations...however, they do not allow the transfer of power through elections and, therefore, are not fully-functioning democracies" (Rutherford 2008, 17). Hybrid regimes allow democratic institutions an opportunity to develop in tandem with the values of autocratic regimes (Ibid 2008, 24). As Cook defends, the military enclave in Egypt started in the 1950s with the onset of the post-WWII modernization and democratization period:

During that era, scholars of the Middle East hypothesized that relatively autonomous militaries were progressive forces of modernization and democratization....Analysts saw the military—fused as it was with organizational capacity, sense of mission, and nationalist sentiment—as the ideal instrument to direct the processes of industrialization, institutionalization, and reform necessary for the development of a modern society (Cook 2007, 14).

Egypt's hybrid, a mixture of democratic institutions emerging alongside authoritarian controls, is still dominated by its military enclave. If R2P becomes a mechanism used to unseat authoritarian/military regimes, then the generals stand to lose their hold on the national economy, not to mention their political power. Though Egypt's authoritarian/military oligarchy is not new information to the IR community, the reality of this regime type provides a clear causal factor for Egypt's refusal of R2P.

The disguised military regime in Egypt still controls the economy and is pressured by strained relationships with the United States. Egypt is a rentier state in the Middle East as are several other states including Jordan. Rentier states are those, which receive funding, aid or some form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from external sources (other states or international organizations) in return for influence (Beblawi 1987, 385). Egypt, therefore, as a rentier state to the US, partners with American interests in the ME region. In this way, the US is able to project power (influence) through Egypt increasing

security in the region with other allies. Successive, 'US administration[s] have long supported authoritarian regimes in the region to ensure stability' (Nanda 2012, 25). The financial benefits for Egypt's continued cooperation in recent years, has been in the billions.<sup>17</sup> US-Egyptian relations are cooling, however, as US financial aid in the region is not buying the influence it once did. Fear in Washington over restructuring the relationship is held in check by the concerns that, 'a spurned Egypt would stop cooperating with the US military and thus stymie Washington's ability to project power in the region' (Hanna 2015, 72). Washington has seen this *modus operandi* before with Jordan in the early 1980s.<sup>18</sup> The relationship between Cairo and Washington is tepid at best, and will require fresh vision from the next US administration.

The Arab Spring uprisings have not changed the political regime(s) in the ME region nor Egypt for that matter. Washington is rethinking its Middle East strategy since resistance to American interests has increased especially in Egypt (Pollack 2016, 62). Former US President George W. Bush has said, 'As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export' (Nada 2012, 25). Stepping back from the ME region means endangering the potential collapse of Egypt, Jordan, and several other ME rentier states (Pollack 2016, 75). Analysts suggest that the present distance between US-Egyptian state interests and worldviews is significant. In fact, Jordan is considered a more 'reliable ally' at this moment than Egypt (Hanna 2015, 73). The predominant reason for this discontent

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<sup>17</sup> Michael Wahid Hanna reported in his article, *Getting Over Egypt*, in *Foreign Affairs* magazine that in 2015, Egypt was, 'scheduled to receive \$1.3 billion in military aid and up to \$150 million in economic assistance from the United States' (Hanna 2015, 67). This aid is expected to continue in the short term as the US reassesses its foreign policy after the 2016 electoral transition with POTUS (Hanna 2015, 68).

by the US with Egypt is the failure of the Egyptian military government to produce an effective and professional military, which assists in the 'modernization and professionalization of Egypt' as it once did (Ibid 2015, 73). Over the years this relationship with Egypt's disguised military regime has strained relations with the US. It is plausible that Egypt is resisting R2P in order to leverage its rentier state interests with the United States. Egypt is counting on US commitments to Israel and the ME region, thereby impelling US policy for the foreseeable future.

