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# Changing Effects of Intervention Methods in Intrastate Conflicts

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


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CHANGING EFFECTS OF INTERVENTION METHODS IN INTRASTATE CON-  
FLICTS

A Master Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty

of

American Military University

by

Derrick Torres

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree

of

Master of Arts in International Relations and Conflict Resolution

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Charles Town, WV

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## DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my loving wife, Cathy. Her encouragement and support made this challenging process less stressful. As a result, the quality of my work and indeed my life are infinitely better.

## ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

### CHANGING EFFECTS OF INTERVENTION METHODS IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS

by

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American Public University System, July 10, 2016

Charles Town, West Virginia

Professor Robert Deller, Thesis Professor

Political leaders in the United States argue over the policy of intervention and the extent to which it should be involved in other countries' domestic conflicts. This study examined 31 intrastate conflicts with 35 episodes of intervention by major powers spanning the period from 1991-2008 in order to determine how various conditions relating to intrastate conflicts and interventions could indicate which method of intervention is most likely to be successful in achieving a third-party's desired outcome. Intervention methods were classified by level of involvement, either direct or indirect, and by mode of implementation, either multilateral or unilateral. Methods of intervention were examined in specific conditions relating to the intensity of the conflict, the goal of warring parties, ethnic and religious divisions, etc. The analysis compared the success rates of each method of intervention in these conditions with the overall success rates of the respective intervention methods in general. The results suggest certain conditions change the effectiveness of intervention methods. Findings regarding specific conditions and intervention methods provide potentially valuable information applicable to the decision making process of third parties regarding intervention in intrastate conflicts.

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## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Observers of international relations commonly reference a shift away from interstate wars towards an upsurge in civil wars along with the expanding role of non-state actors. Decolonization of the global South and the creation and independence of several states following the collapse of the Soviet Union have greatly contributed to an increase in intrastate conflicts (Dunne and Schmidt 2011, 88). Rival factions compete for their share of power, often along ethnic or cultural lines, in states with weak nascent central governments and institutions. In the period between 1944 and 1999, 150 civil wars occurred throughout the world (Regan 2002, 55). In the globalized environment of international politics and finance, domestic conflicts risk affecting beyond their borders, having direct and indirect consequences in far reaching parts of the world. Often civil wars threaten the stability of their regional neighbors and the economic interests of foreign powers, spurring intervention by outside parties. The intervention by third-parties in other states' domestic conflicts is no new phenomenon. France and Spain intervened in the United States' War of Independence. The Cold War saw many proxy wars and interventions by the United States and Soviet Union, including those in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Cuba, and Nicaragua, as the two powers strived to promote their ideologies and/or protect their allies and interests in contested areas.

In the post-Cold War era, major powers are as active as ever in the domestic conflicts of other states. In the aforementioned 150 conflicts, 101 received intervention from outside parties (Regan 2002, 55). Major powers continue to intervene in order to secure their interests. A puzzle exists in the fact that the effects of interventions on the outcomes of conflicts seem difficult to predict. In the Korean War, the United States succeeded in repelling a communist takeover of the Korean Peninsula ("Korean War" 2016). Conversely, intervention in Vietnam resulted in embar-

rasing defeat for the United States, and has since been a benchmark example for the case against intervention (Zambernardi 2011). More recently, external support for rebels in Libya in 2011 helped bring the regime of Muammar al-Gaddafi out of power; and now the United States finds itself again entwined in civil conflicts in Iraq and Syria (Council on Foreign Relations 2016). Political leaders in the United States argue over the policy of intervention and the extent to which it should be involved in ongoing conflicts in places like Yemen, Ukraine, and especially Syria. Therefore, this study sought to examine how and when interventions have been successful. This knowledge could aid political leaders in making informed assessments about how to most effectively commit their country's resources to intervening in outside conflicts.

Intrastate conflicts vary widely with respect to type, actors, scale, and political context. Likewise, intervention can take many forms either in support of or opposition against one side. Methods of intervention can include financial assistance, arms supply, and military deployment, and can be carried out unilaterally or channeled through international organizations. There is a wide spectrum of opinions among policy makers on the degree to which the United States should be directly or indirectly involved in conflicts elsewhere. The costs of intervention can be immense in terms of dollars and human life, and the wrong decision can result in not only international criticism and discontent among domestic constituents, but could leave the country in a less secure and worse-off political position than before. In order to determine how a method of intervention should be chosen based on the contexts of a conflict scenario, this thesis endeavored to answer the question: what effect do the conditions of an intrastate conflict have on the likelihood a particular type of intervention implemented by a third-party will achieve a successful outcome?

The purpose of this study was to determine whether there exists a significant relationship between the conditions of a conflict and the success rates of particular methods of intervention.

This information could be valuable to policymakers for future decision making regarding intervention in intrastate conflicts. This study considered only military and economic actions which were either directed specifically at shifting the advantage of one side or were aimed at limiting the ability of the combatants to wage war.

## **CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW**

## Why States Intervene

Literature addressing intervention is often narrow in its measure of success, limited to the effects of intervention on the duration of conflicts. Certainly it is worthwhile to know the effects of intervention on conflict durations, particularly when the goal of intervention is humanitarian relief or to stop the spread of conflict to regional neighbors. However it does not always give insight to whether an intervention achieved its purpose. Evident by the lack of action in Rwanda and Darfur, states seem to apply humanitarian motives selectively (Bellamy and Wheeler 2011, 514). Regan (2002) is one of the prominent authors on the subject. However in many of his works, the measure of success was limited to the cessation of violence, leaving open to question whether the intervener achieved its desired outcome. The measure of success in intervention may not be the same in all cases. A consideration of why states intervene gives suggestions regarding their determinants of success. Findlay and Teo (2006, 829) contended the approach used by many authors, of focusing on the conflict rather than the actors involved, leads to an incomplete analysis. This so-called phenomenon-centric approach, in which the unit of analysis is the conflict rather than the intervener, is suitable for examining under what conditions civil wars are more or less likely to be prolonged, yet is inadequate in addressing why, when, and on whose side states decide to intervene (Findlay and Teo 2006, 829). Emphasizing intervention as a foreign policy tool, Findlay and Teo (2006, 829) examined an actor's decision making process and the constraints by which decisions are motivated. They explain an actor's decisions are motivated by both international influences and domestic constraints (Findlay and Teo 2006, 829). For example, domestic influences might include whether they have been involved in other costly wars recently (Findlay and Teo 2006, 830). This is of particular significance currently, as the United States has been engrossed in continuous conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan for most of the last 15

years. Characteristics of the conflict state and its relationship to potential interveners also influence intervention decisions. States that attach strategic importance to a country in conflict risk detriment to their interests when they allow the conflict to continue without outside action (Findlay and Teo 2006, 831). Third-parties also must evaluate the changing conditions of intrastate conflicts. A civil war with seemingly little international consequence can suddenly become relevant when worsening conditions threaten to spill-over into neighboring countries or lead to massive outflow of refugees, thus endangering third-party interests (Findlay and Teo 2006, 832). The decision on when and how to intervene in intrastate conflicts is therefore a fluid process subordinate to changing conditions. Examining these conditions could be useful in the analysis of intervention.

During the Cold War, US interventions were undertaken to balance against the Soviet influence. The US intervened on the side of Afghan rebels, seeking to destabilize the Soviet Union, not necessarily for purposes of ending the civil war or to alleviate human suffering (Findlay and Teo 2006, 829). Since the end of the Cold War, intervention has been increasingly legitimized in the international community for humanitarian purposes and as a means to promote peace and stability. The developing norm of humanitarian intervention had been recognized publicly by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 1999, and was the basis for interventions in the Balkans and Somalia (Bellamy and Wheeler 2011, 514). A formal declaration by the UN General Assembly denoted a consensus on the 'Responsibility to Protect' the global population from mass atrocities. However, what many consider an inadequate response to mass atrocities in Rwanda and Darfur seems to suggest disparate levels of commitment to humanitarian intervention (Bellamy and Wheeler 2011, 514). Skeptics worry the humanitarian justification for intervention is subject to abuse by powerful states to interfere in the affairs of weaker states in the Global South (Bellamy

and Wheeler 2011, 512). The difference in motives presents a challenge for the study of intervention.

### **Conflict Management**

Regan (1996, 341) admitted the goals behind any intervention are complex, but suggested the first step in achieving these is to end hostilities. If a third-party is mostly concerned with conflict management, desiring to end a conflict as quickly as possible, negotiated settlement might be an acceptable outcome. The strategy an intervener has chosen may suggest something about their intentions. Providing military aid to a rebel movement trying to overthrow the government does not indicate an especially high concern for conflict management, but similarly supporting the government could (Regan 2002, 59). By this understanding, an intervention supporting government may be regarded as successful short of all out victory with a ceasefire agreement. Multilateral strategies under the oversight of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are often touted as more legitimate conflict management efforts. This view was supported by the finding that multilateral interventions are nearly always either in support of the government or neutral (Lounsbery, Pearson, and Talentino 2011, 240). Lounsbery, Pearson, and Talentino (2011, 227) found that security and stability were not significantly impacted by intervention overall, however when implemented through the auspices of international organizations or coalitions, there is a marginal positive effect of democratization and economic growth. If in fact democratization and economic growth are indicators of security and stability, a multilateral strategy may be more successful when the goal is in ending conflict. Therefore, consideration of the side supported and

approach to intervention, whether through the procedural system of an IGO, could give indications of the third-parties' intentions and subsequently how success can be measured.

If the goal is to end conflict quickly, intervention must "manipulate the costs of continued fighting and the benefits from settlement in a way that convinces both sides that settling now is preferable to the same outcome at some future time" (Regan 2002, 59). In cases where the goal is to limit the duration of conflict, Regan (1996, 345) provided evidence that a mixed military and economic strategy is most effective. However, he showed that intervention in any form increased the average duration of conflicts to 7 years vice an average of 1.5 years without intervention (Regan 1996, 346). Amegashie (2014) examined the causality of this relationship, inquiring whether interventions worsen conflicts, or whether more intense conflicts were just more likely to provoke intervention. The intensity of conflict was worsened not only by a third-party's actual intervention, but even the expectation of intervention affected the behavior of warring groups. Amegashie (2014, 383) explained the expected intervention by a third-party intensified conflicts by inducing the opposing group to further mobilize and arm in order to discourage the third-party from intervening. Furthermore, if the ally is expecting a third-party to intervene, it might fight harder to convince the third-party it is worth intervening. He cited the examples of rebels in Libya having fought harder to convince the United States that they had a significant chance of removing Gaddafi from power, and the uprising of Kurds and Shias against Saddam Hussein trying to attract US military support following the 1991 Gulf War (Amegashie 2014, 391). In the case of actual intervention, the third-party's assistance reduced the incremental costs of the supported party's increased effort, leading to an increase in the cumulative effort in the conflict (Amegashie 2014, 392). As purely an instrument of conflict management, intervention seemed to worsen the situation. More specifically, Regan (2002, 68) showed that the probability of a conflict lasting at

least 48 months was about 23% more likely with an intervention, and that economic strategies were less likely to shorten a conflict than military strategies. As proposed above, a neutral intervention might suggest a purpose of conflict management. Interestingly Regan (2002, 71) showed that neutral interventions were less effective in shortening the duration of conflicts than biased ones, supporting one side or another. This could be because neutral interventions are more limited, and therefore have less impact on the costs of continued fighting for the combatant parties.

