Date of Award
Master of Arts (MA)
Dr. Robin Thompson
The study of the intelligence failure and strategic surprise that initiated the beginning of the Yom Kippur War has been an endeavor for many scholars since the hostilities ceased 40 years ago. This paper analyzes several articles that have attempted to find which party of the three mentioned in Dahl’s thesis of 2004, the Intelligence Community, policy maker, or deceiver, is responsible for Israel’s ill preparedness for the Arabs’ attack. Since those academics only had access to open source materials, the purpose of this research project is to discover if access to declassified documents found on the CIA’s website, as well as recently released testimonies from the Agranat Commission would have changed the views expressed by the authors in their articles. Using the quantitative methodology of correlation and regression analysis this paper found that declassified documents could have altered the theories of most of the scholars.
Kelly, Robert James, "Intelligence Failure and Strategic Surprise: Revisiting the Yom Kippur War" (2014). Master's Capstone Theses. 4.
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