Once Egypt's military began modernizing the state, its control and power has seldom been disrupted. Egypt's ruling military simply seeks to maintain their control, '...concealed behind their veneer of democratic institutions, representative structures, and legitimizing institutions that came to characterize their respective political systems (Cook 2007, 15).' Brooker calls this type of regime, 'disguised military rule' (Brooker 2011, 109). These facades are created giving appearance that democratic institutions are being developed while in actual fact the military enclave and autocratic strength of the president remain dually entrenched. Stacher shows that often, authoritarian regimes, which develop democratic leaning institutions, are able to, 'maintain greater centralized authority' (Stacher 2012, 4). It is the internal institutions that secure the ruling elite from internal and external pressures, '[helping] the ruling elites override, redirect and funnel away foreign pressure as they channel domestic dissent' (Ibid. 2012, 30). As Egypt settles in with another authoritarian regime with the Sisi Administration, the violent demonstrations have stopped and we should expect the state to settle in to another

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<sup>18</sup> After King Hussein would not ratify and join the peace accord between Egypt and Israel, the United States terminated its economic rentier package placing significant economic pressure on Jordan. Since that time Jordan has amended that trajectory and is again back on the US 'payroll' (Choucair 2006, 6, 8-10).

disguised military government.<sup>19</sup> And, this is exactly what has happened.

The heavy hand of authoritarianism in Egypt, therefore, is perceived as having a negative impact on human rights norms. Bellamy argues that, "...atrocities are extremely unlikely in the absence of underdevelopment and authoritarianism...genocide and mass atrocities committed outside the context of civil war...all occur in a context of authoritarian government (Bellamy 2011, 95, 99)." Bellamy's research, using the Polity IV Project dataset, tracks a state's authority scale from +10 (most democratic) to -10 (most authoritarian). Scores ranging between -5 to +5 identify 'anocracies' or a combination of democracy and autocracy (Bellamy 2011, 100; Marshall and Cole 2014, 21). The same dataset system in Polity IV Project, lists Egypt at a -4 or a "...closed anocracy, governed by an uninstitutionalized, or weak, autocratic regime" (Marshall and Cole 2014, 23, 46, 53). Therefore, considering Bellamy's argument, if 'anocratic regimes,' are considered the primary type, which produces genocide and mass atrocities, then it is possible that Egypt could interpret that their state sovereignty is being threatened by the Western modernized powers that are leveraging for political regime change. Though Western states would reject such interpretations as unrealistic, many non-Western powers that reject R2P hold to this theoretical view.

To formulate then, clear causal factors for why Egypt would consider Responsibility to Protect a threat to its state sovereignty, two primary reasons emerge. First, Egypt considers R2P a threat to its political regime type: an autocratic president supported by military enclave (Brooker 2011, 109; Bellamy 2011, 100; Cook 2007, 15;

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<sup>19</sup> See Mara Revkin's article, "*Brotherly Love—Why Sisi's Win is Good for Al Qaeda.*" *Foreign Affairs*, May 29, 2014.

Rutherford 2008, 16; Stacher 2012, 4). Any change to the foundational structures of the international relations system [i.e., human rights-favored over state sovereignty] would constitute a potential threat to any authoritarian regime type when human rights and democratic institutions become the dominant norms of the global order (Brooks 2013, 716; Knight et.al 2011, 81; Luck 2009, 16-17; Talal and Schwarz 2013, 2). And, as Egypt considers more recently published studies in R2P regarding the perception of authoritarian regimes being a breeding ground for potential genocide and mass atrocities, the state has cause for insecurity amongst its Western peers. Second, R2P would also be a threat to Egypt's primary identity in Islamic values; beliefs that place Sharia law first, above all other laws (Mani and Weiss 2011, 45; Moaddel and Azad 2002, 4; WVS 2014). The potential socializing pressure of Western democratic beliefs, often considered founded upon humanism, or Judeo-Christian values, would threaten the very core of Islamic values and beliefs, triggering a clash of world views.