If the goal of a third-party intervention is conflict resolution, then success is not measured by an agreement itself, but by its continued implementation. Neorealists suggest voluntary disarmament by warring groups is antithetical to the anarchic self-help system in which actors maximize their security in order to ensure their survival (Dunne and Schmidt 2011, 92). For this reason, neorealists explain that enforcement by outside parties is required to protect opposing parties during disarmament (Hill 2006, 8). Interveners must ensure the payoffs from cheating on agreements do not exceed the payoffs from abiding by them (Hill 2006, 8). Neoliberal viewpoints on conflict resolution stress the importance of institutions being put in place for the eventual removal of the requirement of third-party enforcement. Institutional guarantees in the form of power-sharing arrangements which address the allocation of political and economic resources are the only way to overcome the security threats posed by post-conflict power consolidation by one group according to neoliberals (Hill 2006, 11). A predicament exists in how to get warring parties to concede to these agreements.

Importance then must be placed on the post-conflict conditions which promote ongoing security and stability as a measure of successful intervention. Lounsbury, Pearson, and Talentino (2011) made an essential distinction from other studies, relating success of intervention to its impact on internal change. Their determinants for success followed a neoliberal assumption that



states intervene for the purposes of promoting democratization and growth in the target state. The two, however, may not be mutually exclusive. Not surprisingly, Pickering and Kisangani (2006, 370) found that military intervention supporting non-democratic regimes tends to result in even more autocratic institutions. They also claimed interventions against authoritarian regimes appear to have a positive effect on democratization. The questionable political state of the Shia-dominated regime of Nouri al-Maliki in Iraq post U.S. occupation leads one to look on this statistic with some skepticism (Weiss and Hassan 2015, 89-93). Pickering and Kisangani (2006, 370) also showed that in developing democracies, military intervention does not have a significant effect on governance.

Hill (2006, 6) claimed that neither the neorealist nor neoliberal approach to conflict resolution are complete, and rather a constructivist framework better applies to the dynamics of third-parties in conflict resolution. The constructivist framework differs from others by emphasizing the internalization of new social norms as the key to conflict resolution. This viewpoint supports the apparent effort by the international community to encourage actors to adopt commonly held liberal values and norms. Whereas realist and liberal oriented theories base the rational behavior of actors on fixed interests, constructivism argues interests are socially defined and can therefore be changed (Hill 2006, 14). Similarly, the way in which opposing groups view each other is a socially subjective construct. This understanding applies to intervention strategy in a few ways. Hill (2006, 17) admitted breaking the inertia of cultural stability is quite difficult, yet exogenous forces such as intervention can be sources of change. This constructivist framework offers justification as to why some warring groups may find anything short of unconditional victory unacceptable, while others are more willing to negotiate. The socially constructed beliefs groups have toward one another then become a target of change by external forces. The constructivist frame-

work also applies to the perceptions between third-parties and their supported groups. A third-party may reasonably mistrust their ally, such as in the relationship between the United States and Iraq or Pakistan (Amegashie 2014, 383). Relationships between interveners and their allies could be consequential when it comes to sharing information, or trust that they share the same goals.

### **Military Victory**

The findings regarding duration of conflict can be misleading, since they give no direct implication as to the political outcome of conflict. Some ancillary connections can be made when considering the chance of a negotiated settlement is greater the longer a conflict lasts (Gent 2008, 725). Therefore, if in fact intervention increases the duration of conflicts, and settlements are more likely the longer conflicts go on, it may make sense to intervene to drive a settlement rather than risk an undesirable outcome by inaction. Gent (2008, 722) claimed empirical consensus concerning military intervention and civil war duration is insufficient because their primary effect is not on duration but on the outcome of a civil war. Arguably, states are not always interested in merely mediating peace negotiations, but driving the post-conflict political conditions which favor their interests. These could include "the sovereignty or autonomy of an ethnic group, the type of government or economic system of the country, the policy of the government concerning the distribution of resources or access to resources by external parties, or a myriad other similar policies" (Gent 2008, 715). This reasonably begins by forcing a preferred military outcome for the supported side.

Intervening on behalf of the government suggests a desire to maintain the status quo, while an intervention on behalf of the opposition group suggests intent to alter it (Regan 2002, 59). With these goals, the intervener may find it necessary to achieve unequivocal victory for their side and would therefore be willing to expend more resources and accept longer conflict duration. Notably, Gent (2008, 713) found when intervention supported rebel groups, it increased their likelihood of winning; however intervention on behalf of governments did not have the same effect. He offered some noteworthy insight into the causality of this observation. Given the asymmetrical nature of civil wars, governments have a default advantage over their opponents with respect to capability. If the opposition is weak, Gent (2008, 714) pointed out, governments can often succeed without the help of outside parties, and therefore intervention is unlikely.

Intervention is similarly unlikely on behalf of a weak opposition group (Gent 2008, 714). This evidence supported his underlying theoretical assumption that intervention is about shifting the balance of power between opposing groups. A third-party is not disposed to waste resources on an intervention when it's either not necessary or has a low probability of success (Gent 2008, 714). Empirical data supported these claims, showing a significant increase in the likelihood of intervention as the relative strength of the opposition group increases (Gent 2008, 730). Instead, states will want to intervene when they are more likely to have the greatest impact on the balance of power, and Gent (2008, 714) showed this will happen when the relative strength of the rebel group is high. Consequently, pro-opposition interventions showed a significant positive impact on opposition victory, yet no such statistical relationship was shown between pro-government intervention and victory, because the benefit to the government was offset by the relative strength of the opposition (Gent 2008, 730).

Gent (2008, 730) concluded third-parties intervene on behalf of rebel groups in the most advantageous cases and on behalf of the government in the toughest cases. Based on this finding, it can be expected that pro-government interventions require a more robust intervention strategy. Amegashie (2014, 391) showed the opposing side fought harder when they did not expect the third-party to intervene in a substantial way, but did not similarly change their behavior when the intervention was believed to be substantial. This is potentially consequential to further examination, suggesting it may not be worth intervening if it will only be in a limited manner. Gent's (2008) analysis was also intriguing when considering Reagan's (1996, 345) finding that supporting the government was more likely than supporting opposition to shorten the duration of conflicts. This suggests that supporting the opposition may lead to longer conflicts but with a higher chance of achieving military victory. Findings by Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2008, 356) diverged from those of Gent (2008) and corroborate Reagan's (1996), stating intervention in support of government increased the chances of government victory, and decreased the time to achieve victory. The crucial differentiation between Gent (2008) and Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2008) is Gent assessed the incremental change in hazard of victory caused by government-biased interventions was less than that of rebel-biased ones, while Balch-Lindsay and Enterline concluded merely that a positive overall change occurred when compared to no intervention.

### **Conflict Conditions**

While much has been discussed about the strategy of intervention, there are other conditions which must be addressed in order to examine the effectiveness of interventions. Reagan

(1996, 338) emphasized the need to determine how features of the disputants relate to a successful intervention strategy, breaking intrastate conflict into ethnically, religiously, and ideologically based identifications. The most statistically significant finding regarding the identification of combatants was conflict divided along ethnoreligious lines was more likely to increase duration than along ideological lines (Regan 2002, 68). Gent (2008, 724) also found when conflicts were based on ethnic or religious divisions, rebel groups were less likely to achieve victory than in ideologically based conflicts. Furthermore, when on behalf of the opposition party in a conflict divided along ethnic lines, an economic intervention strategy was most successful in ending hostilities (Regan 1996, 338). Perhaps the most attainable goal when intervening in identity based conflicts is to negotiate some form of peace settlement.

The timing of actions might hold as much significance as other factors. Arguably the options available to the U.S. immediately after the chemical weapons use by the Syrian regime on civilians in Ghouta are no longer available at the same costs. Gent (2008, 725) showed the likelihood of military victory, especially by the government, was greater earlier in the timeline of a conflict than later. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2008, 356) substantiated this relationship, finding the benefit of a third-party's assistance in increasing the likelihood of government victory was less the longer a civil war persists. Regan (2002, 69) also showed a relationship between the increased intensity, in fatalities per month, and increased duration of conflicts. Getting in early would seem to be the best opportunity to affect victory for the supported side. Regan (1996, 347) explained, while casualties are still relatively low, the incremental costs of continued fighting are considerably higher, and therefore intervention is more likely to succeed in influencing combatants' actions. These studies and that of Amegashie (2014) above lead to a noteworthy suggestion: get in early and go big.

## **Summary**

The literature above has provided many pertinent insights regarding the likelihood of success of intervention based on certain conditions, particularly concerning its effect on duration of conflict. It has been noted above that states intervene for a number of purposes, yet previous studies only evaluate one given goal, whether it is to end hostilities or achieve military victory for one side. The goal of an intervening third-party can be different, based on whether the purpose is humanitarian, conflict resolution, preserving the status quo, or changing it. All of the aforementioned studies provided great insight into the relationships between specific factors and outcomes such as military or economic intervention and duration, or unilateral versus multilateral intervention and democratization. There is limited analysis on whether a particular type of intervention is more successful under specific conditions, and where there is such analysis, it only focuses on its effect on duration. The analysis below sheds light on the way in which unique conditions of conflicts relate to the success of a particular intervention method in achieving a third-party's desired political outcome. The following section, methodology, explains the variables examined and the hypotheses tested.

## **CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

The intent of this thesis was to find how a variety of conditions relating to an intrastate conflict and intervention could indicate which method of intervention is most likely to be suc-

successful in achieving a third-party's desired outcome. An analysis was performed for interventions in intrastate conflicts in the post-Cold War period by major powers in order to answer the question: what effect do the conditions of an intrastate conflict have on the likelihood a particular type of intervention implemented by a third-party will achieve a successful outcome? As opposed to simply determining under which conditions intervention is likely to be successful, this study examined what types of interventions were successful under different conditions including those considered in the literature above and others. Reagan's (1996) examination aggregated all types of military intervention under one umbrella. This does not distinguish between full scale deployment and more limited actions such as advisor support, or merely equipping and training. For this study, intervention methods were categorized based on level of involvement, either direct or indirect, and by whether they were employed unilaterally or multilaterally. Conflict and intervention data was compiled from two main collections: the Correlates of War (COW) Intra-State War Database (Sarkees and Wayman 2010) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP 2016). This study considered both the conditions of the conflict and the characteristics of the intervention for a comprehensive analysis, thus employing both a phenomenon- and actor-centric approach as described by Findlay and Teo (2006, 829). Variables which characterized the conflict and intervention included: side supported, ethnic divisions, human development, basis for conflict, intensity, regime type, and timing of intervention. These variables were analyzed for their effects on the relationship between method of intervention and the outcome.

The dataset used by Regan (2002) and referenced by many of the other reviewed studies spans 1944 – 1999. By examining a different timespan, specifically post-Cold War era, this thesis hoped to achieve the findings which are most relevant to today's political landscape. Another difference from the literature discussed is this thesis examined only interventions by major pow-

ers, defined in this study as the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, or China, coinciding with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Justification for this lies in the inherent contrast in terms of the military and economic capabilities as well as the political influence of major powers compared to other states. Regan (1996, 352) showed considerable divergence between the effects of intervention by major powers and those by other states, noting a biased intervention by a major power was 29% more likely to succeed in ending the conflict than an intervention by a minor power. Since this thesis was most concerned with obtaining information applicable to U.S. policy makers, limiting the scope to major power interventions was most appropriate.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The reasons for intervention, much like the reasons for war in general, are a core issue of argument between major schools of thought in international relations. Some argue, particularly after the Cold War, that humanitarian concern can be the basis for intervention. Realists view states' behavior as driven by self-interests, primarily their continued survival. Various subcategories of realism, from the classical philosophy of Thucydides to the neo-realism of Waltz, claim different underlying reasons for selfish, power-seeking behavior including human nature and the anarchical structure of the international system (Dunn 2011, 87). Liberal theories emphasize cooperation and multilateralism as a means to promote collective security. The League of Nations was born out of this liberal philosophy, popular in the interwar years, with the purpose of preventing another global catastrophe after the First World War (Dunne 2011, 105). Its successor, the United Nations (UN), exists for the purposes of international cooperation on matters such as



peace and security (UN 2016). Neo-liberal strands of this philosophy advocate the capability of economic integration and international institutions to promote mutual peace and prosperity (Lamy 2011, 121). Actors, either states or multinational entities, therefore benefit from promoting participation in their institutions. Nonetheless, states and coalitions still act outside the procedural system of international organizations.