### ***Western Biases? - Stumbling Blocks to Global North-South Relations***

During the research phase of this thesis, two apparent biases sifted to the surface that must be considered. Though these biases do have an impact on this project, they are not the main focus of this thesis, and therefore, are only mentioned here in summary. First and foremost, there is a clear bias when defining modernization theory and explaining human development. Human development is primarily defined as the breaking free from one's oppressors, no matter what level of relational interaction (individual or state level). 'Emancipation, the idea of existing free from domination, is a universal desire...[and] humans have an inherent wish to live free from external constraints' (Welzel 2013, 2). This bias presents emancipation from oppression and "the expansion of

human choice and autonomy" (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 2), as the ultimate goal of human development by any culture. The achievement of a democratic regime or democratic liberal values at the state level is therefore the ultimate in human development and what constitutes modernization. 'The desire for freedoms is so fundamental that all major religions address it by advocating the idea of salvation, ...[and] salvation is an inherently emancipatory idea because it promises an existence free from dominion in the afterlife' (Welzel 2013, 2). If secular liberal and human emancipation values are the driving definitions of modernization, then it stands to reason that any state that does not hold to such values is not considered modernized. Of course much of the Global South does take serious objection to such Western biases and perceptions of modernity at present.

Egypt's dissent of Responsibility to Protect is also a rejection of this type of logic on two fronts. First, Egypt would consider this form of emancipation values a threat to Islamic values. In a world that is dominated by liberal secular thinking, and a high value for freedom of choice, states in the Global South could argue they are not being given that choice. The asymmetric nature of the Global North-South conflict creates various biases on both sides of the divide. 'Arab states have...become accustomed to [the] Great Power game' (Talal and Schwarz 2013, 6). Communication styles, problem-solving methods, even the level of education, 'can be considered one of the most pervasive problems among [states]' (Najafbagy 2009, 146). Second, Egypt would consider this form of emancipation values a threat to its political culture and regime type. Egypt and the Global South are not asking to be 'Americanized', nor demonized or intimidated. The great divide between the, 'haves and have-nots...allows for the compartmentalization of

peacekeeping actions [including R2P] to respond to *national interests* rather than to a common will' (Tanner 2010, 211). In other words, why is there a global reaction in Afghanistan and not Democratic Republic of Congo' (Ibid. 2010, 211)? Who determines 'why some discourses become dominant and others lose out in the marketplace of ideas' (Mearsheimer 1994, 42)? This type of Western reasoning certainly constitutes a huge assumption and major overstatement. The impact of such an overstatement is considerable when measured next to R2P doctrines and their theoretical foundations.

Another bias to be considered is the present transition in Western (Global North) culture from modern to post-modern values. Responsibility to Protect clearly places greater importance and value on human rights and therefore has deep connections to post-modern thought. Post-modern values represent a re-centering of Western and European modernism, values rejected by Islamic publics by and large (Alonso et.al. 2013, 283-85). If the Western modern world assumes that their values and beliefs are the primary socializing norms for the global system, then there is a significant bias in the very least, and a remarkable exhibition of relational arrogance. After all, 'it cannot be a mere coincidence that Islamism has emerged at a time when Europe and the West have started questioning their own modernist paradigm' (Alam 2009, 356). 'Secularism, implying the separation of church and state, is a discourse that the Muslim world appears to have rejected' (Jamal 2006, 51). The growing values gap between the Global North and South is widening as much as in any other area. The Global South, especially the Arab world is in need of significant change in order to stay competitive with the, 'radical evolution of the West' (Salem 1999, 147). As the Global North journeys farther into post-modernism, the Global South for the most part is still struggling to modernize. 'Islamic

fundamentalism may...be understood as a critique of modernity' (Fourie 2012, 61). States in the Western world must make room for the inevitable discourse that includes traditional (religious and spiritual) values of the non-Western world; and in converse the non-Western powers must engage the Western states with clarity and less ambiguity.