Both realism and liberalism justify actors behaving to promote their interests, either selfishly or for the purposes of collective security. Constructivism on the other hand asserts an actor's interests and consequently its behavior are defined by its societal contexts (Hill 2006, 14). This applies to both the intervener and the main combatants in the intrastate conflict. Given the inconsistency with which states act out of humanitarian concern or within the structure of international organizations, a constructivist approach best accounts for the changing motivations of intrastate actors and interveners. The purpose of this study was not to examine the reasons why states intervene in intrastate conflicts. However, the reason for intervention lends to some assumptions about how to measure success. The constructivist view further promotes the proposed notion that the link between method and success of intervention could be subordinate to many factors distinct within a given conflict.

The theoretical basis for defining successful intervention coincides with Gent's (2008, 715) argument that states intervene in order to influence the post-conflict political conditions which favor their interest, determined either by victory or negotiated settlement. Constructivism lends explanation for the selective motives of interveners, arguing that the fundamental structures of societies, including actors' identities and interests, are socially constructed (Hill 2006, 14). If a third-party was most interested in conflict resolution, they would choose a foreign policy tool aimed at such a purpose (Gent 2008, 715). Arguably, it can be expected that if a state in-

tervenes in a conflict supporting one side or the other, their desired outcome is for the supported side to either win the war outright or come to an acceptable compromise. While their unique goals may be defined by societal factors, they hope to achieve them by either altering or preserving the status quo.

On the other hand, interventions do not always deliberately support one side. Consideration must be given to these situations when determining success. Neutral interventions could be aimed at stopping the spread of the fighting or protecting civilians. The desired outcome in these interventions would therefore be to end the conflict. Further institutional transformations are undoubtedly needed to address the roots of any conflicts. Situations in Iraq and Afghanistan have substantiated how political challenges remain after the initial conflict ends (Lounsbery, Pearson, and Talentino 2011, 230). As an approach to mitigate the challenge of differing motives, this study considered neutral interventions having humanitarian or conflict resolution motives to be different in their measure of success than biased interventions where one side is explicitly supported. For the sake of this study, an assumption was made that a prerequisite to achieving political goals is to succeed in ending the conflict in a manner consistent with the biased or neutral status of the intervention.

Considering the constructivist framework, this study tested the hypothesis: the conditions of an intrastate conflict will affect whether a particular intervention method by a third party results in achieving their desired outcome. The particular effect of a given condition on the outcome of an intervention method was predicted based on Regan's (2002, 59) determination that intervention manipulates the costs and benefits of continued fighting relative to negotiated settlement or capitulation. Some conditions which concern the relative capabilities or commitment of the combatant groups, as suggested by Gent (2008, 730) and Regan (1996, 347) may influence

the incremental change intervention has on affecting their decision making and the balance of power. Consideration was given to the social relationships between opposing factions. Groups with deeply entrenched aggression towards one another may have different motivations than groups merely in competition over particular resources. This could be a factor in conflicts where a one ethnic or religious group is marginalized by a different one that is in power, and why such an extraordinary challenge exists in sectarian conflicts in the Middle East. Manipulating the costs and benefits of fighting vice negotiation as mentioned above then is subordinate to these social relationships. Based on the theoretical framework described here, this study analyzed the relationships between multiple independent variables consisting of conditions specific to the conflict and the dependent variable of outcome, controlled for the types of intervention employed.

### **Definitions and Boundaries**

This study examined intrastate conflicts in which a third-party intervened. The selection of interventions analyzed was bounded using definitions common to the field of international relations study. Conflicts examined had ended between 1991 and 2008. The post-Cold War era, ambiguous but widely acknowledged as 1991 and later, is commonly referred to as a shift in the global political system and is significant to the study of interventions and civil conflict for several reasons. First, the dissolution of the Soviet Union gave independence to several former ethnically diverse Soviet republics which were held back from conflict only by the strong autocratic central government of the USSR. Second, while interventions during the Cold War were motivated mainly by desires of the two superpowers to contest the geo-political influence of one another, the post-Cold War era ushered in a new internationally recognized norm of intervening for other purposes such as humanitarian concern, regional stability, and to combat terrorism. Some

of the conflicts examined may have commenced before 1991, but those conflicts which were in the contexts of the Cold War, where the main division between competing actors was along ideological lines and involves a socialist party, were excluded.

This study employed the definition of intrastate conflict as utilized by Sarkees and Wayman (2010) in the Correlates of War (COW) Project. Intrastate conflict was considered to be "wars that predominantly take place within the recognized territory of a state..." and involved either the "government of the state against a non-state entity... government of a regional subunit against a non-state entity... [or] combat between/among two or more non-state entities within the state (Sarkees 2010)." To qualify as a war, a state participant must have met the criteria of having either commit 1,000 troops to the war or suffered 100 battle related deaths, and a non-state participant must have committed at least 100 armed personnel or suffered 25 battle-related deaths (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). This requirement must have been met every twelve month period to qualify as sustained combat. An intervention occurred if any participant of an intrastate conflict received external support, or if an actor originating outside the conflict country engaged as a participant in the conflict against the non-state actor, not necessarily in support of the incumbent government. The implementation of sanctions against warring parties was also considered intervention. Only interventions by major powers were analyzed. Justification for this is the inherent military, economic, and political resources major powers possess which minor powers generally do not. Both the costs and effectiveness of interventions by minor powers may be significantly different from those of major powers and aggregating them would potentially distort the analysis. For this study, major powers were the five permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council: United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China.

Intervention method was classified by level of involvement, either direct or indirect, and by mode of implementation, either multilateral or unilateral. Direct interventions included those which involved the deployment of troops as active combatants or air support. Indirect interventions involved either sanctions or assistance in the form of, weapons, materiel/logistics support, training/expertise, intelligence material, or economic support. Economic support included "any form of economic aid that was extended by an external supporter in order to be used to fund the waging of the armed conflict or is given to the warring party" (Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér 2011). This excluded humanitarian aid, debt relief, and aid for development purposes. According to the UN, "sanctions measures, under Article 41, encompass a broad range of enforcement options that do not involve the use of armed force" (UN Security Council 2016). This included limiting the economic activities of targeted individual or entities, or embargoes on arms or related materials. A mixed strategy of both direct and indirect means was categorized as direct, reflecting the highest level of involvement and assuming most direct interventions simultaneously employ other forms of assistance via sanctions and/or economic aid.

Multilateral interventions were considered to be those supported by the UN. A direct intervention must have been authorized by the UN to be considered multilateral here. A UN mission must have met the same 1,000 troop commitment threshold as noted above to be considered for the intervention analysis here. All others interventions not authorized by the UN were considered unilateral, even if implemented as part of a coalition. Lounsbery (2011, 237) pointed out differences which exist between UN interventions and ad hoc coalitions where intervention is seen as an extension of the major power leading the coalition. A problem with perceived legitimacy exists when not executed through the auspices of the UN. It may be argued the UN is still somewhat an extension of major power interests, particularly with the existence of the five per-

manent Security Council members. However it is the most globally inclusive multilateral organization available for these purposes, as opposed to NATO for instance which is a western organization and thus explicitly biased towards western interests.

The dependent variable of outcome was categorized as either successful or unsuccessful in relation to the intervener's goal. As described above, the measure of success relied on the intent of the intervention. This can be a complex issue, and in some cases there is more than one goal. Goals can be prevention or ending of mass civilian killings, preservation of a friendly government, removal of an adversary government, avoidance of regional instability, etc. The case of US intervention in Somalia exemplifies the challenge of assessing success. Operation Restore Hope was initiated in December 1992 to provide security for UN humanitarian aid delivery, which was being blocked by warlord Mohamed Farrah Aideed. In October 1993, the US shifted its mission to addressing the political causes of the humanitarian crisis, attempting to capture Aideed, resulting in the killing of 18 US soldiers and the subsequent withdrawal of US forces from Somalia (UCDP 2016). Depending on the assessment, intervention could have been considered unsuccessful in resolving the country's political crisis. However it could be assessed the United States successfully responded to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people, and continued to be a significant source of bilateral aid (Coll 1997). A problem of subjectivity exists in assessing the outcome of complex events surrounding intervention. In order to mitigate the subjectivity of judging success, baseline assumptions were made in determining success. If the supported side in a biased intervention achieved victory or the war ended in compromise and the supported side remained in power, intervention was considered successful. A neutral intervention was assessed one of two ways. In some of the sampled conflicts in this study, such as in Pakistan, the United States was less intervening to support the Pakistan government than to fight

against a common enemy. Intervention then becomes more about defeating a threat than reinforcing an ally. For this study, if an intervener was an active combatant and achieved victory, intervention was successful. Otherwise, neutral intervention was assumed to be for purposes of humanitarian relief, conflict resolution, or regional stability. In evaluating the success of these interventions, the analysis examined the existence or absence of continued low level violence after a compromise or ceasefire agreement. Success was determined if the conflict ended during the period of intervention without continued low intensity conflict below the threshold of war.

Predictor variables examined for their effect on the relationship between method and outcome include: intensity, type of incompatibility between warring parties, type of polity of the warring state, whether the conflict parties are divided along ethnic/religious lines, human development, side supported by intervener, and timing of the intervention. Given the previous knowledge described in the literature above, this thesis made a set of hypotheses regarding the effects of specific predictor conditions on the success of particular methods of intervention. Only certain variables were hypothesized to have an effect on direct/indirect intervention. Likewise, only certain variable were hypothesized to have an effect on multilateral/unilateral intervention. The following parameters define each predictor variable and their proposed effect on the success of particular intervention methods.