## **Conclusions**

The research in this project reveals compelling evidence regarding the causal factors explaining Egypt's dissent to Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrines. The focus of this work and driving research puzzle asks, "Why does Egypt resist the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine? In general, a qualitative approach using case study comparisons of Egypt and Jordan coupled with content analysis sheds light on the primary causal factors of the independent variable, R2P and its impact on the dependent variable, Egypt's dissent of R2P norms. Modernization theory provides the theoretical framework that tests the hypothesis. Under consideration is whether the theoretical framework could explain the causal factors motivating Egypt's response to R2P? This research project connects Egypt's reaction to R2P norms, its political culture and modernization theory, which is a gap in present scholarship. This final section begins with a summative review of the findings, moves on to consider significant conclusions from the research, finishing with several key areas for future research.

In summary, research from the World Values Survey shows that some alternative form of democracy is the preferred regime choice in Egypt. This anocratic form of government mixes certain democratic institutions masking or disguising authoritarian leadership partnered with a supporting judicial system and strong military (Bellamy 2011, 106; Brooker 2011, 109). The research uncovers support that such a regime exists in

Egypt (Cook 2011, 1-2; Rutherford 2008, 24; Stacher 2012, 4). In Egypt, there is an autocratic leader with significant individual political power (President Sisi), experienced oligarchies rendering the most critical national decisions, and a sectarian influenced judiciary explaining constitutional (likely Islamic Sharia) law (Brown 2008, 2). Couple these concepts with the fact that much of Egypt roots its identity in its Islamic beliefs over its state citizenship, and you have a considerable hybrid form of government, 'that rules but does not govern' (Cook 2011, ix). This hybrid regime in Egypt seems prepared to endure for the foreseeable future.

These research findings seem inconsistent with Inglehart and Welzel's study in modernization theory. Their definition of modernization theory, while under revision, does include the significant impact that religion and other traditional values have on human development, or in this case, a state's development (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 46-47). As well, they admit that the process of cultural change initiated by the modernizing of publics is not linear, and can change directions, even producing other regime types (Ibid. 2005, 21). In this Stacher agrees, that, 'While some may dispute the durability of authoritarian political systems in Arab states in the wake of the 2011 uprising, history shows that more likely than not authoritarianism—not democracy—emerges from moments of political transition' (Stacher 2012, 31). In addition, modernization seems to take on the appearance of 'Americanization', meaning that all forms of modernization were plumb-lined next to the USA as the standard for defining modernization theory. East Asian states, however, have recently shown that, '[not all] industrializing societies in general are... becoming like the United States, as a popular version of modernization theory assumed' (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 47). This research

shows that authoritarian regime types have not been driven from the geopolitical landscape by the growth, development and expansion of democracy.

The critical component of modernization theory that appears inconsistent when comparing Egypt and Jordan as case studies is the general belief that rising self-expression values and human development will primarily lead a state toward democracy. This is certainly not the case in either state. R2P as a form of human development, albeit at the international state level, represents a norm that will only work within a theoretical framework that honors and allows human rights to flourish. Any state disagreeing with this shift in the global system, where human rights take precedent over state sovereignty, would likely be considered non-modernized. And, from a non-Western state perspective, not congruent with modernization theory definitions. After all, if modernization leads to greater human development and self-expression, it seems logical in converse that not all development and self-expression would be culturally the same or lead to the same cultural conclusions.

Second, research demonstrated just how significant a transition in values and norms for the global community R2P presents. Badescu in her evaluation of the R2P debate accurately describes not only the struggle between the present structures of state sovereignty versus the global shift to human rights, but the evolution of R2P as a new norm penetrating a very 'concrete' system. "The normative evolution of R2P is a perfect illustration of how new norms never enter a normative vacuum, but instead surface in a much contested normative space where they must struggle with other norms and perceptions of interest" (Badescu 2011, 117). As R2P penetrates the international system, several significant but smaller non-Western states (Egypt included) find it objectionable