Intensity at the time of intervention, measured in terms of battle-related deaths, was categorized as minor (<1000 battle-related deaths per year) or high (1000 or greater battle-related deaths per year). *H<sub>1</sub>: When a third party intervenes in a high intensity conflict, the rate of success of direct and indirect intervention will increase and decrease respectively.* Incompatibility over government concerns the "type of political system, the replacement of the central government or the change of its composition." Otherwise, incompatibility was over territory, concern-

ing "the status of a specified territory, e.g.... secession or autonomy" (Högbladh 2008). *H<sub>2</sub>: When a third party intervenes in a conflict over government, the rate of success will be increased by indirect intervention and decreased by direct intervention.* *H<sub>3</sub>: When a third party intervenes in a conflict over territory, the rate of success will be increased by direct intervention and decreased by indirect intervention.* Polity of conflict countries were categorized according to stability (weak/strong) and regime type (autocratic/democratic). A separate category included failed states, those whose central authorities have collapsed (Marshall 2014). *H<sub>4</sub>: When a third party intervenes in a country with a weak central government, the rate of success will be increased by indirect intervention and decreased by direct intervention.* *H<sub>5</sub>: When a third party intervenes in a country with a strong central government, the rate of success will be increased by direct intervention and decreased by indirect intervention.* *H<sub>6</sub>: When a third party intervenes in an autocratic state, the rate of success will be increased by direct intervention and decreased by indirect intervention.* *H<sub>7</sub>: When a third party intervenes in a democratic state, the rate of success will be increased by indirect intervention and decreased by direct intervention.* *H<sub>8</sub>: When a third party intervenes in a failed state, the rate of success will be increased by direct intervention and decreased by indirect intervention.*

Conflicts were considered divided along ethnic or religious lines if ethnicity or religion, as opposed to ideology (e.g.), was the primary identification of one or both of the opposing groups. *H<sub>9A</sub>: When a third party intervenes in an ethnic/religious conflict, the rate of success will be increased by direct intervention and decreased by indirect intervention.* *H<sub>9B</sub>: When a third party intervenes in an ethnic/religious conflict, the rate of success will be increased by multilateral intervention and decreased by unilateral intervention.* Human development index (HDI) measures a country's health, education, and income standards (UNDP 2015). Countries in this



study were categorized as low (HDI <.55) or not low (HDI = .55 or greater). *H<sub>10</sub>*: When a third party intervenes in a low HDI country, the rate of success will be increased by indirect intervention and decreased by direct intervention. Side supported by intervener was categorized as government, opposition, or neutral. *H<sub>11A</sub>*: When a third party intervention is neutral, the rate of success will be increased by multilateral intervention and decreased by unilateral intervention. *H<sub>11B</sub>*: When a third party intervention is in support of the government, the rate of success will be increased by direct intervention and decreased by indirect intervention. *H<sub>11C</sub>*: When a third party intervention is in support of the opposition group, the rate of success will be increased by indirect intervention and decreased by direct intervention. Timing of intervention was categorized as either occurring at the onset of the conflict, or delayed one year or more. *H<sub>12</sub>*: When a third party intervention is delayed greater than one year, the rate of success will be increased by direct intervention and decreased by indirect intervention.

This thesis hypothesized that conditions of a conflict will affect whether a particular intervention method will achieve the third-party's desired outcome. To test the causal relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable of outcome, the sample of interventions was categorized according to each of the examined predictor conditions and analyzed for the success rate of each method of intervention. This allowed for the examination of what effect certain predictor variables have on the relationship between intervention method and outcome. Proposing the rate of success of a particular method of intervention changes under various conditions, the rate of success of a specific intervention method in each condition was compared to the overall success rate of that intervention method.

## **Data Collection**

Most data regarding intervention was obtained from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) External Support- Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset Version 1.0-2011 (Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér 2011). Additional interventions were obtained from the COW Intra-State War Database Version 4.1 to include those where the third-party was listed as an active participant in the conflict, but not a supporter of either the government or opposition party (Sarkees 2010). These cases include United States interventions in Somalia in 1994 and in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995. Sanctions data was retrieved from the UN Security Council, Sanctions webpage (UN 2016), US Dept. of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (Treasury.gov 2016), and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Embargo archive (SIPRI 2016). Outcomes of victory and compromise were assessed according to either the COW Intra-State War Database (Sarkees and Wayman 2010) or UCDP Categorical Variables Dataset 1989-2008 (UCDP Database 2008). The UCDP Battle-Related Death Dataset (UCDP Database 2015) evaluates the existence of continued low intensity conflict after threshold for war has ended.

Conditions of the conflict existing either before or simultaneous with the observed intervention which were evaluated for their influence on the method-outcome relationship, were taken from various sources. Conflict intensity in terms of battle-related deaths at the time of intervention was attained from the UCDP Battle-Related Death Dataset (UCDP Database 2015). The UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015) provides information for incompatibility as either government or territory. Side supported either government, opposition, or neutral were obtained from UCDP External Support Dataset (Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér 2011), COW Intra-State War Database (Sarkees and Wayman 2010), and the various sources for sanctions data. Timing of the intervention was derived from the difference between

the COW Intra-State War Database (Sarkees and Wayman 2010) start date of the conflict and the date of external support or applicable action from the third-party. Direct involvement of other parties as active combatants was available from the UCDP External Support Dataset (Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér 2011) and COW Intra-State War Database (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). Type of polity of the warring state at the time of intervention was available in the Polity IV Data Series (Marshall 2014). The Polity IV Date Series codes the regime authority of each country on a 21 point scale from -10 to 10 based on qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions, and additionally notes instances of state failure (Marshall 2014). Ethnic/religious divisions between the warring parties were assessed from narratives of the conflicts available in the UCDP Encyclopedia (2016). Finally, human development index (HDI) to assess the quality of life in conflict countries. The UN Development Program (2015) published each country's HDI to summarize their health, education, and income standards.

### **Data Analysis**

To create the baseline for comparison, the overall number of successful interventions for each method ( $m_s$ ) was totaled and divided by the number of interventions of that method ( $m$ ), to find the rate of success of each intervention method.

$$r(m_s) = m_s / m, \text{ where } m = (\text{direct, indirect, multilateral or unilateral})$$

Then, for each predictor condition examined ( $x$ ), the analysis grouped together cases of intervention which met the condition. Within each group the number of successful interventions for each method ( $m_{sx}$ ) was divided by the total number of interventions of that method in the group ( $m_x$ ) to find the rate of success for each type of intervention in each condition,  $r(m_{sx})$ .

$$r(m_{sx}) = m_{sx} / m_x$$

The success rate of each method in a condition,  $r(m_{sx})$ , was compared to the overall success rate for that intervention method,  $r(m_s)$ , to determine the relative effect,  $R(m_x)$  of the condition on that method of intervention. For example,  $R(m_x) > 1$  indicated the success rate of direct intervention in condition  $x$  was higher than the success rate of direct intervention in all conflicts; and condition  $x$  was assessed to have a positive effect on the success rate of direct intervention.

$$R(m_x) = r(m_{sx}) / r(m_s)$$

If the rate of success of direct intervention in condition  $x$  was similar to the rate of success of direct intervention overall,  $x$  had no effect on the rate of success of direct intervention. The threshold for change in rate of success for a method of intervention was 10% for a condition to be assessed to have an effect. Additionally, 5 cases was the minimum number for a method within a given condition to have drawn a conclusion. This limit was set as a validity measure in order to ensure that the apparent effect of a condition would not be changed by the mere addition of one event. For example, three of four successful direct interventions in condition  $x$  would result in a 75% success rate, compared to a 60% overall success rate for direct interventions in general. The hypothetical addition of one more unsuccessful direct intervention would change the success rate to three of five or 60%, thus changing the apparent effect of condition  $x$  on direct intervention from positive to no effect. A five case minimum and 10% threshold mitigated this

scenario. Additional comparisons were made between the success rate for each method in a condition and the success rate of interventions overall, and between the success rate for each method in a condition and the success rate of intervention in the condition in general.

For simplification of categorization and analysis, categorical variables were coded using dummy variables. Intensity was labelled *Int\_Hi*. If the intensity level in the first year of intervention was high, meaning 1000 or greater battle-related deaths in that year, *Int\_Hi* was coded 1, and if battle-related deaths were minor, defined as less than 1000, *Int\_Hi* was coded 0. Incompatibility was relabeled *Inc\_Ter* and coded 1 if the warring parties' stated incompatibility was over territory and 0 if it was over government. Timing of the intervention was coded 0 if the intervention took place in the same year in which the conflict reached the threshold of war and 1 if the intervention was delayed a year or more. If the conflict parties were divided along ethnic lines, the variable *Ethnic* was coded 1, and otherwise coded 0. HDI was coded as either 0 if the conflict country had a low HDI score (<.55) and coded 1 if it was other than low. Type of intervention was defined by two variables: *Multilateral* and *Direct*. For each intervention, a 1 was given to either or both variables if it qualified the category. Thus, an intervention which was unilateral and direct intervention was coded as *Multilateral*=0 and *Direct*=1.

The predictor variable *polity* was not dichotomous, and therefore had to be converted into multiple dichotomous variables. Three dichotomous labels were used, labelled *Pol\_Weak*, *Pol\_Aut*, and *Pol\_SF*. If the conflict state was weak autocratic, *Weak*=1, *Aut*=1, and *SF*=0. If the conflict state was weak democratic, *Weak*=1, *Aut*=0, and *SF*=0. If the conflict state was strong autocratic, *Weak*=0, *Aut*=1, and *SF*=0. If the conflict state was strong democratic, *Weak*=0, *Aut*=0, and *SF*=0. If the conflict state was a failed state, *Weak*=0, *Aut*=0, and *SF*=1. Side supported was coded as two dichotomous variable, labelled *Supt\_Gov* and *Supt\_Opp*. If the inter-

vention supported the government, Supt\_Gov=1 and Supt\_Opp=0. Conversely, if the intervention supported the opposition, Supt\_Gov=0 and Supt\_Opp=1. If the intervention was neutral, Supt\_Gov=0 and Supt\_Opp=0. Finally, the dependent variable of outcome was coded dichotomously as Success=1 if successful, and Success=0 if unsuccessful.

## CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

The study examined 31 conflicts with 35 episodes of intervention. In examining these interventions, 15 (42.9%) were found to have involved direct deployment of troops by the intervening parties. Twenty of the interventions examined were indirect (57.1%), either by use of sanctions or providing assistance via weapons, materiel/logistics, training/expertise, and/or funding. Of these indirect interventions, 17 involved providing assistance to one side, and three involved only the use of sanctions. Twenty-three interventions (65.7%) were unilateral in nature, while 12 were multilateral (34.3%). This was a surprising finding given the implication by previous literature, such as Lounsbery, Pearson, and Talentino (2011, 244) of a shift towards multilateral interventions post-Cold War. The disagreement may result from different interpretations of what consists of multilateral. Whereas here multilateral implies being part of or in addition to a UN mission (in the case of direct intervention) or sanctions regime (indirect intervention), Lounsbery, Pearson, and Talentino (2011, 239) more liberally include ad-hoc coalitions under the category of multilateral intervention. The 1999 NATO intervention in Yugoslavia is a prime example of this difference. The legality of NATO military action with regards to the interpretation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter is widely debated because authorization for use of force was not explicitly given by the UN Security Council. As such, for this study NATO action is viewed as an extension of Western power interests, and therefore categorized as unilateral. Similarly, European Union (EU) sanctions are considered here to be unilateral actions because they reflect the interests of mainly Western European powers. Interestingly, despite the overall majority of interventions being unilateral, of the 15 direct interventions, the majority were multilateral. Table 4.1 below depicts the coded data described in this and subsequent paragraphs.

### Table 4.1. Coded Results

1	Intens_H	Inc_Ter	Pol_Wea	Pol_Aut	Pol_SF	Ethnic	HDI	Timing	Supt_Gov	Supt_Opr	Direct	Multilate	Success
2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
3	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
4	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
5	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
6	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
7	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
8	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
9	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1
10	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1
11	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
12	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
13	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
14	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1
15	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
16	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
17	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
18	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
19	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
20	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
21	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
22	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
23	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
24	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
25	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
26	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
27	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1
28	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1
29	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1
30	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
31	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
32	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0
33	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1
34	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0
35	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
36	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0

Sources: Högladh, Pettersson, and Themér 2011; Marshall 2014; Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015; Sarkees and Wayman 2010; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2016; UCDP Database 2008; UCDP Database 2015; United Nations Security Council 2016; Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2016; US Department of Treasury 2016; United Nations Development Programme 2015; United Nations Peacekeeping 2016.