that the precarious global balance would start to tip toward human rights as the new hallmark of the global system. Surely, in the opinion of these states, their sovereignty and the noninterventionist agreements of the past are in jeopardy. Regardless of the strategy of R2P norm entrepreneurs, in its inception, R2P is heading for a very volatile journey in norm development. The concern with R2P was not just the fact that it could become a mechanism for Western norm imposition, but that the imbalanced nature of the state system could lead to, ‘...unfair application’ of the new norm (Knight et.al 2011, 81). Egypt resists Responsibility to Protect doctrines because the norm impacts the state's political regime type (disguised authoritarian military enclave) and traditional Islamic culture.

This research brings several significant conclusions into focus. First of all, Egypt resists Responsibility to Protect for three primary reasons. One, Egypt's disguised authoritarian military regime is under pressure through shifting international norms (Badescu 2011, 101; Bellamy 2011, 92, 99). R2P protocols are changing the primary definition of state-sovereignty perhaps the most enshrined entitlement of the global system. Two, the state's traditional (religious) values are deeply impacted and threatened by secularism due to the advancement of democratic institutions (WVS 2014). Egypt continues to reject the secularism of Western values (even religious values) for what it perceives is a greater devoutness to its spiritual path--Islam. Three, the economic pressure created by the cooling of international relations with the US. The precarious balance inherent in US-Egyptian relations is strained at present. Foreign Direct Investment in Egypt by the US buys influence in a regional ally through which the US can pursue its interests (Beblawi 1987, 391-392). With the US decreasing investment amounts,

Egyptian budgets experience short-falls, which are in turn passed on to the people by way of an increase in the cost of living. The potential for US leveraging and Egyptian resistance over R2P may not be likely but is plausible.

Second, Responsibility to Protect is heralding a coming norm shift in international relations. Like it or not, the global community is changing in several ways, some of them being the growing impact of international human rights laws, humanitarian need in crisis, economic and political pressures and the increasing divide between the rich and poor. The dichotomy between international politics on one side in tension with international ethics is often played out on the field of international law (courts) (Ramsbotham 2011, 279). Re-drafted definitions of state-sovereignty established in global community rhetoric challenge the balance of a present system mostly founded on the principle of non-interference (Talal and Schwarz 2013, 6). Global South powers, in particular Islamic states, have less confidence in the UN mainly, 'because they [do] not find this organization to act as independently as they would prefer' (Pettersson 2003, 19). How will the UNSC secure the confidence of the Global South if they are perceived as being dominated by Western powers? How far can Islamic states allow the UN and Global North powers to drive the agenda of the global community unchecked?

Third, the scientific model of research in International Relations must be reviewed and amended to include religion. The resurgence of religion as a causal factor in international relations can no longer be ignored. Terrorists, especially Islamic terrorists make, 'theologians of many previously secular analysts' (Slim 2005, 21). It is clear that religious actors, 'are generally not territorially bound, but transnational' (Toft et.al 2011, 24). While religious actors engage political authorities for many reasons, the most

common causal factor is to promote their ideology, or perhaps purify their beliefs amongst the public they engage (Ibid. et.al. 2011, 26). Religious actors are not going away, the political authorities they engage cannot try to force religious actors into private spheres when transnational opportunities are so painfully clear. As Toft concedes, states must, 'accept that the more governments try to repress or exclude religion from public life, the more such efforts will be self-defeating' (Toft et.al. 2011, 214). As Slim concludes,

the flurry of new books on charismatic Christianity in Africa, on Islamist theology and the increasingly routine monitoring of cults shows that it is both possible and important for secular political and military analysts to engage with and understand religious ideology and the political and military programs that flow from them...the burden of credulity is now on the side of the secular analysts. (Slim 2005, 23).

If governments continue ignoring the challenge of adding religious intelligence to the overall discourse in International Relations, we will empower the obvious unintended consequences being reaped at this moment in several arenas of conflict (Clark 2011, 247-249). Religion must enter the scientific research debate, the global community will be better for it.

Finally, several key areas of further research should be considered moving forward. First, focusing on the nature of regime types in the Middle East, is it possible—as in East Asia—that modernization can flourish in other cultural or political value sets such as theocratic publics, communism, and authoritarian or military regimes? Can theocratic publics, in this case Islamic publics, remain unchanged by human development, modernization and industrialization without political or religious oppression? There is a great need for research with authoritarian regimes and the potential of developing legitimate democratic institutions, judiciaries, and benevolent

welfare states within them. Can authoritarian theocracies or monarchies develop benevolent institutions in order to govern and not just rule? Research regarding biases inherent in modernization theory would significantly contribute to the explanation regarding why certain regime types or cultures maintain their non-democratic values during industrialization, state upheaval, or periods of political or social change?

An additional suggested research focus would be the power and impact of international norm transference especially through the Internet and social media during international/national conflict. It is very clear that social media played a major role in the Arab Spring of 2011 (Bruns et.al. 2013, 871-872).<sup>20</sup> Certainly the power of grassroots movements embolden protesters, therefore, it is necessary to assess the actual power of social media to rapidly inform publics. Included in this is the transnational nature of religious and non-state actors, and domestic publics to organize and mobilize rapidly through social media. In addition, social media, the Internet and mass media in general are all powerful tools for promoting transparency. Such studies can help governments understand the positive tool social media can be in calming or provoking conflict.

Another opportunity for research is the impact of Responsibility to Protect as a norm penetrating the international system and the theoretical transformation that the norm announces to the global community. Is R2P the harbinger of a major theoretical shift in the global system from a state-centric, state sovereignty focus to a human rights foundation? Is the state sovereignty system realigning in favor of human rights and meeting human needs globally? Is the global system preparing for more of a pluralist approach to power sharing? Is it possible to achieve greater pluralism in the global

system without military conflict? Such research is necessary and beyond valuable at this juncture in global relations.

To conclude, Egypt's resistance to Responsibility to Protect doctrines are a signal to Western powers in two main ways. In one way, Egypt resists R2P since as the largest Arab state in the ME it has the relational equity to do so. Egypt is making a bold stand that will now have an impact in the UNSC for the next two-years. Western powers, especially the US, look to Egypt as an anchor state for the region, yielding several practical benefits from the relationship.<sup>21</sup> This is a relationship that will not implode unless one of the partners draws a significant line in the sand or walks away. After all, R2P is an international norm, therefore, the US need not face Egyptian resistance alone or in a vacuum. Secondly, Egypt resists R2P because Islamic values are threatened by advancing secular post-modern Western values. Egypt is likely one of the primary Islamic states capable of checking the widening gap between Western and Eastern value sets without risking military conflict. The theoretical ideologues of Islamism centered in Egypt have a golden opportunity to engage a state reformation project between East and West values in the ME, 'reforms that yield a more constrained, law abiding, and accountable state' (Rutherford 2008, 196). The issue facing Egypt and Western powers at the moment is an issue of trust. R2P is a dialogue for both the Global North and South regarding trust? Can Western powers truly be trusted as they project power, save lives and provide for humanitarian aid in the midst of crises without toppling regimes

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<sup>20</sup> Kris Notaro, blogging for IEET, reports on the night President Mubarak shut off all cell phone and Internet use in Cairo, giving Egyptian citizens access to the government TV channel only, which inflamed the people and filled the streets with protestors.

<sup>21</sup> Egypt allows access of US naval ships through the Suez Canal, American military aircraft to fly in Egyptian airspace, and diplomatic support for American policies in the region, just to name a few benefits to the relationship (Hanna 2015, 67).

unnecessarily? Can autocratic leaders be trusted with power and then act in a way that provides security for their people? Will the greater dialogue R2P inspires enable International Relations advancement or bog it down in the mire of self-interest, mixed with the blood of the innocent? Only time will tell.

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