Unilateral interventions included five direct interventions, involving deployment of troops, and 20 indirect interventions. Multilateral interventions included 10 direct interventions and two indirect interventions. Consequently, the sample of intervention consisted of 14.3% unilateral and direct, 51.4% unilateral and indirect, 28.6% multilateral and direct, and 5.7% multilateral and indirect. The most common method of intervention therefore was found to be unilat-



eral and indirect. With one exception, nearly all of these unilateral indirect interventions comprised of providing assistance to the military of one of the combatants in the form of weapons, cash, training, or materiel. The exception was EU sanctions in 1999 on Ethiopia. The conflict examined was between Ethiopia and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). These sanctions occurred in response to the border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea; however the decision to include these sanctions as an intervention in the civil conflict between Ethiopia and OLF came from the fact that Eritrea was providing support to OLF. Both instances of multilateral indirect interventions were in Liberia, in the First and Second Liberian civil wars. It should be noted that there was a UN peacekeeping mission in Liberia, UNOMIL, during these periods, but did not meet the troop commitment threshold for intervention.

Some conflicts such as the Maoist insurgency in Nepal were split into multiple conflicts in the COW Intra-State War Database (Sarkees and Wayman 2010), demarcated by ceasefire agreements. In the analysis here, conflicts which deescalated and subsequently resumed among the same actors without a major shift in government or territorial control, with assistance or intervention being continuous, were counted as one event. As such, the Nepal insurgency, First Liberian Civil War, and Philippine-Moro conflict were aggregated as continuous events. Conversely, some conflicts and interventions within a conflict were split into separate events when control of the central government changed hands or separate interventions took place. Conflict in Afghanistan was listed as a continuous event in the COW Intra-State War Database (Sarkees and Wayman 2010), but separated here into three separate conflicts. Between 1989 and 1992, after Soviet withdrawal, president Najibullah remained in control of the government. In 1992, Jam'iyat-I Islami-yi Afghanistan, supported by the United States, achieved victory over the government. From 1995-96, the new government of Afghanistan, supported by Russia, was challenged

and defeated by the Taliban. From 1996 to 2001, Russia supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban regime until in October 2001, the US led coalition intervened to remove the Taliban from power in support of the Northern Alliance. In the case of Rwanda, France was not part of the UN Mission in Rwanda, and as such French assistance was considered a separate intervention.

Interventions occurred in a variety of conflicts with different conditions. The mean number of battle-related deaths in the year intervention began was 1895. Twenty-one interventions were initiated in high intensity conflicts where there had been greater than 1,000 battle-related deaths in the year of intervention, the highest being the 1997 Republic of Congo Civil War with 10033 estimated deaths. Of the interventions examined, nine were in conflicts over territory, between a government and an opposition group seeking autonomy or secession. The remaining 26 were fought to replace the central government and/or political system. Based on Polity score, 19 interventions took place in autocratic states, seven in democratic states, and nine in failed states. Of the 19 interventions in autocratic states, nine were in states with weak central governments and 11 in states with strong regimes. Interventions happened in four weak democratic states and three strong democratic states. Though the focus of this study was not to explore the susceptibility of certain types of political systems to civil conflict, it was interesting to have found conflict present in democracies with strong central governments. The conflicts found in this study occurring in strong democratic states were the Philippine-Moro conflict, the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, and the Nepal Maoist Insurgency with two interventions. Of note, all of the interventions in states scored as democratic, both weak and strong, were unilateral and indirect in nature. All but one of these, the aforementioned EU Sanctions in Ethiopia, took the form of providing military assistance. Ethnic or religious divisions were a factor in 22 of the examined interventions. HDI

scores were low for the conflict country in 25 interventions, being the most common characteristic of the interventions sampled. Eight interventions occurred in countries with medium HDI scores (greater than .55 and less than .7). Two interventions took place in the former Yugoslavia, in Bosnia and Kosovo with high HDI scores. Given this data on conflict country conditions, interventions ensued most commonly in high intensity conflicts, those fought for control over the central government or political system, those along ethnic/religious divisions, in autocratic states, and in states with low human development. Sixteen of the 35 interventions occurred in conflicts meeting at least four of these conditions, with three occurring in conflicts which met all five.

Eleven of the interventions were neutral, not in support of one side or the other. Nine of those neutral interventions were multilateral. Additionally, of the 12 multilateral interventions, nine were neutral. This indicates that multilateral interventions are more likely to be neutral, and also neutral interventions were likely to be multilateral. The majority of interventions were biased, with 18 in support the government, and six supporting the opposition. These six in support of opposition groups were:

1. US support of the Mujahedeen against Najibullah's government in Afghanistan
2. US assistance to UNITA in the Angolan Civil War
3. French assistance to the Cobra militia in the Republic of Congo
4. Russian support of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan after the Taliban took control of the government in 1997
5. NATO support of the Kosovo Liberation Army in Yugoslavia
6. US, UK, and France military support of the Northern Alliance against the Taliban government in Afghanistan in 2001.

Twenty of the examined interventions ensued in the same year or before the conflict reached the battle-related death or troop commitment threshold for war, while 15 were delayed at least one year. With the exception of one outlier, the average time for delayed interventions was

1.71 years. The exception was US military aid to Sri Lanka against the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, occurring 16 years into the conflict.

### **Significant Findings**

Overall, the rate of intervention in general being successful was almost even with 51% of interventions achieving success. Direct interventions were successful in 60% of cases and indirect interventions were successful in 45% of cases. Direct interventions overall were successful 1.33 times more often than indirect interventions. Multilateral interventions were successful in 58% of cases and unilateral interventions were successful in 48% of cases. Thus multilateral interventions were successful 1.21 times more often than unilateral ones. Direct interventions, however, were more successful when they were carried out unilaterally, with 80% of the cases achieving success. Interventions which were both direct and multilateral were successful in 50% of cases, nearly equal to the baseline rate. The mean number of events for each method of intervention in each condition group ( $m_x$ ) was 7.1. The analysis therefore considered findings to be reliable only when  $m_x > 7.1$ . The following results were found for the conditions examined.

#### *Intensity*

In high intensity conflicts, direct interventions were as successful as direct interventions overall. Indirect interventions were 33% less successful than indirect interventions overall. Additionally, direct interventions were twice as successful as indirect interventions. Indirect interventions were 41% less successful than the baseline for interventions overall, 33% less successful than indirect interventions overall, and 33% less successful than interventions in high intensity conflicts in general. Multilateral interventions were 28% less successful in high intensity con-

flicts than multilateral interventions overall. In minor intensity conflicts, indirect interventions were 1.33 times more successful than indirect interventions overall.

### *Incompatibility*

In conflicts over government, indirect interventions were 1.33 times more successful than indirect interventions overall. Direct interventions were not significantly affected. In addition, unilateral interventions were 1.23 times more successful than unilateral interventions overall. In conflicts over territory all cases of indirect intervention were unsuccessful. However, there were not enough cases of direct intervention to determine a significant effect. Interventions in conflicts over territory were 45% less successful than intervention overall.

**Table 4.2 Results for Intensity and Incompatibility**

1		Total	Success	$r(m_{sx})$	$R(m_x)$	Overall	Condition
7	Int_Hi	20	9	45%		0.88	
8	Direct	10	6	60%	1	1.18	1.33
9	Indirect	10	3	30%	0.67	0.59	0.67
10	Multi	7	3	42%	0.72	0.82	0.93
11	Unilateral	13	6	46%	0.96	0.90	1.02
12	Int_Minor	15	9	60%		1.18	
13	Direct	5	3	60%	1	1.18	1.00
14	Indirect	10	6	60%	1.33	1.18	1.00
15	Multi	5	4	80%	1.38	1.57	1.33
16	Unilateral	10	5	50%	1.04	0.98	0.83
17	Inc_Ter	9	3	33%		0.65	
18	Direct	4	3	75%	1.25	1.47	2.27
19	Indirect	5	0	0%	0.00	0.00	0.00
20	Multi	7	2	29%	0.50	0.57	0.88
21	Unilateral	6	1	17%	0.35	0.33	0.52
22	Inc_Gov	26	15	58%		1.14	
23	Direct	11	6	55%	0.92	1.08	0.95
24	Indirect	15	9	60%	1.33	1.18	1.03
25	Multi	9	5	56%	0.97	1.10	0.97
26	Unilateral	17	10	59%	1.23	1.16	1.02

Sources: Högladh, Pettersson, and Themnér 2011; Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015; Sarkees and Wayman 2010; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2016; UCDP Database 2008; UCDP Database 2015; United Nations Security Council 2016; Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2016; US Department of Treasury 2016; United Nations Peacekeeping 2016.

### *Polity*

Indirect interventions in politically weak states were 1.24 times more successful than indirect interventions overall. There were not enough cases of direct intervention to determine a significant effect. Additionally, indirect interventions in politically weak states were 1.22 times more successful than intervention in politically weak states in general. In politically strong states, there were not enough cases of direct intervention to make a meaningful conclusion; however indirect interventions were 27% less successful than indirect intervention overall. Additionally, indirect interventions in politically strong states were 45% less successful than interventions overall and 28% less successful than interventions in politically strong states in general. Direct interventions in autocratic states were 17% less successful than direct interventions overall. Indirect interventions were 1.22 times more successful than indirect interventions overall. Furthermore, intervention in autocratic states had a positive effect on unilateral interventions and a negative effect on multilateral interventions. In democratic states indirect intervention was 46% less successful than indirect interventions in general. There were no cases of direct intervention in democratic states. Intervention in democratic states was 43% less successful than intervention overall. In failed states, direct intervention was 1.18 times as successful as direct intervention overall; indirect intervention was not significantly affected. Intervention in failed states was 1.31 times more successful than intervention overall. Additionally, state failure increased the success of multilateral interventions 1.22 times over multilateral interventions in general.

**Table 4.3. Results for Polity**

1		Total	Success	$r(m_{sx})$	$R(m_x)$	Overall	Condition
27	Pol_Weak	13	6	46%		0.90	
28	Direct	4	1	25%	0.42	0.49	0.54
29	Indirect	9	5	56%	1.24	1.10	1.22
30	Multi	4	2	50%	0.86	0.98	1.09
31	Unilateral	9	4	44%	0.92	0.86	0.96
32	Pol_Strong	13	6	46%		0.90	
33	Direct	4	3	75%	1.25	1.47	1.63
34	Indirect	9	3	33%	0.73	0.65	0.72
35	Multi	1	0	0%	0.00	0.00	0.00
36	Unilateral	12	6	50%	1.04	0.98	1.09
37	Pol_Aut	19	10	53%		1.04	
38	Direct	8	4	50%	0.83	0.98	0.94
39	Indirect	11	6	55%	1.22	1.08	1.04
40	Multi	5	2	40%	0.69	0.78	0.75
41	Unilateral	14	8	57%	1.19	1.12	1.08
42	Pol_Dem	7	2	29%		0.57	
43	Direct	0	0	0%	0.00	0.00	0.00
44	Indirect	7	2	29%	0.64	0.57	1.00
45	Multi	0	0	0%	0.00	0.00	0.00
46	Unilateral	7	2	29%	0.60	0.57	1.00
47	Pol_SF	9	6	67%		1.31	
48	Direct	7	5	71%	1.18	1.39	1.06
49	Indirect	2	1	50%	1.11	0.98	0.75
50	Multi	7	5	71%	1.22	1.39	1.06
51	Unilateral	2	1	50%	1.04	0.98	0.75

Sources: Högladh, Pettersson, and Themér 2011; Marshall 2014; Sarkees and Wayman 2010; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2016; UCDP Database 2008; UCDP Database 2015; United Nations Security Council 2016; Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2016; US Department of Treasury 2016; United Nations Peacekeeping 2016.

### *Ethnic/Religious Divisions*

In ethnic/religious conflicts, direct intervention was 17% less successful than direct intervention overall. Indirect intervention was 27% less successful than indirect intervention overall. Direct intervention, however, was 1.52 times more likely to be successful than indirect intervention and 1.22 times more likely to be successful than intervention in ethnic/religious conflicts in general. Multilateral intervention in ethnic/religious conflicts was 24% less successful than multilateral interventions overall; unilateral interventions were 21% less successful. Intervention in conflicts without ethnic/religious divisions were 1.36 times more successful than intervention overall, with indirect intervention 1.23 times more successful than intervention overall and 1.39

times more successful than indirect intervention overall. Unilateral interventions in non-ethnic/religious conflicts were 1.25 times more successful than unilateral interventions overall.

**Table 4.4. Results for Ethnic/Religious Divisions and HDI**

1		Total	Success	$r(m_{sx})$	$R(m_x)$	Overall	Condition
52	Ethnic	22	9	41%		0.80	
53	Direct	10	5	50%	0.83	0.98	1.22
54	Indirect	12	4	33%	0.73	0.65	0.80
55	Multi	9	4	44%	0.76	0.86	1.07
56	Unilateral	13	5	38%	0.79	0.75	0.93
57	NotEthnic	13	9	69%		1.36	
58	Direct	5	4	80%	1.33	1.57	1.16
59	Indirect	8	5	63%	1.39	1.23	0.90
60	Multi	3	3	100%	1.72	1.96	1.44
61	Unilateral	10	6	60%	1.25	1.18	0.87
62	HDI>Med	10	4	40%		0.78	
63	Direct	5	4	80%	1.33	1.57	2.00
64	Indirect	5	0	0%	0.00	0.00	0.00
65	Multi	3	2	67%	1.15	1.31	1.67
66	Unilateral	7	2	29%	0.60	0.56	0.71
67	HDI_Low	25	14	56%		1.10	
68	Direct	10	5	50%	0.83	0.98	0.89
69	Indirect	15	9	60%	1.33	1.18	1.07
70	Multi	9	5	56%	0.96	1.09	0.99
71	Unilateral	16	9	56%	1.17	1.10	1.00

Sources: Högladh, Pettersson, and Themér 2011; Marshall 2014; Sarkees and Wayman 2010; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2016; UCDP Database 2008; UCDP Database 2015; United Nations Security Council 2016; Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2016; US Department of Treasury 2016; United Nations Development Programme 2015; United Nations Peacekeeping 2016.

### *Human Development*

Indirect interventions in low-HDI countries were 1.33 times more successful than indirect intervention overall. Direct interventions were 17% less successful than direct interventions overall. Furthermore, indirect interventions were 1.2 times more successful than direct intervention. In medium or greater HDI countries, intervention was 22% less successful than intervention overall. Interestingly, none of the indirect interventions in these countries were successful and direct interventions were 1.57 times as successful as direct interventions in general.



### *Side Supported*

Neutral intervention decreased the rate of success for multilateral interventions by 23%. Unilateral cases were too few to make a reliable conclusion. Neutral interventions were 29% less successful relative to intervention overall. Even though multilateral neutral interventions were less successful than multilateral interventions in general, they were still 1.22 times more successful than the overall rate for neutral interventions. Direct intervention success was considerably decreased by 58%. When interventions supported the government in intrastate conflicts, direct interventions were all successful, increasing the effectiveness of direct interventions by a factor of 1.67. Indirect interventions were not significantly affected. Indirect interventions were, however, 31% less successful than interventions supporting governments in general. There were not enough cases of intervention supporting opposition groups to make any conclusions for specific types of intervention.

### *Timing*

There was no substantial change in success rate for direct intervention with respect to timing. However, indirect intervention was found to be 26% less successful than indirect intervention overall. Direct and indirect intervention had the same 50% success rate when at the onset of conflict. When intervention was delayed, direct intervention was twice as effective as indirect. Multilateral and unilateral interventions were not affected by timing.

### **Table 4.5. Results for Side Supported and Timing**

1		Total	Success	$r(m_{sx})$	$R(m_x)$	Overall	Condition
72	Neutral	11	4	36%		0.71	
73	Direct	8	2	25%	0.42	0.49	0.69
74	Indirect	3	2	67%	1.48	1.31	1.83
75	Multi	9	4	44%	0.77	0.87	1.22
76	Unilateral	2	0	0%	0.00	0.00	0.00
77	Supt_Gov	18	10	56%		1.09	
78	Direct	5	5	100%	1.67	1.96	1.80
79	Indirect	13	5	38%	0.85	0.75	0.69
80	Multi	3	3	100%	1.72	1.96	1.80
81	Unilateral	15	7	47%	0.97	0.92	0.84
82	Supt_Opp	6	4	67%		1.31	
83	Direct	2	2	100%	1.67	1.96	1.50
84	Indirect	4	2	50%	1.11	0.98	0.75
85	Multi	0	0	0%	0.00	0.00	0.00
86	Unilateral	6	4	67%	1.39	1.31	1.00
87	Timing_Onset	20	10	50%		0.98	
88	Direct	6	3	50%	0.83	0.98	1.00
89	Indirect	14	7	50%	1.11	0.98	1.00
90	Multi	5	3	60%	1.03	1.18	1.20
91	Unilateral	15	7	47%	0.97	0.92	0.93
92	Timing_Delay	15	8	53%		1.05	
93	Direct	9	6	67%	1.11	1.31	1.25
94	Indirect	6	2	33%	0.74	0.65	0.63
95	Multi	7	4	57%	0.99	1.12	1.07
96	Unilateral	8	4	50%	1.04	0.98	0.94

Sources: Höglbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér 2011; Marshall 2014; Sarkees and Wayman 2010; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2016; UCDP Database 2008; UCDP Database 2015; United Nations Security Council 2016; Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2016; US Department of Treasury 2016; United Nations Peacekeeping 2016

## Analysis

High conflict intensity was shown to have no change on the success of direct intervention and a negative effect on the success of indirect intervention. Therefore, hypothesis  $H_1$ , when a third party intervenes in a high intensity conflict, the rate of success will be increased by direct intervention and decreased by indirect intervention, was not true. Direct intervention remained more successful than indirect in high intensity conflicts. The explanation for this finding could come from the decrease in incremental costs of continued or increased fighting with higher in-

tensity conflicts. Once the combatants have already invested so much in terms of battle-related deaths, indirect assistance is too little to make a substantial impact on the costs of enduring the conflict versus the costs of conceding or compromising. This concurs with Regan's (1996, 347) assumption that intervention is more likely to succeed in influencing combatants' actions when casualties are still relatively low. When conflict intensity was minor, however, indirect intervention effectiveness was increased to the same rate as direct intervention. Therefore the actions of the combatants are influenced more easily by less severe methods, at lower costs to the intervenor. The effectiveness of multilateral interventions was decreased by high intensity, perhaps because they constrained the abilities of third parties to intervene aggressively enough to influence the outcome of conflicts in their favor.

Conflict over government positively affected indirect intervention success and did not affect direct intervention success. Therefore, hypothesis  $H_2$ , *when a third party intervenes in a conflict over government, the rate of success will be increased by indirect intervention and decreased by direct intervention*, was not true. Conflict over territory decreased the effectiveness of indirect intervention as predicted, but its effect on direct intervention was inconclusive due to sample size. Hence, hypothesis  $H_3$ , *when a third party intervenes in a conflict over territory, the rate of success will be increased by direct intervention and decreased by indirect intervention*, was inconclusive. Every one of the conflicts over territory concerned an ethnic group attempting to gain autonomy. All of these conflicts which involved indirect intervention are ongoing at varying levels of intensity. It appears combatant groups seeking autonomy are especially persistent, and indirect intervention is not enough to alter the conflict. Conflicts over control of the central government were far more common and all methods of intervention (direct, indirect, unilateral, and multilateral) had nearly the same effectiveness. Decision making when intervening in

these conflicts could then be based on the lowest costs, or based on other conditions present in the conflict which may drive the success rate of a particular strategy.

Success rates of indirect intervention were positively affected in politically weak states and negatively affected in politically strong states. Direct intervention effectiveness was inconclusive due to sample size. Thus, hypothesis  $H_4$ , *when a third party intervenes in a country with a weak central government, the rate of success will be increased by indirect intervention and decreased by direct intervention*, and hypothesis  $H_5$ , *when a third party intervenes in a country with a strong central government, the rate of success will be increased by direct intervention and decreased by indirect intervention*, were both inconclusive. These findings concerning the relative effect of indirect intervention disagree with the implications of Gent (2008) regarding the relative strength of the combatant parties. As noted in the literature review, Gent (2008, 714) implies governments generally have an asymmetric advantage over opposition groups, and that government can more easily succeed when their relative strength against an opposition group is high. When the government is weak and the relative strength of the combatants is more balanced, one could infer the conflict would become more entrenched. This would suggest a need for a more forceful intervention to affect an outcome. However, the findings suggest otherwise, given the positive effect of weak government on indirect intervention.

Conflict in autocratic states had a negative effect on direct intervention and a positive effect on indirect interventions. As such, hypothesis  $H_6$ , *when a third party intervenes in an autocratic state, the rate of success will be increased by direct intervention and decreased by indirect intervention* was false. Autocratic polity had the opposite effect of the prediction. Conflicts in democratic states had a negative effect on indirect interventions, opposite that of the prediction; and their effect on direct intervention is not known because no such cases occurred. Hypothesis

*H<sub>7</sub>*, when a third party intervenes in a democratic state, the rate of success will be increased by indirect intervention and decreased by direct intervention, is therefore false. Direct and indirect intervention in autocratic states had similar success rates. However, unilateral intervention was more successful than multilateral intervention. This suggests third parties interested in affecting the outcome of conflict in autocratic states would have equal likelihood of success with either direct or indirect intervention and the constraints of the multilateral process would hinder their effectiveness. Therefore, the political costs of unilateralism in terms of international opinion would have to be considered in relation to the costs in terms of effectiveness. State failure in the conflict country increased direct intervention success as predicted, but did not affect indirect intervention. Thus, hypothesis *H<sub>8</sub>*, when a third party intervenes in a failed state, the rate of success will be increased by direct intervention and decreased by indirect intervention, is false. Intervention in failed states had a relatively high success rate overall, 67%. All types of intervention were at least 50% successful, with direct and multilateral being the most successful.

Ethnic/religious divisions negatively affected all methods of intervention. Consequently, hypotheses *H<sub>9A</sub>*, when a third party intervenes in an ethnic/religious conflict, the rate of success will be increased by direct intervention and decreased by indirect intervention, and *H<sub>9B</sub>*, when a third party intervenes in an ethnic/religious conflict, the rate of success will be increased by multilateral intervention and decreased by unilateral intervention, were both false. No method of intervention in ethnic/religious conflicts was more than 50% likely to be successful; however direct was more successful than indirect. Multilateral was more only slightly more successful than unilateral. One can gather from this finding, due to exceptionally low success rates, it may not be worth intervening in ethnic/religious conflicts unless a third-party is willing to accept the heightened costs of committing troops for a payoff of only 50% likelihood of success.

Low human development positively affected indirect intervention and negatively affected direct interventions. Hypothesis  $H_{10}$ , *when a third party intervenes in a low HDI country, the rate of success will be increased by indirect intervention and decreased by direct intervention*, was therefore true. An intriguing ancillary discovery to this finding was that all but one of the 25 conflicts in low-HDI countries were over control of the central government as opposed to territory. Likewise, all but one of the conflicts over territory were in medium or higher HDI countries. This implies groups of low income, education, and health do not try to secede or gain autonomy, but rather seek to change their central institutions. Effectiveness of indirect intervention was increased in low-HDI countries, and decreased in medium or higher HDI countries. This may be because the incremental benefit of indirect assistance is greater to groups in poorer countries relative to richer countries.

Neutrality decreased the effectiveness of multilateral interventions, contrary to the prediction. The effect of neutrality on unilateral intervention is unknown. Hypothesis  $H_{11A}$ , *when a third party intervention is neutral, the rate of success will be increased by multilateral intervention and decreased by unilateral intervention*, was then false. Neutral interventions overall were generally unsuccessful, with a success rate of only 36%. Neutral interventions were more successful when multilateral, yet still had only a 44% success rate. Direct intervention was also largely unsuccessful when neutral. Therefore, third-parties might consider choosing a side to support, or limit their actions to sanctions if they wish to remain neutral yet still affect the conflict. Committing troops while remaining neutral has seemingly been an ineffective strategy. Direct intervention effectiveness was increased by supporting the government, as predicted, but indirect intervention was not affected. Hypothesis,  $H_{11B}$ , *when a third party intervention is in support of the government, the rate of success will be increased by direct intervention and decreased*

*by indirect intervention*, was then false. If third parties intervene on behalf of governments in conflicts where the opposition group is strong, as suggested by Gent (2008, 714), a more forceful intervention strategy would be required to affect the outcome. This is consistent with the finding that direct interventions are appreciably (2.6 times) more effective than indirect interventions when supporting the government. Since there were not enough instances of each intervention type in the sample of intervention supporting opposition groups, hypothesis  $H_{11C}$ , *when a third party intervention is in support of the opposition group, the rate of success will be increased by indirect intervention and decreased by direct intervention*, was inconclusive.

Delayed intervention greater than one year after start of the conflict negatively affected indirect intervention as predicted. Due to a lack of relative effect on direct intervention, hypothesis  $H_{12}$ , *when a third party intervention is delayed greater than one year, the rate of success will be increased by direct intervention and decreased by indirect intervention*, was false. This could have similar reasoning as high intensity conflicts due to the reduced incremental costs of continued fighting in relation to conceding the longer conflicts go on, thus requiring a more robust response from interveners. Interestingly, the success rate of intervention was not significantly different based on timing. This is therefore suggestive that success is not affected by timing, however, as time passes the ability to affect the conflict's outcome becomes more costly as indirect intervention becomes less effective.

Overall, ten of the hypotheses were false, one was true, and four were inconclusive for a lack of sufficient cases. However, only five of the hypotheses were false due to a lack of change in relative effectiveness. Another five of the hypotheses were false because the effect was opposite of that predicted. Furthermore, each hypothesis predicted an effect on two intervention methods. Therefore, 30 total predictions were made. Of these, only five were proven false due to

no relative effect, and five were inconclusive. The remaining 20 either predicted the observed effect or the opposite effect. So, even though the effect was not always as predicted, it can be assessed that the observed condition had an effect on the success rate of an intervention method in 2/3 of the condition-method pairings. Therefore, the main hypothesis, that *the conditions of an intrastate conflict will affect whether a particular intervention method by a third party results in achieving their desired outcome*, was true. The exceptions were: high intensity and direct intervention; conflict over government and direct intervention; state failure and indirect intervention; supporting government and indirect intervention; and timing and direct intervention. Notably, these findings show an effect on direct intervention does not mean an opposite effect on indirect intervention. Likewise, an effect on multilateral intervention does not mean an opposite effect on unilateral intervention.



## CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS

The post-Cold War era of intrastate war and globalization leave states faced with difficult decisions regarding their level of involvement in other state's civil conflicts. Inaction risks letting these civil conflicts spread to neighboring countries causing regional destabilization. These civil conflicts also threaten the possibility of unfriendly forces gaining control of territory or government, posing danger to the national security of potential interveners and their allies. States may wish to intervene in intrastate conflicts for a number of reasons, including humanitarian relief, to support a friendly government, or to depose a hostile government. How to intervene, with regards to deploying troops, providing economic assistance, and whether to go through the processes required for the UN to authorize the use of force or to act unilaterally, all require complex cost/benefit analysis. This thesis asked the question, what effect do the conditions of an intrastate conflict have on the likelihood a particular type of intervention implemented by a third-party will achieve a successful outcome? Considering this question, this thesis hypothesized that the conditions of an intrastate conflict would affect whether a particular intervention method by a third party resulted in achieving their desired outcome.

To test the hypothesis, this study examined 31 intrastate conflicts in the post-Cold War era from 1991 to 2008, in which 35 interventions by major powers occurred. Interventions were analyzed for the presence of particular predictor conditions, intervention methods, and outcomes. Predictor conditions considered were: intensity, type of incompatibility between warring parties, polity of the warring state, ethnic/religious divisions, human development, side supported by intervener, and timing of the intervention. Intervention methods were categorized by the level of involvement in terms of direct contribution of military troops or indirect means such as assistance or sanctions, and by procedural implementation with respect to UN authorization. Outcome

was evaluated conditionally based upon the assessed goal of intervention. An intervention supporting one side or another was successful if the supported side achieved decisive victory or if a compromise resulted in them gaining or maintaining authority. Neutral interventions were determined to be successful if the conflict ended during intervention or if the third party achieved victory over their opponent.

Effects of conditions on the success of intervention methods were hypothesized based on the presumed effect they would have on the ability of intervention to manipulate the decision making of combatant groups. The success rates of particular intervention methods in these conditions were compared with the general success rates of the intervention methods in the overall sample to determine the relative effect of conditions on the success of specified methods of intervention. The findings suggest certain conditions change the effectiveness of intervention methods. Specifically, state failure and supporting government forces increased the effectiveness of direct intervention. Autocracy, ethnic/religious divisions, and low HDI decreased the effectiveness of direct intervention. Conflict over government, weak central government, autocracy, and low HDI increased the effectiveness of indirect intervention. High intensity, conflict over secession or autonomy, strong central government, democracy, ethnic/religious divisions, and delayed timing decreased the effectiveness of indirect intervention. High intensity, autocracy, ethnic/religious divisions, and neutrality decreased the effectiveness of multilateral intervention. State failure increased the effectiveness of multilateral intervention. Finally, ethnic/religious divisions decreased the effectiveness of unilateral intervention. Table 5.1 below summarizes the relative effect of the examined conditions on intervention methods.

**Table 5.1 Summary of Relative Effects**

	Direct	Indirect
Int_Hi	0	-
Inc_Gov	0	+
Inc_Ter	?	-
Pol_Weak	?	+
Pol_Stron	?	-
Pol_Aut	-	+
Pol_Dem	?	-
Pol_SF	+	0
Ethnic	-	-
HDI_Low	-	+
Supt_Gov	+	0
Supt_Opp	?	?
Delay	0	-
	Multilat	Unilat
Int_Hi	-	0
Pol_Aut	-	0
Pol_SF	+	?
Ethnic	-	-
Neutral	-	?

*Sources:* Högladh, Pettersson, and Themnér 2011; Marshall 2014; Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015; Sarkees and Wayman 2010; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2016; UCDP Database 2008; UCDP Database 2015; United Nations Security Council 2016; Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2016; US Department of Treasury 2016; United Nations Development Programme 2015; United Nations Peacekeeping 2016.

The majority of were unilateral in nature, contrary to suggestions made by scholars such as Lounsbery, Pearson, and Talentino (2011, 244) that states have shifted towards multilateral interventions post-Cold War. However direct interventions were predominantly multilateral, suggesting states are more willing to give assistance or apply sanctions unilaterally than commit troops without authorization from the UN. The most common methods of intervention were found to be unilateral and indirect, conceivably because they are the easiest, not requiring the rigorous processes of international organizations, and lower cost than committing military forces. Unilateral and indirect interventions were also overall less effective than multilateral or direct. Interestingly, however, direct interventions were more successful when they were carried out unilaterally. This could possibly be due to the constraints which international bodies place on

direct interventions, limiting their scope and magnitude, thereby negatively affecting their ability to influence the combatant parties. The UN obligates decision makers to compromise among objectives and results in operations aimed toward satisfying the greatest number (Lounsbery, Pearson, and Talentino 2011, 238). Multilateral interventions were also found more likely to be neutral; and neutral interventions were more likely to be multilateral. Neutral interventions overall were largely unsuccessful in ending conflict or achieving victory over an adversary, with only a 44% success rate. Direct neutral interventions were overwhelmingly unsuccessful, only succeeding in 25% of cases. Committing troops while remaining neutral is costly and seemingly ineffective. These findings could have tremendous implications for current conflicts, such as in Syria, where third parties are interested in fighting an opposition group but not supporting the government. Another condition in which intervention was largely unsuccessful was division along ethnic/religious lines. These interventions were successful in only 41% of conflicts. All methods of intervention were negatively affected by ethnic/religious divisions, and direct intervention remained most effective at a 50% success rate. Additional political costs may be associated with these conflicts, as third parties may not wish to be perceived as supporting one ethnic/religious group over another and consequently supporting the marginalization a minority group. This could have potential consequences for maintaining post-conflict security and stability, as evidenced by the rise of ISIS due in part to the marginalization of Sunnis by the Shia government in Iraq (Weiss and Hassan 2015, 89-93).

These baseline findings serve as a starting point for the cost/benefit analysis for third parties when making decisions about intervention. Variations to the costs and benefits of individual intervention methods can then be made based on the specific conditions of the conflict. Overall for intervention, the costs of committing troops would be weighed against a historical 60% suc-

cess rate. Yet in conflicts over government, for instance, states could have the same benefit of 60% success rate with the reduced costs of indirect intervention. Decision making processes might center on the costs of going outside the procedural system of the UN in terms of international opinion against the benefit of sharing the political, fiscal, and physical costs of intervention with other nations. When conditions exist in a conflict which decrease the effectiveness of multilateral intervention, such as high intensity, decisions might be altered when the benefit of sharing the costs multilaterally no longer outweigh the costs of decreased likelihood of success. It is important to recognize that a condition which affects one method does not necessarily inversely affect the opposite method. Consequently, given a condition increased the effectiveness of indirect intervention does not suggest indirect intervention was more successful than direct intervention under that condition. Hence, the ultimate decision making analysis must reference which method of intervention was most effective and weigh the expected likelihood of success against the costs of implementing a given method.

Where there were enough cases to make a conclusion, direct intervention was generally more successful than indirect in high intensity, both ethnic/religious and non-ethnic/religious conflicts, medium or higher HDI countries, interventions supporting government, and one year or later after initiation of conflict. Success was nearly equal for direct and indirect interventions in minor intensity, conflicts over government, autocratic states, and at the onset of conflict. Success was nearly equal in minor intensity. Indirect was significantly more successful than direct intervention only in low HDI countries. Multilateral intervention was more successful than unilateral in minor intensity, conflict over territory, and at the onset of conflict. Multilateral and unilateral interventions were equally, or near equally successful in high intensity, conflict over gov-

ernment, ethnic/religious conflicts, low HDI countries, and when delayed one year or more. Unilateral was more successful only in autocratic states.

The most discernible limitation of this research was the impracticality of being able to account for every factor in a conflict which may contribute to its outcome given their inherent complexity and uniqueness. Indeed, a combination of the conditions examined in this study will be present in any conflict. The results here show only the individual effects of each condition, whereas in any conflict the effectiveness of a specific intervention method is going to be influenced by the combined effects of multiple conditions. It is not determined here whether these combined effects would approximate the simple average of each of the components, or have some more complicated mathematical relationship. Another limitation is that political actions by third-parties are not restricted to those examined here. Indirect actions such as humanitarian aid or officially stated diplomatic solidarity or condemnation may also have an influence on conflicts. Additionally, one must recognize that the findings expressed above do not prove the causality of outcomes in the conflicts examined, but merely patterns in the occurrence of successful outcomes in certain conditions. The interactions involved in these conflicts are all uniquely complex, as are the political relationships between third parties and the combatants. It cannot be determined from the information provided here that these particular conflicts resulted in the observed outcomes because of intervention or because of something else about the conflict. Intervention may have actually worsened the opportunity for a conflict to result in an outcome desirable to the third party. In many circumstances, a lack of intervention could have resulted in a more desirable outcome than taking action. This study only evaluated the relative success of observed interventions. Finally, this study was limited by the sample size of cases available, restricted by the boundaries of timeframe (post-Cold War) and threshold for what was considered war. As was

justified in Chapter 3, the dynamics of international politics differ in the post-Cold War era, and as such, interventions may have different goals and outcomes in this environment. This however sacrifices the statistical confidence associated with a larger sample size. Likewise, lower intensity conflicts, below the threshold for war adhered to by this study, may also involve different dynamics which affect the outcomes of interventions.

Future research can build on the knowledge gained from this study. There is no limit to the number of conditions which could be examined for their effect on interventions method and outcome. Furthermore, prospective studies could qualitatively investigate the details of these conflicts in order to gain a precise assessment of the political outcome beyond what is examined here. The U.S. led intervention in Afghanistan was considered successful for the purposes of this research because it resulted in the removal of the Taliban from control of the central government. The political state of affairs following this initial victory could be interpreted many ways, leaving to question whether the U.S. in fact achieved their desired outcome. The same question could be asked of many conflicts where military victory was decided but post-conflict conditions remain unstable and threaten stability. More research could further specify the details of these interventions regarding their strategy. Military intervention is a broad spectrum which could be limited to providing security for specific areas, air support only, special operations forces only, or full scale mobilization. An extensive project beyond the scale of this study but based on its premise which integrates these suggestions could provide comprehensive knowledge on the expected results of specific intervention strategies in particular situations. The decision on when and how to intervene will always be subordinate to the cost/benefit analysis on the part of the third party. The information from this thesis, however, could aid in that analysis as future conflicts arise.

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## APPENDIX: SAMPLE OF CONFLICT DATA

**Table A.1 Sample of Conflict Data**

1	Country	WarName	SideA	SideB	Start	End	Intervener
2	Afghanistan	Second Afghan Mujahideen Uprising	Afghanistan (Taleban)	UIFSA (Northern Alliance)	1997	2001	US,UK,FRA,RUS
3	Afghanistan	Second Afghan Mujahideen Uprising	Afghanistan	Mujahadin	1995	1996	RUS
4	Afghanistan	Second Afghan Mujahideen Uprising	Afghanistan	Mujahadin	1989	1992	US
5	Afghanistan	Second Afghan Mujahideen Uprising	Afghanistan (Taleban)	UIFSA (Northern Alliance)	1997	2001	RUS
6	Algeria	Algerian Islamic Front	Algeria	Islamic Front	1992	1999	FRA
7	Angola	Angolan War of the Cities	Angola	UNITA	1992	1994	US
8	Angola	Third Angolan	Angola	UNITA	1998	2002	MONUA (FRA, RUS)
9	Bosnia	Bosnian-Serb Rebellion	Bosnia	Bosnian Serbs	1992	1995	US
10	Burundi	Second Burundi	Burundi	Tutsi army	1993	1998	FRA
11	Chad	Fifth Chad	Chad	FUDC	2005	2006	FRA
12	Chad	Fourth Chad (Togoimi Revolt)	Chad	MDD & MDJT	1998	2000	FRA
13	Congo, Brazzaville	First Congo (Brazzaville)	Congo (Brazzaville)	FDU (Cobra militia)	1997	1997	FRA
14	Congo, Brazzaville	Second Congo (Brazzaville)	Congo (Brazzaville)	Ninjas and Cocoye militia	1998	1999	FRA
15	Cote d'Ivoire	Cote d'Ivoire Military	Cote d'Ivoire	MPCI, MPIGO, MJP	2002	2004	UNOCI (CHI, FRA, RUS)
16	Croatia	Croatia-Krajina War	Croatia	Krajinia Serbs	1995	1995	UNPROFOR (FRA, RUS, UK, US)
17	DR Congo	Second Congo	Democratic Republic of Congo	RCD, MLC, et al	1998	2002	MONUC (CHI, FRA, RUS, UK, US)
18	Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation	Ethiopia	Oromo Lib. Front	1999	1999	EU (Sanctions)
19	Georgia	Abkhazia Revolt	Georgia	Abkhazia	1993	1994	RUS
20	Liberia	First Liberian Civil War	Liberia	NPFL	1992	1996	UN (Sanctions)
21	Liberia	Second Liberian Civil War	Liberia	LURD & MODEL	2002	2003	UN (Sanctions)
22	Nepal	Nepal Maoists Insurgency	Nepal	CPN	2001	2006	UK
23	Pakistan	Waziristan	Pakistan	Waziri tribes	2004	2006	US
24	Philippine	Philippine-Moro	Philippines	MILF & ASG	2000	2006	US
25	Rwanda	Second Rwanda	Rwanda	Patriotic Front	1994	1994	UNAMIR (RUS, UK)
26	Rwanda	Second Rwanda	Rwanda	Patriotic Front	1994	1994	FRA
27	Sierra Leone	First Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone	RUF	1991	1996	US, UK
28	Sierra Leone	Second Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone	ARFC/RUF	1998	2000	UK
29	Somalia	Second Somalia	Somalia	Aideed Faction	1991	1997	US, FRA
30	Somalia	Third Somalia	Somalia	SCIC (UIC)	2006	2008	US
31	Sri Lanka	First Sri Lanka Tamil	Sri Lanka	Tamils	1983	2002	US
32	Sudan	Darfur	Sudan	SLA & JEM	2003	2006	UNAMIS (CHI, RUS, UK)
33	Tajikistan	Tajikistan	Tadzhikistan	United Tajik Opposition	1992	1997	RUS
34	Turkey	Second Turkish Kurds	Turkey	Kurds, PKK	1991	1999	US
35	Yugoslavia	Croatian Independence	Yugoslavia/Serbia	Croatia	1991	1992	UNPROFOR (FRA, RUS, UK, US)
36	Yugoslavia	Kosovo Independence	Yugoslavia	KLA	1998	1999	NATO

*Sources:* Högladh, Pettersson, and Themér 2011; Marshall 2014; Pettersson and Wallenstein 2015; Sarkees and Wayman 2010; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2016; UCDP Database 2008; UCDP Database 2015; United Nations Security Council 2016; Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2016; US Department of Treasury 2016; United Nations Development Programme 2015; United Nations Peacekeeping 2016.

**Table A.2 Sample of Conflict Data cont.**

1	Country	WarName	Intensity	Incompat	Polity	Ethnic	HDI	Timing	Supt Side	Method	Outcome
2	Afghanistan	Second Afghan Mujahideen Uprising	3813	Gov	AUT		0.297	Delay	B	UD	S
3	Afghanistan	Second Afghan Mujahideen Uprising	3100	Gov	AUT		0.297	Delay	A	UI	U
4	Afghanistan	Second Afghan Mujahideen Uprising	3302	Gov	AUT		0.297	Onset	B	UI	S
5	Afghanistan	Second Afghan Mujahideen Uprising	6396	Gov	AUT		0.297	Onset	B	UI	U
6	Algeria	Algerian Islamic Front	257	Gov	aut		0.574	Delay	A	UI	U
7	Angola	Angolan War of the Cities	2321	Gov	AUT	Y	0.39	Onset	B	UI	U
8	Angola	Third Angolan	1041	Gov	aut	Y	0.39	Onset		MD	U
9	Bosnia	Bosnian-Serb Rebellion	4989	Ter	SF	Y	0.71	Delay		MD	S
10	Burundi	Second Burundi	254	Gov	AUT	Y	0.295	Delay	A	UI	U
11	Chad	Fifth Chad	100	Gov	aut	Y	0.332	Onset	A	UI	S
12	Chad	Fourth Chad (Togoimi Revolt)	394	Gov	aut	Y	0.332	Delay	A	UI	S
13	Congo, Brazzaville	First Congo (Brazzaville)	10033	Gov	dem	Y	0.534	Onset	B	UI	S
14	Congo, Brazzaville	Second Congo (Brazzaville)	3272	Gov	aut	Y	0.534	Onset	A	UI	S
15	Cote d'Ivoire	Cote d'Ivoire Military	624	Gov	SF	Y	0.398	Onset	A	MD	S
16	Croatia	Croatia-Krajina War	858	Ter	aut	Y	0.67	Onset	A	MD	S
17	DR Congo	Second Congo	2953	Gov	SF	Y	0.329	Delay		MD	S
18	Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation	683	Ter	dem	Y	0.284	Onset		UI	U
19	Georgia	Abkhazia Revolt	1611	Ter	dem	Y	0.672	Onset	A	UI	U
20	Liberia	First Liberian Civil War	25-999	Gov	SF		0.359	Delay		MI	S
21	Liberia	Second Liberian Civil War	341	Gov	aut		0.359	Onset		MI	S
22	Nepal	Nepal Maoists Insurgency	429	Gov	DEM		0.451	Onset	A	UI	S
23	Pakistan	Waziristan	320	Gov	aut		0.444	Onset		UD	U
24	Philippine	Philippine-Moro	1427	Ter	DEM	Y	0.623	Onset	A	UI	U
25	Rwanda	Second Rwanda	1054	Gov	SF	Y	0.244	Onset	A	UI	U
26	Rwanda	Second Rwanda	1054	Gov	SF	Y	0.244	Onset		MD	U
27	Sierra Leone	First Sierra Leone	552	Gov	AUT		0.262	Onset	A	UI	S
28	Sierra Leone	Second Sierra Leone	2644	Gov	SF		0.262	Delay	A	MD	S
29	Somalia	Second Somalia	1154	Gov	SF	Y	NA	Delay		MD	U
30	Somalia	Third Somalia	547	Gov	SF		NA	Delay	A	UD	S
31	Sri Lanka	First Sri Lanka Tamil	1882	Ter	dem	Y	0.62	Delay	A	UI	U
32	Sudan	Darfur	161	Gov	AUT	Y	0.4	Delay		MD	U
33	Tajikistan	Tajikistan	3281	Gov	AUT		0.616	Onset	A	UD	S
34	Turkey	Second Turkish Kurds	304	Ter	DEM	Y	0.576	Onset	A	UI	U
35	Yugoslavia	Croatian Independence	3933	Ter	aut	Y	0.67	Delay		MD	U
36	Yugoslavia	Kosovo Independence	1235	Ter	AUT	Y	0.714	Delay	B	UD	S

*Sources:* Högladh, Pettersson, and Themnér 2011; Marshall 2014; Pettersson and Wallenstein 2015; Sarkees and Wayman 2010; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2016; UCDP Database 2008; UCDP Database 2015; United Nations Security Council 2016; Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2016; US Department of Treasury 2016; United Nations Development Programme 2015; United Nations Peacekeeping 2016.